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INTRODUCTION
The government needs money, for example, to save the Social Se-
curity system, improve our schools, and provide health care to those
too poor to afford it. The problem is that Americans are unwilling to
pay for the government they want. We hate taxes, always have, always
will.
So, how might we fund the government without raising taxes?
Debt has been the traditional answer. After years of federal budget
deficits and an ever-escalating federal debt burden, however, Ameri-
cans have become, at least for the moment, almost as attached to the
idea of a balanced budget as they are to tax cuts. The question now
becomes more difficult: how do we fund expensive but cherished old
government programs and, if possible, some modest but not cost-free
new programs while lowering taxes (or at least not raising them) and
keeping the budget balanced? One answer: the government could
find something valuable to sell.
The government has many assets: land, monuments, collectibles
(original documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitution, and a wide range of one-of-a-kind objects from Archie
Bunker's armchair to the Enola Gay), and other more esoteric forms
of property, like the broadcast waves. The asset with the greatest value
to the greatest number of potential buyers, however, is not among
those listed. That asset is the power to make laws. Generally speak-
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ing, our law prohibits government agents from selling for personal
gain that part of the government's law-making power that they con-
trol,' but our question here is different. Does and should our law al-
low the government to raise revenue to swell the public coffers by
promising to pass and keep in place certain laws? To make this ques-
tion more concrete, we ask you to consider the following example.
An industry, say the tobacco industry, wants a certain law passed.
It details the legal protection for which it is willing to pay. For exam-
ple, it drafts a law that includes some form of tort immunity for dam-
ages caused by its products and some restrictions on the FDA's ability
to regulate nicotine. Its offer is this: if Congress enacts the law and
promises to keep it in place for twenty-five years, the industry will pay
into the national treasury some amount of money, say $368 billion,
$68 billion due upon enactment and the rest due in annual install-
ments to be paid over the next twenty-five years.
Should Congress or any other legislature in this country make
such a deal? If a legislature does, should a court enforce that deal?
What about holding an auction to fund a tax cut? Entities and indi-
viduals could submit bids-bills they would like passed and the
I See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994) (criminalizing bribery of public officials). We say
"generally speaking" at the beginning of the sentence in the text because if "personal
gain" includes "getting elected," then our law provides some room for the exchange of
law-making authority for personal gain. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1976)
(holding that provisions limiting individual contributions to campaigns were constitu-
tional, despite First Amendment objections; that provisions limiting expenditures by
candidates on their own behalf violated the candidates' rights to freedom of speech;
that provisions limiting total expenditures in various campaigns were invalid; that pro-
visions limiting the amount which any individual could spend, independent from but
relative to the candidate, impermissibly abridged freedom of speech; that the report-
ing requirements under the Act were valid; and that the Federal Elections Commission
created by the Act violated the Appointments Clause, insofar as it had primary respon-
sibility for conducting civil litigation, rule-making authority, and the power to deter-
mine eligibility for funds and federal elective office); Pamela S. Karlan, Not by Money but
by Virtue Won? Vote Trafficking and the Voting Rights System, 80 VA. L. REv. 1455, 1460
(1994) (discussing how our law allows politicians to promise during a campaign to
support x or y legislation, in exchange for the votes of the citizenry needed to win of-
fice, while prohibiting those seeking election from offering money, as opposed to per-
formance, in exchange for citizen votes).
2 The deal crafted in the spring of 1997 by some state attorneys general and the
big tobacco companies (the so-called June 20 "settlement agreement") was at its core
such an offer, albeit one made-up to look like something else. Our view of the deal
brought us to the questions we raise in this Article, giving these questions an immedi-
acy that they otherwise would not have had. It is, however, not critical to accept our
characterization of what Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore and his colleagues
announced on June 20, 1997. We aim here only to clarify what we mean when speak-
ing of the government raising revenue by selling its law-making power.
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amount of money they are willing to pay to keep those laws in place
for the next twenty-five years. While many legal academics have ad-
dressed topics that bear on these matters, we have been unable to lo-
cate any discussion in the literature of entities or individuals buying
laws from the government! Perhaps this is because there has been no
reason to take the issue seriously in the past. The 1997 offer by the
tobacco industry changed that, and a consideration of the legitimacy
of such deals is a matter that now seems long overdue.
Tobacco aside, there is another reason to take up these questions
now: the rise of contracts that trade performance for favorable regu-
latory treatment or regulatory stability. Raising money is not the only
concern of government-protecting the general welfare of the people
and the nation is another. What about selling the power to make or
change a law (or regulation) in exchange for a promise by private par-
ties to do something in the public interest; Indeed, the proposed to-
bacco deals also included this kind of regulation-for-performance ex-
change: the tobacco companies would agree to certain restrictions on
their claimed First Amendment right to advertise (and would pay
money) in exchange for the legal protections they wanted written into
law and maintained for twenty-five years.
In the paradigmatic regulation-for-performance contract, the
regulated entity contractually promises the government that the entity
will provide or do something that is not otherwise clearly required by
extant law. In return, the government contractually promises the
regulated entity to maintain the regulatory regime set out in the con-
tract. If the government breaches its promise of regulatory stability, it
must pay contract damages. Consider, for example, the Department
of Interior's ("DOI") heavy reliance on habitat conservation agree-
3 The literature does include economic analyses of the efficiency of providing
compensation to private parties when the governor changes regulations. See MichaelJ.
Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 47, 87 (1977) (arguing that the implementation of transitional relief prevents ef-
ficient government policies and that people should make investments with the expec-
tation that political policies may change); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv. 509, 615-16 (1986) (arguing that since governmental
transitional relief is generally undesirable, relying on the market to address the effects
of changes in government policy is more efficient); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Op-
portunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV.
1129, 1131 (1996) (arguing that "for certain types of tax transitions, the efficient tran-
sition policy entails full transition relief in the form of guaranteed grandfathering").
The idea that the government might sell its law-making authority to raise revenue,
however, is absent from the literature. Because academics, unlike tobacco lawyers,
failed to understand the significance of regulatory contracts, the analysis of regulatory
contracts suffered and the underlying values at stake were obscured.
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ments as a means of implementing the Endangered Species Act.4 Un-
der the DOI's program, private landowners and regulators agree to a
plan for conservation and habitat protection of threatened or endan-
gered species on private land." In return for their willingness to un-
dertake contractual commitments to fulfill specified habitat conserva-
tion measures, private landowners receive a contractual promise from
the DOI to either forego imposing additional conservation require-
ments in the future or to pay compensatory damages should the DOI
or another branch of government do so. Should agencies make such
deals? If Congress decides to impose additional conservation re-
quirements, should courts order the government to pay damages to all
parties with a DOI contract?
Regulatory contracts, especially the regulation-for-performance
variety, are suddenly in vogue. The Supreme Court recently placed its
imprimatur of approval on such contracts in United States v. Winstar
6Corp. Winstar involved a deal between federal bank regulators and
certain solvent banks wherein the regulators allegedly promised to
maintain certain regulatory standards governing the calculation of re-
quired capital reserves. In return, the solvent banks agreed to merge
with insolvent banks that otherwise would have immediately fallen
into federal receivership.7 Subsequently, Congress responded to the
crisis in the savings and loan industry by passing the Financial Institu-
tion Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA"), which in-
cluded provisions on calculating required capital reserves that would
have disallowed some of the accounting methods allegedly guaranteed
by the regulatory contracts.s
In Winstar, the Supreme Court held that the more stringent capi-
4 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
5 DOI's habitat conservation program is outlined in the Habitat Conservation Plan
Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1998). See also Donald C. Baur &
Karen L. Donovan, The No Surprises Policy: Contracts 101 Meets the Endangered Species Act,
27 ENvrL. L. 767 (1997) (arguing that the No Surprises program works to the benefit
of both endangered species and landowners); Amy C. Deny, No Surprises AfterWinstar:
Contractual Certainty and Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act,
17 VA. ENVrL. LJ. 357 (1998) (noting the Supreme Court's willingness to balance gov-
ernment's role as a private contractor and sovereign power in favor of its contracting
responsibilities); Eric Fisher, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species
Act: No Surprises & the Quest for Certainty, 67 U. CoLO. L. REv. 371, 391-97 (1996) (dis-
cussing the problems that may arise in trying to enforce a contractual agreement be-
tween the government and private parties).
6 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
7 See id. at 847.
" 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t) (1994) (stating that "the Bank Board... encourag[ed]
healthy thrifts ... to take over ailing institutions in a series of 'supervisory mergers'").
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tal reserve requirements included in FIRREA breached the regulatory
contract and that the government was therefore liable for damages.9
In so holding, the majority indicated that courts should interpret and
enforce almost all regulatory contracts under standard contract law
rules. ° As a general matter, regulatory contracts enjoy the same legal
status as ordinary, nonregulatory contracts employed to constrain un-
certainty in the private marketplace. The implicit premise of the Win-
star plurality and concurring opinions is that regulatory contracts are
no more normatively problematic-indeed, are as presumptively so-
cially beneficial-as the ordinary, nonregulatory contracts that are the
subject of standard contract law.
For its part, the Clinton Administration has been strongly at-
tracted to regulatory contracts as a means of addressing contentious
regulatory issues. While the President expressed some concerns about
the details of theJune 20 tobacco deal, his federal budget plan antici-
pated huge tobacco company payments but included no proposed to-
bacco tax from which such payments might come." It is reasonable to
conclude that he was receptive, if not committed, to a deal that would
call for the industry to make voluntary, i.e., contractual, payments in
exchange for a law providing regulatory relief.12 As for trading the
power to regulate for concessions above those required by law (in-
9 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 910 (holding that the United States is liable for breach of
contract).
10 See id. at 870-71 (noting the propriety of applying ordinary contract principles to
regulatory contracts).
1 See One Budget: Many Interpreters, L.AL TIMES, Feb. 18, 1998, at B6 ("The new
spending [in President Clinton's proposed budget] is to be offset ... by a federal set-
tlement with the tobacco industry that may or may not include a new tax on tobacco
..... "); David Perlman, Science Spending War on the Horizon: tunds Clinton Stated Not Yet
Available, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 13, 1998, at A2 (reporting that the President's budget pro-
posed spending money that would come from tobacco companies but did not say
whether the money would be realized through what Albert Teich, Director of Science
and Policy, American Association of Advancement of Science, characterizes as "ciga-
rette taxes, penalties on tobacco companies, voluntary payments or some combination
of the three").
12 See, e.g., Clinton Urges Damage Cap in Tobacco Bilk Move an Effort to Get Firnns Back to
Bargaining Table, DALLAS MORNING NEws, June 20, 1998, at IF (discussing Clinton's
endorsement of liability limits for tobacco companies, which the President hoped will
lure cigarette makers back to the bargaining table to resurrect tobacco legislation);
Clinton Wants Tobacco Bill That Caps Damage Payments, DALLAS MORNING NEwS, June 22,
1998, at 6D (same); Brian McGrory, Democrats Fuming over Clinton, Tobacco, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 7, 1998, at A8 (noting that Democrats were angry over Clinton's align-
ment with Republican tobacco legislation); Philip Morris Chairman Sends Letter to Stock-
holders on Senate Tobacco Bill; Bus. WIRE, Apr. 20, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis library,
BWIRE File (noting that the Clinton Administration closely monitored the June 20
settlement agreement).
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stead of for money), the DOI contracts discussed above are a center-
piece of the Clinton Administration's "reinvention" of environmental
regulation.1
3
Congress also seems open to the idea of raising money through
selling law-making authority and has been generally supportive of
regulatory contracts. The Senate responded to the tobacco industry's
June 20 offer to pay $368 billion over twenty-five years in exchange for
Congress's promise to limit the industry's exposure to the legal proc-
ess and adopt various procedural obstacles to the regulation of nico-
tine with a counter-offer, the McCain bill.1 4 Under the McCain bill,
"participating" tobacco companies would promise to pay $514 billion
to the federal and state governments and to refrain from certain
forms of advertising in exchange for the government's passage and
maintenance of a law providing those companies and their agents
some protection from lawsuits and from FDA regulation, albeit much
less than the industry's offer had contemplated. 5 More money for less
law was an offer the industry could and did refuse.
The tobacco industry's gambit did not fail because Congress re-
fused to trade its law-making authority for money. Rather, it failed, at
13 The Clinton Administration's Project XL Initiative in which companies contract
for exemptions from some regulatory requirements in return for their commitment to
go "beyond compliance" as to other regulatory requirements, represents another vari-
ety of regulatory contract. For discussions of Project XL, seeRena I. Steinzor, Reinvent-
ing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Contro 22
HAItV. ENVrL L. REv. 103, 104 (1998) (analyzing experiments in reinventing the sys-
tem that controls pollution through the encouragement of industry self-regulation as
an alternative to traditional rules).
14 National Tobacco Policy and Youth Smoking Reduction Act, S. 1415, 105th
Cong. (1998).
Both the McCain bill and the legislation embedded in the June 20 agreement
gave tobacco companies a choice: contract with the government (agree to give a and b
for x and y) or the government will regulate the companies (companies give a, and in-
dependent of the government's receipt of a, the government gives y, which it may take
away when it chooses). See infra note 76 (discussing provisions of both deals). The to-
bacco companies that drafted theJune 20 deal devised this structure in order to coerce
non-signing tobacco companies to either sign similar deals or face government fines
and receive less favorable regulatory treatment-not much of a choice. The tobacco
companies that devised this headlock nearly found themselves caught in its grip when
the Senate Finance Committee changed the terms of the proposed contracts but kept
the coercive take-it-or-suffer device. They escaped by running an expensive and suc-
cessful lobbying drive to kill the McCain bill. The companies' lobbying to kill the legis-
lation helped mask the fact that the McCain bill, like its predecessor, theJune 20 "set-
tlement agreement," contemplated a contractual relationship, however coerced,
between the government and big tobacco. Given the Hobbesian choice built into
these bills, it is easy to understand why the tobacco companies could notjust walk away
from the congressional contract negotiations that they had begun.
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least for the time being, because the parties could not agree on
terms. Perhaps another industry (with a better public image than to-
bacco) will have better luck.7 Congress may have proved itself a diffi-
cult bargaining partner, but it has also demonstrated its willingness to
negotiate. Before Congress goes any further down this path or other
government entities decide they can bargain their law-making author-
ity for money or other goods, we, as a nation, should consider the wis-
dom of such horse-trading. The tobacco deals spawned a lively na-
tional debate about public health, the dangers of nicotine, the FDA's
power to regulate, the industry's right to advertise, the size of attor-
neys' fees, and the regressive nature of a tobacco consumption tax.'
That debate did not include, however, a discussion of whether the
government should trade its law-making authority for money. It is
now time for that discussion to begin. To all those inclined to mini-
mize this problem by pointing out that as a practical matter law-
making is always a market commodity, we answer that not everything
that is, should be. The existence of black and grey markets does not
necessarily mean it would be a good idea to create a white one. We
believe it is not.
16 In September of 1999, the Justice Department announced a major lawsuit
against big tobacco. See Marc Lacey, Tobacco Industry Accused of Fraud in Lawsuit by U.S.,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 23, 1999, at Al (reporting on the Justice Department's civil lawsuit
against cigarette companies). If that lawsuit settles, as most lawsuits do, we may see
once again a settlement contract that calls for the passage of legislation in exchange
for industry payments although we have little doubt that once again the legislation
would be characterized as a "give" by tobacco and not a "give" to tobacco, which we be-
lieve it would actually turn out to be.
17 The move by governments to sue industries over the production of dangerous
products continues. See generally Barry Meier & Richard A. Oppen, Jr., States' Big Suits
Against Industry Bing Battle on Contingency Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999, at Al (report-
ing on the debate over the enormous legal fees that accrue in lawsuits against large
companies). In settling those lawsuits, industries and governments will have many op-
portunities to follow the legislation-for-money scenario developed by the tobacco in-
dustry in 1997. The buying of legislation through settlement contracts may yet turn
out to be the wave of the future.
is While it is true that the effects of the McCain bill on smokers would have been
substantially the same as the effects of a tax on tobacco, it is also true that the bill did
not call for a tobacco tax. The bill called for "participating tobacco companies" to pay
annual fees to the federal government and required those companies to make "good
faith" efforts to see to it that the complete costs of those fees would be passed on to the
consumer. S. 1415 §§ 402, 404. This procedure demonstrates the essentially contrac-
tual nature of the legislation.
1999]
480 UN!VERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:473
I. A TOPOLOGY OF REGULATORY CONTRACTS
A. DistinguishingRegulatory Contracts from Other Means of Controlling
Present and Future Political Outcomes
As a preliminary matter, we need to refine the concept of a "regu-
latory contract" Regulatory contracts, as we will use the term, are
contracts between government entities and private actors subject to,
or potentially subject to, regulation in which the government prom-
ises to maintain (or to enact and maintain) a specified regulatory re-
gime in exchange for either money or performance by the private
party. Before moving on, however, the term "government entities"
deserves some more attention. 19
By specifying that government entities, as opposed to government
agents, enter regulatory contracts, we mean to distinguish these con-
tracts from bribes-money or services promised to an individual gov-
ernment agent in exchange for the agent's promise to use her official
position to maintain or enact a specified regulatory regime. Offering
or accepting a bribe is a crime, as is offering or accepting something
of value for the past performance of an official duty, known as an ille-
gal gratuity. Regulatory contracts, as we have defined them, exclude
bribes and illegal gratuities.
Regulatory contracts may be conceived as a response to the com-
mitment dilemma in politics. The essence of the commitment di-
lemma is that, although an interest group or constituency can invest
19 The contracting government entity may be either an executive agency or the
legislature. Where the contracting government entity is a regulatory agency, the
agency may purport to bind only itself in its future exercise of regulatory authority of
matters (then) within the agency's lawful discretion, or it may purport to bind itself
and the rest of the government, including the legislature. In the limited version, the
agency commits only that it will not exercise its discretion to alter the regulatory
treatment of the industry. In the more expansive version, the agency is committing
not only that it will not exercise its discretion to alter the regulatory treatment of the
industry but also that the legislature will not mandate changes in the agency's regula-
tory treatment. The analysis we present in this paper is designed to cover both versions
of agency regulatory contracts as well as regulatory contracts enacted as law by legisla-
tures. We believe that the normative concerns raised by agency contracts, particularly
the expansive type, are somewhat greater than those raised by legislative contracts, and
we attend to the greater problems posed by agency contracts throughout this Article.
20 Which is not to say that we see no relationship between the two phenomena.
While it is possible that regulatory contracts would capture for the government some
of the wealth now being diverted to private pockets for government favors, it is also
possible that regulatory contracts will become so valuable to private parties that bribes
and illegal gratuities increase to ensure that individual government agents support
these contracts.
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or work hard to secure favorable legislation or regulation, the invest-
ment is rendered meaningless if the legislation or regulation can read-
ily be revised or revoked the next day. Successful or dominant players
in the political process will seek not just to dictate but to stabilize or
freeze political outcomes. There are other means of stabilizing politi-
cal outcomes, but regulatory contracts, while not foolproof, offer
some distinct advantages over the alternatives. Regulatory contracts
aside, players in the political process have a wide range of alternatives
available to assist them in dictating political outcomes and ensuring
that those outcomes stay in place. These alternatives run the gamut
from criminal to constitutionally protected conduct including, at one
end of the spectrum, bribes, illegal gratuities, and possibly blackmail
and, at the other end of the spectrum, the First Amendment right to
speak and convince others that one's position is correct, and therefore
should be and remain the law.
2'
Given our current system of financing elections, withholding and
reallocating campaign contributions are among the most commonly
used means of securing and maintaining political outcomes. Al-
though potentially effective in controlling political outcomes, these
methods have serious problems associated with them. First, whatever
the contributions are buying, whether it be access (normatively trou-
bling to the public but legal) or some promise to perform (norma-
tively troubling and criminal), the parties to the deal have an interest
in keeping the details of the exchange vague in order to avoid public
condemnation or criminal sanction as well as to preserve the benefits
of the deal. Vague promises, however, are simply not as valuable as
concrete and specific ones.
Second, whether vague or specific, these promises for access (le-
gal) or votes (illegal) are not enforceable, leaving room for opportun-
21 SeeBuckley v.Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976):
Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and spending of
money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some in-
volve a combination of the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the
dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself
to introduce a non speech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny re-
quired by the First Amendment.
Id.; see also Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court and Free Speech: Love and a Question, 42 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 789, 795-97 (1998) (disagreeing with the Buckley Court's aggressive use of
the First Amendment to frustrate Congressional efforts to deal with the distorting role
of wealth in the democratic process); Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption,
Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. LJ. 45, 47 (1997) (arguing that "the govern-
ment interest in guarding against corruption is insufficient to justify the burdens that
most campaign finance regulations place on free speech").
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ism by politicians: get paid now, vote how one wants later. Opportun-
ism of that sort is, of course, largely controlled by the fact that politi-
cians generally will run again and thus are repeat players (as are the
contributing parties) with an interest in maintaining a reputation for
keeping their word. The fact that government decisions are almost
always the product of collective action, however, makes it more diffi-
cult to control opportunism than the "repeat player" story might lead
one to believe. Monitoring a "bought" politician, devoted to winning
over the necessary votes to pass a measure, is no simple matter, par-
ticularly when collegial ties between elected officials and party loyal-
ties may encourage public officeholders to cooperate in withholding
accurate information on behind-the-scenes maneuvering of political
matters.
Third, buyers have a collective action problem. To the extent that
there is competition among similarly well-off groups for political sup-
port, each has an interest in paying a "bought" politician to renege on
a previous promise (implicit or explicit) that was made to a competi-
tor. None of this is to say campaign contributions are not worth the
candle; it is to say that they are not always reliable as a means of either
securing or maintaining a particular political outcome.
As to "speaking out," this method might prove quite effective at
influencing outcomes, although there is always the chance that ex-
pensive ads will backfire. The bigger problem, however, is that
"speaking out" is a terrible method of achieving stability. Talk gener-
ates talk, which is in itself destabilizing. Thus, while "speaking out"
might prop up a stable regime that is under siege, it seems a singularly
poor strategy for ensuring stability in the first instance.
To enhance the value of buying (access or promises to perform)
from individual government actors (and thus increase the price each
actor can command), buyers and government actors might jointly
support institutional rules that increase the control that individual
government actors wield over content and that also impede legislative
or regulatory change.n For example, as public choice scholars have
See Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice and the Legal Academy, 86 GEO. L.J. 1075,
1087-88 (1998) (reviewing JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOs, AND GOVERNANCE:
USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997)) (arguing that much of the
"industrial organization" of Congress, as well as the reliance on administrative agen-
cies, is designed to ensure the durability of political deals by making the passage of
new legislation or the implementation of real regulatory reform difficult); Matthew D.
McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements
and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 U. VA. L. REV. 431, 481 (1989) (discussing how
constraints placed on agencies provide politicians with warning of agency deviations
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noted, the committee system in Congress for the passage of legislation
provides committee chairmen with enormous power to block even
popular legislative proposals. Because changes in the identity of
chairmen are relatively rare, normally occurring only when an elec-
tion brings a new political party to power, the committee system tends
to stabilize political outcomes. Moreover, even in the absence of any
special means to stabilize political outcomes, natural institutional iner-
tia can also be counted on to achieve some degree of stability.
Finally, in our political system, constitutional amendments can
dictate and stabilize political outcomes. The Constitution removes
certain issues from ordinary politics, but current constitutional provi-
sions and jurisprudence provide industries with little protection
against regulatory change, at least in the absence of a pre-existing
regulatory contract.J Additionally, industries would face a virtually
impossible task were they to seek passage of protective constitutional
amendments.
Regulatory contracts stabilize political outcomes by attaching a
significant cost to regulatory change.24 The mere fact that political
and how structure and process impose delay, affording ample time for politicians to
intervene before an agency can present them with a fait accompli).
23 Recent interpretations of the Contract Clause provide private entities that have
been able to secure regulatory contracts from state or local governments with constitu-
tional protection from uncompensated changes in regulatory policy, marking a depar-
ture from the Supreme Court's post-New Deal approach to economic regulation. See
discussion infra Part I.B.
24 Some commentators have argued that a governmental guarantee of compensa-
tion for regulatory change actually will facilitate, rather than impede, regulatory
change. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the TakingsJurisprudenc 90
MICH. L. REv. 1892, 1955 (1992) (arguing that providing compensation to those af-
fected by proposed legislation makes the enactment of such legislation more likely).
The premise of this argument is that, without compensation, private actors that are
likely to be disadvantaged by regulatory change will fight reform proposals. By con-
trast, if such groups are assured compensation, they will be indifferent to reform.
Hence, more regulatory change will occur under a compensation regime than under a
no-compensation regime.
We are unpersuaded by this argument. We believe that with a guarantee of com-
pensation there will be situations in which an interest group that benefits from a regu-
latory contract will lack the political might to defeat reform proposals, but in which the
legislature will be unwilling to incur substantial liability in exchange for regulatory re-
form. As we explain below, the cost of compensating the private beneficiaries of regu-
latory contracts will tend to be large because such beneficiaries have no incentive what-
soever to operate their businesses and make their investments in a way that would
minimize the cost to them of regulatory change. See infra Part V.A. In fact, the esti-
mated costs of compensating the thrifts for the costs of regulatory change run in the
billions of dollars. See Michael Grunwald, Lawsuit Surge May Cost U.S. Billions; 125
Claims Allege Breach of Contrac, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1998, at Al (reviewing thrift and
other cases brought against the United States in the wake of Winstar and quoting Dep-
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players consummate regulatory contracts suggests that the contracts
offer certain advantages over the alternative means of stabilizing po-
litical outcomes. One obvious advantage is that the government's
promise to perform can be made explicit and specific without running
afoul of extant criminal law or risking the public opprobrium that at-
taches to explicit promises of "access."2s The explicit and specific na-
ture of the government promises that can be obtained in regulatory
contracts is valuable wholly apart from whether the contracts are en-
forceable in court. When the government's promise is specific and a
matter of record, the non-monetary costs to the government of break-
ing its word are increased. The more obvious it is that a promise was
made and broken (functions of the explicitness and specificity of the
bargain), the greater the reputational effects of reneging on the
deal.
2 6
uty Assistant Attorney General Stuart Schiffer as stating "[t] his is the largest family of
cases we've ever had, and I've never seen dollars like this at stake.... The money is so
huge, you get kind of numb.... Whenever I read about the budget surplus, I just
think: Here it is"); Michael Grunwald, Thrift Wins $908 Million from U.S. in Dispute from
S&L Crisis, WASH. Posr, Apr. 10, 1999, at A6 ("A judge ruled today that the federal
government must pay a California thrift more than $908 million for reneging on fi-
nancial promises during the savings-and-loan crisis, a ruling that could herald the be-
ginning of a second taxpayer-funded bonanza for the industry."). In times (such as
our own) where new taxes are regarded as political anathema, in order to compensate
for regulatory change, legislators would need to seize the money from some estab-
lished program (benefiting some established interest group or constituency), and do-
ing so would invariably come at great political cost. We believe that legislators gener-
ally will wish to avoid such politically fraught situations by ignoring or downplaying the
need for regulatory reform for as long as possible.
Grandfather clauses, in contrast to compensation payments, may well facilitate the
passage of reform legislation. When the legislature grandfathers current beneficiaries
of a certain regulatory regime from new regulations, it reduces or eliminates the oppo-
sition of those beneficiaries without extracting money from some other interest group
and entailing associated political costs. The prevalence of grandfather clauses in legis-
lation establishing new regulatory regimes attests to their political appeal. See Kaplow,
supra note 3, at 584 ("Grandfather provisions... are commonly used to mitigate the
immediate impact of policy changes."). The principal problem with grandfather
clauses, however, is that in many contexts they may dramatically limit the reach of
regulatory reform and its potential societal benefits. For other critiques of grandfather
clauses on efficiency and distributive justice grounds, see Peter Huber, The Old-New
Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1075 (1983) (arguing that grandfather-
ing itself creates perverse incentives that increase aggregate threats to public health).
That is not to say that regulatory contracts might not themselves engender pub-
lic condemnation. However, at least up to this point, regulatory contracts have re-
ceived little direct public attention. For that reason, as well as others, such as the nor-
mative legitimacy conveyed by the concept of "contract" itself, these contracts have
largely escaped the normative taint that might otherwise attach to them. We return to
the "transparency" questions raised by regulatory contracts later. See infra Part II.A
(discussing the virtues of transparency).
26 Of course, the reputational effects of reneging on a bribe (by definition a sur-
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Another advantage is that, to the extent that courts treat these
contracts as valid, legislatures or agencies cannot unilaterally annul
them. None of the other alternatives for dictating or maintaining po-
litical change can similarly be fine-tuned, be open to public view, and
be enforced in court. For these reasons, regulatory contracts are su-
perior to other means of stabilizing political change.
Regulatory contracts, however, are not foolproof. For one thing,
sometimes political officials will choose political change even though
it means the government would be seen as breaking a promise and a
court might award sizeable contract damages. As for the private con-
tracting party, it might not see damages as the equivalent of the con-
tracted-for performance. There are many reasons why that might be
true. First, the process of seeking and collecting damages is expen-
sive, even in the absence of protracted litigation. Second, some of the
damages occasioned by regulatory change may be impossible to quan-
tify or prove, although the private party may well perceive those dam-
ages to be real. Third, the private party may fear a domino effect:
one change in a regulatory regime might beget other changes.
Even if there were reasons to assume that private parties would see
the right to receive damages as the equivalent of the promised per-
formance, the "right" to such damages upon breach of a regulatory
contract is highly uncertain. Contract damages are only available to
the extent that the courts treat these contracts as valid, and, to put it
mildly, the courts have not been consistent in this regard over time.
Even when private actors enter into a regulatory contract with the full
expectation that current judicial doctrine would support its enforce-
ability, they assume the risk that the doctrine (and the underlying atti-
tudes and composition of the courts) will have changed by the time
they need to enforce the contract. Moreover, because of the unique
power that governments wield, a private actor might find that in cer-
tain circumstances it is unwise even to threaten the enforcement of a
regulatory contract because the government might retaliate against
the actor in any number of ways.
B. The Supreme Court and Regulatory Contracts
Over the many years in which the Supreme Court has struggled
with the enforcement of what we call regulatory contracts and the
questions about the inalienability of sovereignty that such contracts
raise, two approaches to protecting the sovereignty of government
reptitiously made promise) are not just quantitatively different, they are qualitatively
different as well.
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have emerged: one procedural, the other substantive. The first is
more or less coherent; 7 the other is not. In recent years, both meth-
ods have been all but abandoned. Here, we provide a brief overview
of the Supreme Court's various approaches to this subject.
Early in its history, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Mar-
shall enforced regulatory contracts with a vengeance.28  The Court
seemed unconcerned about the particular aspect of sovereignty that
the contract ceded or the corruptness of the circumstances that sur-
rounded the contract's formation. For the most part, the inviolabil-
27 But see, e.g.,James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the Federal Contract
Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against the State, 31 BuFF. L.
REV. 381, 437-45 (1982) (describing the Court's Contract Clause jurisprudence as fun-
damentally incoherent without distinguishing the procedural route's inherent, if
somewhat unrealized, coherence from the substantive route's ipsi dixit nature).
28 See Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts
Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 670-72 (1988) (describing the Marshall Court's re-
sponse to legislative attempts to avoid contractual commitments and labeling this the
Supremacy of Contract era).
Marshall wrote three opinions for the Court in response to legislative attempts to
escape obligations undertaken by predecessors. In all three, the Court invalidated the
subsequent legislative action and upheld the contract rights of the legislature's con-
tract partner. SeeTrustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819) (finding unconstitutional a state act altering Dartmouth College's charter by
declaring it a public corporation); NewJersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812)
(holding unconstitutional an act of the New Jersey legislature which would have
stripped tax-exempt status from a plot of land); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87
(1810) (declaring that a legislature cannot void its past contracts, including grants of
land, by passing new legislation).
In Fletcher, Marshall intimated that the legislature might be disabled from undo-
ing the contracts of its predecessors even without an express constitutional restriction.
First, he asserted that legislation presuming to annul contract rights against the gov-
ernment "if legitimate, is rendered so by a power applicable to the case of every indi-
vidual in the community." Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135. Then, several para-
graphs later, he concluded that "[t]he validity of this rescinding act, then, might well
be doubted, were Georgia a single sovereign power." Id. at 136. By the time the Court
decided Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Marshall had concluded that only the
Constitution, and not independently derived natural law principles, prohibited the
legislature from altering the college's charter. See Sterk, supra note 28, at n.68.
3 In Fletcher, the Court stated:
It would be indecent, in the extreme, upon a private contract, between
two individuals, to enter into an inquiry respecting the corruption of the
sovereign power of a state. If the title be plainly deduced from a legisla-
tive act, which the legislature might constitutionally pass, if the act be
clothed with all the requisite forms of a law, a court, sitting as a court of
law, cannot sustain a suit brought by one individual against another
founded on the allegation that the act is a nullity, in consequence of the
impure motives which influenced certain members of the legislature
which passed the law.
Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 131.
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ity of legislatively made contracts remained intact until after the Civil
War. During the Taney era, however, signs of Supreme Court dissatis-
faction with the supremacy of the contract model began to surface!'
What is most interesting about the first two cases before the Taney
Court to break with ChiefJustice Marshall's approach is that the first
case marks the start of the procedural approach to protecting sover-
eignty and the second case marks the start of the substantive ap-
proach.
The first case was Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of
the Warren Bridge, decided in 1837.32 Massachusetts had granted a
charter to a private company to construct a bridge (the Charles River
Bridge) over the Charles River and to collect tolls for forty years. Be-
fore the forty years came to an end, the legislature granted another
company a charter to build a bridge over the Charles River (the War-
ren Bridge), provided that as soon as construction expenses were re-
covered, and in any event in no later than six years, travel over the
bridge would be free.33 The Charles River Bridge proprietors argued
that the Warren Bridge legislation violated their contract.! ChiefJus-
tice Taney rejected this claim, holding that their contract did not ex-
plicitly grant them an exclusive right.O This holding's significance
must be assessed in light of Justice Story's review of the record in his
dissent, which shows that there was evidence that the intention of the
parties was to grant just such an exclusive right!s6 ChiefJustice Taney
31 The dissent in FRetcherstated:
As to the idea, that the grants of a legislature may be void because the legisla-
ture are corrupt, it appears to me to be subject to insuperable difficulties.
The acts of the supreme power of a country must be considered pure for the
same reason that all sovereign acts must be considered just; because there is
no power that can declare them otherwise. The absurdity in this case would
have been strikingly perceived, could the party who passed the act of cession
have got again into power, and declared themselves pure, and the intermedi-
ate legislature corrupt.
I& at 144.
32 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
See id. at 537 (finding that the charter provided that the Warren Bridge "was to
be surrendered to the state" as soon as the expenses of building and supporting it were
reimbursed but that the period was not to exceed six years from the time the company
commenced receiving tolls).
s4 See i&/ (stating that the plaintiffs charged "that the act for the erection of the
Warren Bridge impaired the obligation of the contract between the commonwealth
and the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge").
See i& at 548-49 ("This is the whole grant. There is no exclusive privilege given
to [the plaintiffs] over the waters of the Charles river....").
See id. at 614-17 (Story, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the grant carried with it an
exclusive franchise to a reasonable distance on the river").
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wrote: "[I] n charters of this description, no rights are taken from the
public, or given to the corporation, beyond those which the words of
the charter, by their natural and proper construction, purport to con-
vey. "37 Thus, what came to be known as the "unmistakability" doctrine
was born-a doctrine that stood more or less unchallenged for 150
years until it was gutted by the Supreme Court in Winstar.ss
The second of these cases, West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, decided in
1848, held that the government could not contract away its eminent
domain power.3 9 Vermont had given the West River Bridge Company
an exclusive franchise to collect tolls for crossing the West River.40 As
the demand for bridges increased, Vermont passed legislation provid-
ing for the revocation of such franchise rights to permit the building
of public bridges.41
[I] nto all contracts, whether made between States and individuals or be-
tween individuals only, there enter conditions, which arise not out of the
literal terms of the contract itself.... [T]hey are always presumed, and
must be presumed, to be known and recognized by all .... Such a con-
dition is the right of eminent domain.4
This approach, which treats the inalienable aspects of sovereignty
as self-evident, echoes through all the later decisions in this line of
cases-collectively referred to as the "reserved powers" cases.4 3 De-
spite the seemingly arbitrary nature of designating some powers of
government as too essential to be traded away without any serious at-
tempt to explain why these powers deserved such special treatment,
the substantive approach to protecting sovereignty took off in earnest
after the Civil War.
Fueled undoubtedly by the Court's mistrust of Reconstruction
governments, what we will call the Sovereignty Century-the period
from the late 1870s to the late 1970s-took off with a bang with three
37 Id. at 549.
See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872-87 (1996) (plurality opin-
ion) (discussing the origins of the unmistakability doctrine and why it should not be
expanded).
39 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 535-36 (1848) (considering a challenge against the state's
attempt to revoke West River Bridge Company's exclusive right to construct a bridge
over the West River).
40 See id. at 530 (describing West River Bridge Company's arrangement with Ver-
mont).
41 See id. at 513-14 (discussing the legislative history of the exclusive franchise given
to West River Bridge Company and its subsequent withdrawal).
42 Id. at532.
43 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 874-75 (reviewing the "reserved powers" doctrine and the
cases that gave rise to it).
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decisions issued in a three-year period. In each of these cases, the
Court refused to enforce regulatory contracts on the ground that the
contracts purported to bargain away that which could not be bar-
gained away-core aspects of sovereignty.u While some regulatory
contracts managed to escape both the procedural and substantive nets
cast wide by the Supreme Court during the Sovereignty Century, the
chance that damages would be awarded against the government for
breaching a regulatory contract became slimmer and slimmer as the
Century wore on.
By the 1940s it seemed that no regulatory contract was safe from
the sweep of the reserved powers doctrine, the substantive side of
Skepticism about the legitimacy and integrity of Reconstruction governments
undoubtedly made it easier for the Court to countenance legislation passed by post-
Reconstruction state governments abrogating Reconstruction contracts. That is not to
say, however, that suspicion of Reconstruction governments by itself explains the dawn
of what we are calling the Sovereignty Century. In a fascinating article entitled The
Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought Herbert Hovenkamp explains that the
demise of ChiefJustice Marshall's treatment of government contracts as nearly invio-
late and the near simultaneous emergence of substantive due process, particularly the
ascension of the "right" to contract, were twin developments both linked to a shift in
economic theory from mercantilism to laissez-faire economics. Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Classical Corporation in American Legal Though, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1601-04 (1988)
(discussing the development and decline of classical corporate theory in America). In
a mercantilist regime, governmental grants of vested rights are seen as essential to
economic development; under laissez-faire market theory, the state ideally grants little
or nothing but is dedicated to protecting the right to bargain and the pursuit of eco-
nomic self-interest. The shift from mercantilism to laissez-faire economics explains
what might otherwise appear contradictory the demise of the Contract Clause and the
emergence of the right to contract as a fundamental constitutional right. Hovenk-
amp's article ends with a description of the "post-classical" corporation, a highly regu-
lated entity that little resembles either its mercantilist ancestor, the "pre-classical cor-
poration," or its "classical" parent, of which, Hovenkamp claims, little remained after
the New Deal. Id. at 1688-89. Hovenkamp was writing, however, pre-Winstar. After
Winstar, the post-classical corporation resembles its mercantilist ancestor a good deal
more than it did when Hovenkamp examined it.
See, e.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942)
(including for the first time the power to modify debt obligations in the pantheon of
powers essential to sovereignty). Prior to this case, powers connected to the state's fi-
nancial obligations had been largely exempted from the essential list, which is not to
say that the explanation of which powers were not essential to sovereignty was any
more illuminating than the explanation of which powers were. For example, in Stone
v. Mississippi ChiefJustice Waite stated:
While taxation is in general necessary for the support of government, it is not
part of the government itself. Government was not organized for the pur-
poses of taxation, but taxation may be necessary for the purposes of govern-
ment. As such, taxation becomes an incident to the exercise of the legitimate
functions of government, but nothing more.
101 U.S. 814, 820 (1879).
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sovereignty protection. While the procedural side remained as extant
doctrine, there was little need to rely on it because of the triumph of
substantive protection. In the last part of the Sovereignty Century,
from the early 1940s to the late 1970s, when protection for sovereignty
had reached its zenith, there was virtually no chance that a court
would enforce a regulatory contract in the face of a later legislative act
that would effectively cancel the promise.
In 1977, with the decision in United States Trust Co. v. Newjersey, the
Sovereignty Century ended.46 The Supreme Court held that New Jer-
sey47 was liable to the bondholders because it enacted legislation
which violated the State's promise not to use revenues pledged as se-
curity for bonds in order to finance new railroad projects.48 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the Court, expressed doubt about the coher-
ence of the substantive side of sovereignty protection, calling the ef-
fort to sort the government's powers into the saleable and the inalien-
able "formalistic."49 He suggested that the exercise therefore should
not be determinative of judicial decisions regarding enforceability5
Nonetheless, he stated that the cases from the Sovereignty Century
that relied on such distinctions "contain an important element of
truth."51 For Justice Blackmun, that truth was that the State's "finan-
431 U.S. 1 (1977).
47 In effect, the Court held the same true for New York as well since it had made
and broken the same promise. One might read United States Trust as limited to actions
brought pursuant to the Contract Clause and hence inapplicable to cases involving the
federal government. In Winstar, however, a majority of the Justices treated the Con-
tract Clause cases as precedent relevant to the federal government's obligation to
honor its promises. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 873-74 (relying on a number of the Court's
previous decisions which apply the Contract Clause to public contracts). The Court
seemed no more willing to protect the federal government's sovereignty through the
maintenance of substantive barriers than it had been willing to protect state sover-
eignty in this manner in recent years. See id at 889 (maintaining that the reserved
powers inherent to sovereignty could not be bargained away regardless of the proce-
dural protections in place and were inapplicable because "a contract to adjust the risk
of subsequent legislative change does not strip the Government of its legislative sover-
eignty"); id. at 922-23 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The notion of 'reserved powers' . . .
stand[s] ... for the proposition that certain core governmental powers cannot be sur-
rendered; thus understood, that doctrine would have no force where.., the private
party to the contract does not seek to stay the exercise of sovereign authority, but
merely requests damages for breach...." (citation omitted)).
48 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 10 (finding a NewJersey law repealing a prior
agreement not to spend security of bonds a violation of the Contract Clause).
o Id. at 23-24.
See id. at 24 ("Such formalistic distinctions perhaps cannot be dispositive...
s' Id.
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cial obligations" were surely on the binding side of the dividing line.s
Blackmun reasoned that governmental opportunism was most likely to
be present when the State was reneging on a financial obligation. "If
a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to
spend the money for what it regarded as an important public purpose,
the Contract Clause would provide no protection at all."53 Whatever
the merits of this line of reasoning, the fact is that it has not withstood
the test of time.54 Instead, as Winstarshowed, a majority of the current
Court believes that, as long as the remedy sought for breach of a regu-
latory contract is damages, as opposed to specific performance, the
obligation is financial and thus the contract is enforceable against the
State irrespective of its underlying subject matter.0 In short, the sub-
stantive side of sovereignty protection is all but dead.
As to the procedural side, the unmistakability doctrine born in
Charles River Bridge has been gutted. As Winstar showed, the Court
stands ready to read into contracts implied promises by the govern-
ment to assume the risk that the law will change in a manner inconsis-
tent with the government's contractual promise. a Thus a majority of
52 Id. at 25-26.
5Id. at 26.
54 Justice Blackmun argued that the case for court enforcement of government
contracts was strongest when "financial obligations" were at issue because the potential
for governmental opportunism was greatest as to those contracts. Id. at 26. We too
distinguish regulatory contracts from whatJustice Blackmun might call "financial obli-
gations" (e.g., procurement contracts and debt obligations), arguing that the former
should not be enforceable in court, although the reasons we give differ from his. The
line we propose would leave the contract at issue in United States Trust on the regula-
tory, nonenforceable side of the line because it involves more than a promise to repay
a debt at a specified interest rate. See discussion infra Part V.C. Despite our differences
with the holding in United States Trust and Blackmun's opportunism argument, we
agree that an "important element of truth" underlies the distinction between regula-
tory contracts and what might be termed purely financial obligations. United States
Trust, 431 U.S. at 24.
55 As the plurality put it in Winstar: "The answer to the Government's contention
that the State cannot barter away certain elements of its sovereign power is that a con-
tract to adjust the risk of subsequent legislative change does not strip the Government
of its legislative sovereignty." United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 888 (1996)
(plurality opinion). Three Justices concurring in a separate opinion stated that the
"'reserved powers'. . . doctrine would have no force where, as here, the private party to
the contract does not seek to stay the exercise of sovereign authority, but merely re-
quests damages for breach of contract." Id. at 923 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
Justice Souter's plurality opinion, in which Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and
Breyerjoined, maintains that the government's promise need not be "unmistakable"
for a court to award damages for breach except in a somewhat ill-defined group of
cases where the award of damages would be tantamount to an order of specific per-
formance. See id. at 879-83 (plurality opinion) (finding the United States liable for
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breach of contract where the government had promised thrifts that supervision, good-
will, and capital credits would be counted toward satisfaction of the regulatory capital
requirements). The plurality's assertion that its position, namely that the unmis-
takability rule is limited to those instances in which specific performance against the
government is requested, is consistent with long-established precedent, is wrong. Be-
fore Winstar, the Court had never indicated that the applicability of the unmistakability
doctrine turned on the nature of the relief sought. Moreover, asJustice Rehnquist ex-
plained in his dissent (which Justice Ginsburgjoined in part), damages claims were at
issue in several of the pre-Winstar cases in which the Court had applied the unmis-
takability doctrine to deny the requested relief and thus relieve the government of its
.promise" not to change the law. See id. at 926-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing the damages claims at issue in United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700
(1987), and Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477
U.S. 41 (1986)).
Justice Breyerjoined the plurality opinion and wrote a concurring opinion to ex-
pand upon his views on unmistakability. Breyer begins by emphasizing that, as he
reads the Court's precedent, the unmistakability doctrine, whatever its contours, was
not meant to apply to "ordinary" government contracts. See id. at 916-17 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("It is difficult to believe that the Court intended.., to disable future
courts from inferring... a more narrow promise in more typical cases."). He sets
forth two reasons to support his views that the unmistakability doctrine does not gov-
ern in the case before the Court. First, he expresses doubt that the absence of an
"unmistakable" promise was the controlling factor in the earlier cases that purported
to rest on the unmistakability doctrine. See id. at 913-14 (asserting that an "unmistak-
able" promise is not necessary in order for a private party to collect damages from the
government). He argues that other factors, not the lack of an explicit government
promise of stability in law, justified the results in those cases-factors that indicate how
unlikely it was that the parties understood the government to be making such a prom-
ise. See id. at 910-12 (clarifying his view that government contracts are foremost gov-
erned by traditional contract law and by the intent of the parties). Second, he argues
that the cases that purport to rest on the lack of an unmistakable promise all involve
allegations that the government had made either a "broad promise not to legislate, or
otherwise to exercise its sovereign power." Id. at 916. For Breyer, the Winstarfacts fell
into neither category. The surrounding facts suggested that the government agents
intended to promise regulatory stability, not to deny it; and the promise of regulatory
stability was narrow, not broad. Breyer thus seems to leave some room for the "unmis-
takability doctrine" to function when broad promises of regulatory stability are in-
volved, although at the same time he asserts, in apparent agreement with the plurality
opinion he joined, that the doctrine was never meant to supplant ordinary principles
of contract construction. In sum, Breyer hedges a bit and in so doing only succeeds in
making his approach to "unmistakability" difficult to discern.
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, in whichJustices Kennedy and Thomasjoined,
differs from the Souter plurality in that it accepts that the unmistakability doctrine ap-
plies to contracts with the government even when the only relief requested is damages.
See id. at 919 (Scalia, J., concurring) (accepting the argument that the unmistakability
cases had never been limited to non-damages claims and additionally arguing that
"[v]irtually every contract" is in practice a promise to pay damages for nonperform-
ance and nothing more). Justice Scalia, however, interprets the unmistakability re-
quirement in such a way as to render it a nullity in practice. According to Scalia, "un-
mistakable" does not mean plain, precise, or explicit; it means simply a promise that a
court could construe to be present from the contract's other terms or overall structure.
See i. at 919-22 (discussing permissible inferences from the governmental promise not
to change regulation). If, however, the unmistakability doctrine does not mean that a
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the Justices in Winstar-were able to find a contractual commitment on
the part of the government not to require more sensible loss reserves
even though none of the many written or even alleged oral communi-
cations between the banks and regulators contained such an express
promise.
The second procedural mechanism for protecting sovereignty, the
express delegation doctrine, has similarly been nullified . In Home
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, the Supreme Court read the
unmistakability doctrine to require not only that the contract explic-
itly state that the government intended to cede an aspect of sover-
eignty but that the authority of the contracting arm of government to
bargain away sovereignty be unmistakably present as well." Read
contract must contain a plain statement of the promise, it is hard to see how, if at all,
the doctrine adds anything to ordinary principles of contract construction.
Indeed, Justice Scalia seems to interpret the banks' arrangements with the federal
regulators using the general interpretive principles one might apply in discerning the
intent behind routine business dealings between private entities. See id. at 920-21
(agreeing with respondents that the government's actions challenge the "reverse pre-
sumption" that a government will not agree to restrain its sovereign powers). Moreo-
ver, for those who doubt that Scalia's approach guts the unmistakability doctrine, it is
important to notice that even under ordinary principles of contract construction, the
conclusion Scalia reaches-that the government promised regulatory stability-is open
to question. But even such principles would not mandate the conclusion Scalia
reaches. According to Scalia, the circumstances of the transactions-namely, that the
banks agreed to do something the government apparently wanted, i.e., merge with fail-
ing thrifts-established that the government was implicitly committing to maintain its
favorable treatment of the banks' loss reserves practices for the "long term." Id. at 921-
22. Scalia emphasizes that, if the government instead were simply promising to main-
tain that favorable policy for the time being, the banks would have been receiving
nothing of value and thus, as rational actors, would not have agreed to the merger
transactions. Id. at 922 (explaining why he believes the promise was unmistakable).
An agency promise, however, to implement and maintain for the time being a favor-
able policy is not necessarily (or even ordinarily) valueless to a regulated entity. Once
a favorable policy has been established, it may well be much more likely to endure
than if the policy had never been established in the first place.
57 According to the Souter plurality, the express delegation requirement "simply
has no application to the present case, because there were no contracts to surrender
the Government's sovereign power to regulate." Id. at 889-90 (plurality opinion).
Thus, once again the plurality relies on the "agreeing to pay damages has nothing to
do with sovereignty" argument to avoid one of the doctrines developed by earlier
Courts to protect sovereignty.
53 Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265, 273 (1908). The Court
stated:
The surrender, by contract, of a power of government, though in certain well-
defined cases it may be made by legislative authority, is a very grave act, and
the surrender itself, as well as the authority to make it, must be closely scruti-
nized.... Because such a contract has the effect of extinguishingpro tanto an
undoubted power of government, both [the promise to cede an aspect of sov-
ereignty] and the authority to make [such a contract] must clearly and unmis-
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robustly, the express delegation doctrine might itself have been used
to avoid the contract at issue in Winstar. Congress had not explicitly
granted the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") the power to
assume the risk that Congress might pass more stringent standards for
savings and loans in the future. Instead, a plurality found that the
doctrine was inapplicable because a promise by the government to pay
damages if it changed the law was not an infringement on sovereignty.
Moreover, a majority of the Justices were convinced that the express
delegation doctrine was satisfied in any event because the statute cre-
ating the FHLBB authorized it to "make contracts."5 9 So much for the
express delegation doctrine.
To summarize, both doors opened by Chief Justice Taney have
been slammed shut. The Court has come full circle back to ChiefJus-
tice Marshall's understanding that regulatory contracts are inviola-
ble.60 We will draw upon the example of the recent regulatory con-
takably appear, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of the continuance of
the power.
Id.
59 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 890 (plurality opinion) (maintaining that the bank regula-
tors "had ample statutory authority to ... promise to permit respondents to count su-
pervisory goodwill and capital credits toward regulatory capital and to pay respon-
dents' damages if that performance became impossible"); see id. at 923 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[W]hatever is required by the 'express delegation' doctrine is to my
mind satisfied by the statutes which the principal opinion identifies as conferring upon
the various federal bank regulatory agencies involved in this case authority to enter
into agreements of the sort at issue here." (citation omitted)).
60 In Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 524 U.S. 951 (1998), the Federal Circuit avoided imposing liability on the gov-
ernment under Winstar by holding that the congressional action that allegedly consti-
tuted the breach of contract was a "public and general" act, which removed it from the
category of actions that could give rise to a damages claim for breach. The problem
with this escape route is that the congressional action at issue in Yankee Atomic seems, if
anything, less public and general than the action held to constitute a breach in Win-
star, that is, the passage of certain sections of FIRREA.
Yankee Atomic sued the United States for breach of contract, claiming that Con-
gress's recent imposition of a decontamination assessment upon Yankee Atomic consti-
tuted a violation of various contracts entered into by the United States and Yankee
Atomic in the 1960s. Under those contracts, the government provided Yankee Atomic
with uranium enrichment services that Yankee Atomic required for its operations. Al-
though these enrichment contracts did not address the issue of any future decontami-
nation regulation or taxation, the claims court, applying Winstar, had held that the de-
contamination assessment was a breach of an implied term in the enrichment services
contracts. The Federal Circuit sidestepped the claim court's questionable contractual
interpretation and instead held that the assessment fell within the "public and general"
exception to governmental liability because Congress acted "for the purpose of solving
the decontamination and decommissioning of uranium enrichment facilities (i.e., the
legislation was passed for the benefit of the public)." 1I. at 1574. But the same could
be said of the legislation at issue in Winstar: if the decontamination assessments could
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tract controversies to demonstrate that this understanding is wrong.
II. CAPTURE, COMPROMISE AND CONTROLLING OPPORTUNISM: THE
FUNcIIONS OF REGUIATORY CONTRACTS
While all regulatory contracts seek to stabilize, if not also to dic-
tate, a particular political outcome, the reasons for seeking stability
may differ. One might seek stability to secure the benefit of private
party capture of public governance, to seal a compromise that protects
both the current government actors and private parties from the pos-
sibility of greater losses in the future, or to protect private parties from
the risk of government opportunism. 1 These categories--capture,
be characterized as for the public benefit, FIRRA surely could also be characterized
this way. To put it mildly, it is difficult to reconcile Winstarand YankeeAtomi4 and, tell-
ingli, the Federal Circuit never really attempted to do so.
Kyle Logue has argued that the government should be forced to pay damages
for revoking or modifying tax law provisions upon which taxpayers have relied. See
Logue, supra note 3, at 1183 (proposing expectation damages as an appropriate meas-
urement). Building on the logic of Winstar, Logue sees tax legislation designed to cre-
ate incentives as a form of regulatory contract. Logue argues that requiring the gov-
ernment to pay damages for "breaching" the promises of stability he would read into
tax law makes sense for the same reason that it makes sense to award damages for
breach of other regulatory contracts-the guarantee of performance or damages upon
breach would lower the ex ante cost to the government of inducing the desired behav-
ior on the part of private actors. See iU. at 1139 (arguing that the government's failure
to guarantee grandfather treatment may require that it pay taxpayers more to compen-
sate them for the risk of tax transactions).
Logue's analysis is quite interesting, but in our view it wrongly assumes that most or
even almost all regulatory contracts will fall within what we call the opportunism pro-
tection category rather than the capture or compromise category. See id. at 1146 (de-
scribing governmental opportunism). Indeed, interest group capture of the legisla-
ture is particularly likely in the context of tax incentive legislation, where the stakes
regarding specific tax code incentives are very high on a per capita basis for small in-
terest groups and relatively low for the general public. SeeMANCtJR OLSON, THE LoGIc
OF COLLECTVE ACTION: PUBuC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 147-48 (1971)
(distinguishing the power of industry groups to compel tax and other revisions from
the inability of the business community as a whole to effectuate them). Moreover, al-
though this is not Logue's intent, his extension of Winstai's logic demonstrates just
how inconsistentwith democratic principles Winsta's premises are. Beyond tax legisla-
tion, all entitlement legislation-social security, welfare, Medicaid, and Medicare-in-
duce reliance and thus may involve an implicit promise of regulatory stability. Indeed,
it is difficult to imagine legislation upon which citizens do not rely in making financial
planning decisions. If, however, almost every change in law triggered an obligation by
the government to pay damages, the flexibility of a majority to change any law would
be significantly restricted. See discussion infra Part IV.B (maintaining that regulatory
contracts are a form of legislative entrenchment); see also Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Sub-
sidies: One-time vs. Periodic: An Economic Analysis of the Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 TAX L.
REV. 305, 324-25 (1994) (advocating compensation for retroactive regulatory change,
and assuming that tax incentive regulation generally falls within the category of oppor-
tunism protection).
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compromise, and opportunism protection-are not mutually exclu-
sive. For example, in some sense all capture and compromise con-
tracts may also be said to protect against opportunism by the govern-
ment or its agents. Moreover, we do not believe it makes much sense
to speak of the motives of entities. Some agency officials in the deci-
sion-making chain or members of Congress voting on a regulatory
contract may have been unduly influenced while others may support
the contract as a legitimate compromise of competing interests. Fi-
nally, even if we could characterize some contracts as falling exclu-
sively within one category as opposed to another, we have no confi-
dence6 that, ex post, a court (or anyone else) could correctly identify
which category applies.
Why then bother to separate for purposes of normative discourse
what we do not believe can be separated in practice? Consider: If all
three purposes are normatively unworthy of support, then the case for
supporting and enforcing regulatory contracts would be significantly
weakened, if not destroyed. On the other hand, if one or more of
these purposes seems normatively attractive, then the case for enforc-
ing at least some, if not all, regulatory contracts would be strength-
ened. In addition, we would have some measure by which to assess
the various methods of sorting valid from invalid contracts: How well
does each method support the worthy contract while discouraging the
rest?
A. Capture Contracts
Congress enacted virtually all administrative agency statutes in re-
sponse to claims by a portion of the electorate that the broader "pub-
lic interest" mandated external policing of industry conduct. In the
prototypical New Deal or post-New Deal administrative agency statute,
Congress pronounced general public interest goals for industry regu-
lation and then broadly delegated authority to an expert regulatory
agency to implement those goals. Agency regulators were supposed to
be sufficiently detached from industry to the extent that they could
and would force the industry to remedy the problems that had
spurred government intervention in the first place.
62 In this, of course, we are far from being alone. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle,
Congres Is a "They, "Not an "It" Legislative Intent As Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L & EcoN.
239, 250 (1992) (using public choice theory to explore some of the conceptual prob-
lems in speaking of "legislative intent" in statutory interpretation).
See discussion infra Part III.A.
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According to "capture" or "public choice" political theorists,.6
however, government regulation does not work this way in practice.
Instead, well-organized interest groups-most notably the targets of
prospective regulation-often work to secure provisions in regulatory
statutes that leave key decisions in the hands of agency regulators.
The interest groups then exploit their power with key legislators to se-
cure case-by-case legislative interventions in agency decision making.
In addition, they foster bonds with agency regulators by, inter alia,
providing agencies with key information, hiring former agency per-
sonnel, developing personal relationships through lobbying contacts,
and supporting the continued funding of regulatory programs in
which the regulators have developed human capital.
In "captured" agencies, agency regulators do not act as "arms-
length" representatives of some larger "public interest" in their inter-
actions with regulated industries. Instead, government officials work
to advance the agenda of current firms in the industry by formulating
regulations that benefit or at least do not substantially burden the in-
dustry. In the most malignant capture account, the captured regula-
tory agency enables an industry to bar new entrants and extract mo-
nopoly rents so that consumers are materially worse off with
regulation than without it. Capture of this sort, theorists claim, is par-
ticularly likely when an agency is charged with regulating only a single
industry (for example, the FAA and the airline industry).
Capture accounts sometimes focus solely on the legislature rather
than on the regulatory agencies. Where a narrow interest group is es-
pecially strong in the legislature, it may not need to win favorable out-
comes for itself "behind the scenes" in a regulatory agency. Instead,
powerful groups sometimes can secure direct, specific giveaways in
legislation itself. At least on some accounts, legislatively mandated ag-
ricultural subsidies-subsidies that benefit only a few large firms and
seem to have no conceivable broader public interest rationale-are
prime examples of legislative capture.
Capture is, of course, an imprecise and controversial theory.6
For a good overview of the public choice literature, see DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHIlP P. FRIC=tY, LAW AND PUBUC CHOICE: A CRMCAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
65 See Sidney A. Shapiro, Keeng the Baby and Throwing Out the Bathwater. Justice
Breyer's Critique of Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 721, 726 (1995) ("The lack of a con-
vincing rationale suggests that [agricultural] subsidies are the product of public choice
politics, which is confirmed by political analysts.").
For thoughtful assessments of public choice/capture models of politics, see Ste-
ven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 34-56 (1998); Einer K Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
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The word itself suggests undue or illegitimate industry influence, but
it is possible to speak of illegitimate interest group influence only if
one has a coherent normative baseline defining legitimate interest
group influence. Moreover, even if one has such a normative theory,
it may be difficult to apply the theory in practice to the messy realities
of political policymaking. As numerous critics of capture or public
choice accounts have noted, capture accounts tend to avoid the com-
plexities of real life by oversimplifying the motives of government de-
cision makers.61 In other words, legislators and agency officials some-
times act out of motivations other than a desire to distribute benefits
or "rents" to narrow interest groups.
These problems notwithstanding, the capture account of regula-
tion embodies a basic truth about regulatory contracting: sometimes
legislators or agency officials or both agree with regulated firms about
what the content and scope of a regulatory regime should be. Where
this is true, both legislators and regulators as well as the regulated may
reasonably fear that political changes will disrupt their ability to real-
ize their shared vision of the "best" regulatory regime. Such political
change may take the form of a new assertiveness by legislators com-
mitted to a less pro-industry, more "public interest" regulatory agenda.
Such shifts in legislative interest and activity may result from any
number of sources: increased or better focused lobbying by constitu-
ents or groups critical of the perceived coziness of regulators and
regulated firms; the impending possible election of new legislators or
a new legislative leadership with weaker ties to industry and stronger
ties to non-industry constituencies; or simply the desire of a "political
entrepreneur" within the legislature to find an issue that might gener-
ate favorable popular press and attention. Pressure for regulatory
change may also result from political change within the executive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE LJ. 31 (1991) (examining proposals to make judicial review
less politically deferential in light of interest group influence); Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice; 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987) (discuss-
ing special interest groups and the question of whether legislatures can legitimately
formulate public policy). Administrative agency-sponsored efforts at deregulation
pose a significant challenge to the capture theory. SeeJoseph D. Kearney & Thomas W.
Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323,
1365-69 (1998) (chronicling agencies' deregulatory steps in response to political pres-
sure).
67 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HARv. L. REv. 554, 557 (1991) ("Public choice theory is useful, but it
cannot purport to be more than a partial explanation for political behavior."); Edward
L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of
Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1991) (arguing that the public choice theory, while not
invalid, is limited in its applicability).
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branch, most dramatically the election of a new President represent-
ing a different coalition of voters with different ideological commit-
ments.
Regulatory contracts may provide legislators, regulators, and regu-
lated firms with a means to entrench their shared regulatory vision
against the possibility of such political change. By entering into bind-
ing contracts with regulated firms whereby the "government" prom-
ises not to change the regulatory status quo, regulators can raise the
costs of any legislative or executive branch initiatives to restructure the
regulatory regime. In so doing, regulators may fend off or at least
slow any such initiatives.
The problem in using regulatory contracts as a means of en-
trenchment is that, in order to be legally binding, the contracts can-
not contain only a unilateral promise by the government to provide a
benefit-here, insurance against regulatory change. Rather, the con-
tract must at least resemble a mutual exchange in which the industry
gives something of value-in contract doctrine terms, consideration-
to the government in return for the promise of insurance against
regulatory change.
Precisely because they share the viewpoint of industry, legislators
or regulators or both in the capture scenario may not wish to bargain
for industry commitments that will impose substantial costs on indus-
try. Instead, they may favor contractual promises by industry that both
parties know will not be enforced in practice, will not cost the industry
much, or, at the extreme, will call for actions that would be in the in-
dustry's interest even in the absence of a governmental promise of in-
surance against regulatory change. The trick for regulators and regu-
lated entities in the capture scenario is to design regulatory contracts
so that industry appears to be giving up a great deal to advance non-
industry, public interest objectives. Capture contracts thus are prem-
ised on a deception: that the industry has provided the government
(as opposed to the government actors) with valuable consideration in
exchange for the government's promise of regulatory stability.
In recent years, certain firms within the electric power industry
and the savings and loan industry have claimed that they entered into
regulatory contracts with agencies, which the government subse-
quently breached. Formerly regulated monopolists in the electric
power industry claim that state regulators implicitly guaranteed them
a customer base during the era when electricity was thought to be a
natural monopoly, and that, based on that guarantee, the electric
power companies had made infrastructure and other investments.
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The state regulators later adopted a deregulatory agenda, opening
electricity markets to competition and leaving the formerly regulated
monopolists with "stranded costs." The state regulatory agencies
never expressly guaranteed to compensate former monopolists in the
event of deregulation, but the electric power companies contend that
such a contractual guarantee was implicit in the course of dealing be-
tween regulators and the regulated monopolies.6
Certain savings and loan banks claim that the federal bank regula-
tors induced them to merge with or to acquire insolvent thrifts in re-
turn for a promise to forebear enforcing stringent loan loss require-
ments against the resulting merged entities. These alleged
"forbearance" assurances, which Congress never expressly authorized
and which were never expressly given by regulators, allowed the sav-
ings and loan banks to maintain huge outstanding liabilities based on
minimal cash reserves69 . After the financial disruption caused by such
aggressive lending had become painfully apparent, Congress passed
FIRREA, a comprehensive reform statute that, among other things,
forbade the federal regulators from allowing any financial institution
to maintain low loss reserves. The institutions that claimed to have re-
ceived implicit forbearance assurances sued, seeking millions of dol-
lars in damages.0
63 SeeJ. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the
Regulatory Contract; 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851, 879-91 (1996) [hereinafter Sidak & Spulber,
Deregulatory Takings] (discussing regulators' obligations to compensate utilities for
regulatory changes);J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and theFal-
lacy of Forvard-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1093-96 (1997) [hereinafter Sidak
& Spulber, Givings] (examining whether the government has implicitly compensated
regulated firms for the negative impact of new policies). The former monopolists have
advanced contractual compensation claims in rate-setting hearings before state legisla-
tures, administrative agencies, and most recently before the courts. The local tele-
phone service monopolists are now making analogous arguments in response to the
deregulation of the telecommunications industry. But see William J. Baumol & Thomas
W. Merrill, Does the Constitution Require That We Kill the Competitive Goose? Pricing Local
Phone Service to Rivals, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1122 (1998) (arguing that Sidak's and Spul-
ber's claims lack merit).
69 It bears noting, however, that Congress certainly could have intervened to stop
agency deal-making. On one account, the incentive structure of members of Con-
gress-and in particular the fact that "individual legislators are not seen by their voter
as playing a role" in a banking crisis and thus "are not penalized for letting the prob-
lem grow"-explains why Congress refused to buck the power of the thrift industry and
instead allowed or even encouraged regulators to pursue permissive loan loss reserves
policies. Thomas Romer & Barry R Weingast, Congress: The Genesis of the Thrift Crisis, 2
STAN. L. & POL' REv. 37, 45 (1990).
70 In some cases, they even sought billions of dollars. See Margaret Cronin Fisk,
"Winstar"Litigants Bet on Future Damage Awards, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 11, 1999, at A19 ("[I]n
goodwill lawsuits [by thrifts] against the federal government... [t]he amount of dam-
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The criticism of these particular alleged regulatory contracts is
that these contracts, assuming they exist at all, simply reflect agency
capture.' Indeed, the electricity, savings and loan, and a number of
other controversial regulatory deals were entered into by agencies that
fit the public choice theorist's prototypical candidate for agency cap-
ture: the agencies in question all had jurisdiction over only a single
powerful industry and thus over time came to rely strongly on the pa-
tronage of that industry.? Moreover, the agencies did not have highly
ages claimed is enormous. For example, Glendale Federal Bank... is claiming dam-
ages of nearly $4.5 billion."); Stephen Labaton, The Debacle That Buried Washington:
LongAfter the S & L Crisis, Courts Are Handing Taxpayers a New Bill, N.Y. TIMIES, Nov. 22,
1998, § 3, at 1 (explaining that thrifts' claims against the federal government for
breach of contract could amount to $50 billion). The New York Times article also ex-
plained that in the wake of Winstar, the federal government faces huge damage claims
for breach of regulatory contracts from, not just the thrift industry, but other indus-
tries as well:
[O]ther industries are looking for ways to make use of the [Winstar] prece-
dent....
Lawyers representing electric utilities, telecommunications companies and
developers of low-income housing have begun filing lawsuits, and health care
lawyers say they may be next. Initial successes indicate that taxpayers may end
up facing yet more bills .... In all, utilities have pending claims of an esti-
mated $50 billion.
Id. at 12.
71 For depictions of the former utility monopolists (and their shareholders) as hav-
ing captured regulators or, at least, as having received adequate compensation for the
investment risks they took, see Oliver E. Williamson, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of
the Regulatory Contract: Some Precautions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1007 (1996) (responding to
Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 68, and arguing for a variable degree
of compensation for stranded costs). Professor Macey argues that the Winstarand Win-
startype merger transactions reflected the undue influence of thrifts on bank regula-
tors and that the mergers effectively "transferred considerable wealth from a highly
disaggregated group---the U.S. taxpayers, who were the ultimate guarantors of the
[federal deposit] insurance fund-to the highly concentrated and politically well-
connected creditors and acquirors of failed thrifts." Jonathan R. Macey, Winstar, Bu-
reaucracy and Public Choice, 6 SUP. Cr. ECON. REV. 173, 189 (1998). Macey's basic point
is that the mergers allowed the troubled thrift industry and its inadequate regulatory
apparatus to continue longer than was economically sensible, and that had the thrift
industry been allowed to fail earlier, the government bailout would have been much
less expensive than was the case. The availability of government deposit insurance
meant that the owners of the thrifts had every incentive to stay in business and keep
making questionable loans despite the substantial risk that doing so would ultimately
result in even greater net unpaid debts for the thrifts. See id. at 183 ("[Slhareholders
of insured depository institutions have incentives to take risks as their equity position
deteriorates: losses will be disproportionately borne by the debt-holders (including the
[federal insurance fund]) while gains will accrue to the shareholders.").
SeeJohn P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 309
(1990) (arguing that agencies are "vulnerable to capture" when they "regulate[ ] a sin-
gle industry");Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Adminis-
trative Agencies, 8J.L. EcON. & ORG. 93, 93-94 (1992) (suggesting that agencies regular-
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organized public interest group outsider "clients" or constituencies
that might check industry influence-as, for example, the EPA has in
national and state environmental organizations. And at least in the
hindsight view of some prominent observers, both the former electric-
ity monopolists and the savings and loan banks who enjoyed forbear-
ance assurances received unduly favorable-from the broader public
interest view, indefensibly favorable-treatment under the terms of
the alleged regulatory contracts."
ing multiple industries are less susceptible to capture than agencies regulating a single
industry); Bradford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVL.
L.J. 34, 50 (1993) (asserting that the EPA is unlikely to be captured because it regulates
multiple industries).
Another example of a capture regulatory contract may be one between the DOI
and oil companies regarding offshore oil and gas exploration rights. The Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA"), codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1984), passed
in 1953, authorized the DOI to lease the rights to explore for oil and gas in the outer
continental shelf. The standard OCLSA lease did not state that the lease precluded
future environmental regulation that might limit or delay exploration; quite the con-
trary, the leases contained language that appeared to make the leases subject to any
new regulation. The leases provided that they were subject to "all other applicable
statutes and regulations." Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1331, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 1999). The Federal Claims Court has read this language to include all other
applicable regulations in existence at the time the lease was issued, see Conoco, Inc. v.
United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 309, 322 (1996) ("The clause referring to 'all other applica-
ble statutes and regulations' makes no mention of future or subsequent legislation
.. "), rev'd by Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1999), but
one could easily read the same language as including all applicable regulations-both
existing and future.
In the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration's Department of Interior entered
into leases with oil companies for exploration rights off the shore of North Carolina.
In 1990, in response to environmentalist concerns and the lobbying of a wide range of
North Carolina constituencies, Congress passed the Outer Banks Protection Act
("OBPA"), Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 6003, 104 Stat. 555 (1990) (repealed by 33 U.S.C.
§ 1753(c) (1) (1994)), which imposed a temporary moratorium on proposed explora-
tion off the North Carolina coast until an environmental review board had examined
the potential environmental impacts of that exploration. The oil companies re-
sponded by suing the United States for breach of contract, claiming that OBPA would
either prevent them from obtaining DOI approval for any specific exploration plan or,
at a minimum, would greatly delay their receipt of such approval. See Edward A. Fitz-
gerald, Conoco, Inc. v. United States: Sovereign Authority Undermined by Contractual Obli-
gations on the Outer Continental Shelf, 27 PUB. CONT. L.J. 755, 758-64 (1998) (reviewing
comprehensively the history of the offshore exploration controversy).
In an opinion relying on the Federal Circuit's decision in Winstar, and anticipating
the Supreme Court's affirming opinion, the Federal Claims Court in Conoco held that
the OCSLA leases in question had implicitly allocated to the United States the role of
insuring the oil companies against any economic losses resulting from the imposition
of any new regulation restricting oil exploration. See Conoco, 35 Fed. Cl. at 324 (finding
that changes in federal policy on environmental regulation cannot "subvert the par-
ties' mutual assent, reduced to writing and memorialized in contract"). The Federal
Circuit reversed the claims court's opinion on causation grounds, namely that the
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B. Compromise Contracts
The capture scenario notwithstanding, it is certainly the case that
powerful government actors in the legislature, the executive branch,
and regulatory agencies sometimes have a much more pro-regulatory,
"public interest" agenda than the regulated industries would like.' In
certain presidential administrations, for example, a central dynamic
has been regulatory agencies advocating more controls on industry,
and fierce legal and political resistance by industry. In such cases, of
course, the battling government actors and industry cannot use regu-
latory contracts to entrench a shared regulatory vision because they
have none.
However, where the dominant political actors in Congress, the ex-
ecutive, or regulatory agencies are engaged in political or legal battles
with regulated industries, regulatory contracts may appeal to both the
government actors and industry as a way of entrenching a compro-
mise between their competing regulatory visions. A compromise con-
tractual solution presumably would require fewer concessions by an
industry than it would be forced to make if it were to lose its political
struggle with the proponents of regulation. At the same time, the
compromise contract would provide for greater industry concessions
than proponents of "public interest" regulation in government would
be able to secure if they were to lose their political battles with indus-
try.
7 4
congressional moratorium on exploration was not the but-for cause of the delay in ex-
ploration because the State of North Carolina independently had exercised its legal
rights under the Coastal Zone Management Act to block the issuance of the necessary
regulatory permits to the companies. See Marathon Oil, 177 F.3d at 1339 (finding that
North Carolina's objection to granting certification was based on the inadequacy of
information supplied by Mobil and noting that the state action appeared independent
but that the issue was not raised on appeal).
The Federal Circuit thus largely sidestepped the contractual interpretation issues
addressed by the claims court. See id (repeatedly emphasizing the narrow scope of the
court's decision). It is not obvious that the DOI officials who approved the OCSLA
leases had the intent to insure the oil companies against regulatory change. But even
if they did have that intent, it is not clear that intent should receive judicial recogni-
tion, at least in the absence of both an express congressional authorization for DOI
officials to provide the oil companies with regulatory insurance and any explicit men-
tion of such insurance in the contracts at issue. According to many commentators,
and indeed many legislators in Congress during the time in which the OCSLA leases
were consummated, the DOI was dominated by the oil industry with which it was os-
tensibly negotiating. See Fitzgerald, supra, at 794 (citing legislative history in which
members of Congress express concern about oil industry power).
74 We do not mean to suggest that government actors and private parties will
measure risk with equal accuracy. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that they
will not. See infra notes 169-78 and accompanying text (discussing how private parties
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Compromise regulatory contracts will be particularly appealing to
government actors who are risk averse-that is, who weigh downside
risks of continued political battle more heavily than upside risks. One
reason that government actors may be risk averse is that the pro-
regulatory constituencies they represent, for whom they are agents,
are themselves risk averse. Standard economic theory would predict
that advocates for aggressive "public interest" regulation in the elec-
torate may well be risk averse as to the worst possible future outcomes
of a contractually unconstrained political process. In the realm of
monetary or market risk, an investor can diversify against risk-essen-
tially self-insure-by investing in multiple enterprises that are likely to
fare differently under the same market conditions.7 Hedging, how-
ever, is not really an option for environmentalist or public health ad-
vocates. Because they cannot self-insure against a terrible overall po-
litical loss for the cause or issue they believe in, advocates of
regulation may direct their supporters in government to remove issues
they care about from the political battlefield by striking a long-term
compromise deal with industry.
Even in the absence of risk aversion, advocates of regulation in the
electorate may favor contracting out of political battles with certain
companies or industries to make available more lobbying and other
resources to devote to political battles with other companies or indus-
tries. Given their need for financial resources to lobby effectively and
their perennial shortages of such funds, public health and environ-
mental advocates may conclude that contracting out of political
change with selected companies or industries is a rational resource
conservation strategy.
For their part, the motivation of industry actors in embracing
compromise contracts may also be complex. Some industry actors,
particularly smaller businesses, may be risk averse with respect to the
risk of unfavorable regulatory change in the future. Even where this is
not the case, an industry actor may favor a compromise contract to
save on the costs of continuing political battles.76 In addition, by pro-
are likely to have exclusive access to information relevant to measuring risks to the
public, and that the utility curves of corporations are simple compared to those of the
general population with which the government is concerned).
See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 591 (1984) (discussing the role of risk aversion in
investment decisions).
76 Any analysis of whether compromise regulatory contracts offer a means by which
interest groups can economize on political lobbying costs, however, is subject to some
complications. On the one hand, to the extent that a long-term (say 20-year) com-
promise regulatory contract removes a politically contentious issue from ongoing po-
BARGAINING AND DEMOCRACY
viding greater certainty as to the future regulatory regime, regulatory
contracts may allow a company to engage in more rational business
planning. In the absence of regulatory certainty as to how many of
the toxic chemicals produced by a chemical company might be
banned, a chemical company might spend funds developing substi-
tutes for all of its chemicals, including some that might well escape a
ban if the industry fares well in future political regimes. If, instead,
the company is assured by a regulatory contract precisely which
chemicals will be banned and when the ban will occur, it can more
easily focus its research and development.
In negotiating compromise contracts with an industry, pro-
regulatory government actors may disfavor promises by the industry
that the industry will make certain regulatory concessions far off in
the future. Instead, the government actors may favor current or im-
mediate performance by the industry as a quid pro quo for long-term
governmental assurances of regulatory stability or compensation for
regulatory change. Furthermore, government actors may insist upon
current concessions by the industry that are, as a practical matter, ir-
reversible.7
litical debate, it may save an interest group resources because the group need not con-
tinuously invest money in the political process to safeguard its interests. If the original
tobacco deal had been consummated, the tobacco industry might have assumed that it
could save $500,000 per year in political investments that it otherwise would have ex-
pended in the absence of the long-term agreement. On the other hand, precisely be-
cause the compromise contract will cover a 20-year period and therefore substantially
affect the industry's future, the industry might find it worthwhile to expend a huge
sum-for example, $10 million-to ensure that the contract contains the most favor-
able terms as possible and is in fact consummated. For a detailed discussion of the be-
hind-the-scenes machinations that led to the $8.2 billion fee awarded to the lawyers for
Florida, Mississippi, and Texas, and an explanation of how the tobacco companies pro-
tected themselves by negotiating a $500 million per year annual cap on any and all fees
to be paid to the lawyers (which translates into a 2-cents-a-pack increase in the cost of
cigarettes), see Jim Oliphant, How Tobacco Fee Was Reached, AM. LAW., Dec. 24, 1998, at
1. The additional up-front lobbying cost of securing the compromise contract may
equal or even outweigh the long-term savings in lobbying costs. For this reason, it is at
best unclear whether regulatory contracts can be defended as efficient on the grounds
that they economize on the overall resources devoted to political lobbying. SeeJ. Mark
Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Profes-
sors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REV. 1155, 1157-58 (1989) (pointing out that political
action committees gave legislators over $6.7 million to influence the 1986 Tax Reform
Act, a figure that ignores the time and other resources those groups spent organizing
themselves and lobbying assorted "opinion leaders").
r To illustrate why this would be the case, imagine that an industry that produces
nine toxic chemicals offers environmentalist regulators the following deal: in T (now)
it will not eliminate any toxic chemicals, but in T (some future time period) it will
eliminate toxic chemicals 1-7. In return, the government will commit not to regulate
toxic chemicals 8 and 9 in either T, or T, From the regulators' perspective, the fatal
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Compromise contracts, unlike capture contracts, are not inher-
ently deceitful in that they entail a bargained-for, rather than pro
forma, exchange of consideration. They are nonetheless normatively
problematic, as a comparison of regulatory contracts and constitu-
tional amendments can help illustrate. Compromise contracts oper-
ate much like a constitutional amendment: by binding (or at least fi-
nancially burdening) the hands of future government actors, both
constitutional amendments and regulatory contracts alike can protect,
if not remove, certain issues from the ebb and flow of ordinary poli-
tics.7 '8 Indeed, regulatory contracts have the same effect as a constitu-
drawback of the offer is that they may be out of power in T2-- a pro-business political
majority may instead dominate regulatory politics in that time period. In fact, in the
compromise contract scenario, it is the fear of that possibility that drives the govern-
ment actors to the bargaining table. If a pro-business coalition were to take power in
T, that coalition, using its control of the executive branch and Congress, might ex-
pressly release the industry from contractual obligations regarding chemicals 1-7 or
simply ignore the industry's breach of the contract.
A contract that imposes heavy regulatory responsibilities on industry in the future,
moreover, increases industry's incentive to fight for political change. Such a contract
thereby increases the probability that the political shifts between T and T will favor
business and not pro-regulatory constituencies. A contract that required the industry
to immediately discontinue production of toxic chemicals 1-5 as a quid pro quo for a
government promise not to regulate chemicals 6-9 in T, or T, by contrast, might re-
move (or at least lower) the industry's incentive for post-contract-formation politick-
ing-particularly if the industry would have no reason to seek reversals of the bans
once they were implemented because the industry had made the necessary, and pre-
sumably costly, changes in its production processes.
78 Under longstanding judicial interpretations of the Takings Clause, the govern-
ment normally can change its regulatory treatment of private assets other than land
without violating the Takings Clause, even where such changes in regulatory treatment
result in substantial reductions in the market value of the assets in question. See David
A. Dana, Land Use Regulating in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243, 1250-
64 (1997), and David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 655, 658-68 (1995), for a review of recent takings jurisprudence. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has pronounced that, at least in heavily regulated areas of the economy
(and most areas of the economy now are), private actors should presume that uncom-
pensated regulatory change is always a significant possibility, at least where the assur-
ance of constant regulatory treatment did not take the form of ajudicially enforceable
regulatory contract. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1008-09 (1984)
("In an industry that long has been the focus of great public concern and significant
government regulation, the possibility was substantial that the Federal Government,
which had thus far taken no position on disclosure... would find disclosure to be in
the public interest."); see also Robert A. Graham, Note, The Constitution, the Legislature,
and Unfair Surprise: Toward a Reliance-Based Approach to the Contract Clause, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 398, 400 (1993) (explaining that, in the context of Contracts Clause cases, the
courts have also assumed that an actor in a heavily regulated industry "realizes that the
legal backdrop against which she conducts business is subject to change" and thus has
no reliance-based claim for compensation in the event of regulatory change). We are
generally sympathetic to this constrained reading of the Takings Clause for precisely
the same reasons that we are generally unsympathetic to judicial enforcement of regu-
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tional amendment broadening the scope of the Takings Clause guar-
antee ofjust compensation. Yet the burdens imposed on the future by
regulatory contracts are the result of a less elaborate and less compre-
hensive political process than that required for constitutional
amendments.
The extraordinary procedural requirements for amending the
Constitution ensure that the norms embodied in amendments reflect
a fundamental consensus in the country. In contrast, compromise
regulatory contracts may be consummated before there is any societal
consensus on an issue-indeed, consummation can occur even when
there is heated debate and division by partisan interest groups and
perhaps general lack of attention, knowledge, or understanding by
broad segments of the electorate.s° By removing issues from ordinary
latory contracts-notably, our view that impeding government actors in changing pre-
existing policies may result in the continuation of policies that reflect capture or lack
of adequate information on the part of the original government decision makers. For
a more detailed discussion of this view, see infra Part V.A.
It is certainly possible that, even under the courts' constrained reading of the Tak-
ings Clause, a litigant could successfully style the breach of a judicially enforceable
regulatory contract as a Takings Clause violation. A party that has received ajudicially
enforceable contract promising constant regulatory treatment arguably has an unusu-
ally distinct, reasonable expectation that the government will not change the relevant
regulations without paying compensation; it is precisely the assurance of judicial en-
forceability that would make such an expectation reasonable. See Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) ("[The Supreme Court] has examined the
'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identi-
fied several factors-such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference
with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the governmen-
tal action-that have particular significance."); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (stating that examination of the takings question de-
pends on several factors, including the economic impact of the regulation, its interfer-
ence "with distinct investment-backed expectations," and "the character of the go-
ernmental action"). Thus, an expansion in the scope of those regulatory deals that the
courts will recognize as contractually enforceable may translate directly into an expan-
sion in the scope of the reach of the Takings Clause's guarantee ofjust compensation.
Additionally, even if the courts in regulatory contracts cases decline to award damages
based on a takings theory but do award damages for contractual breach, the practical
effect will be the same as if the courts had formally expanded the scope of the Takings
Clause's guarantee ofjust compensation.
This consensus, moreover, presumably reflects notjust what a majority thinks is
right for today, but also what it thinks is right for the future, since the position cannot
be changed without extraordinary effort. See infra Parts III.A, III.B (discussing the rela-
tionship between constitutional and legislative entrenchment).
80 Consider also that compromise regulatory contracts might be used by an indus-
try as insurance against potential blowback from its own lobbying efforts. Once an in-
dustry places the regulatory regime under which it operates into play by seeking legis-
lative relief (some form of deregulation), anything might happen. Therefore, before
placing its regulatory status into legislative play, an industry might secure a compro-
mise agency regulatory contract to minimize the downside risk of its own grander lob-
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politics before the formation of a fundamental public consensus,
compromise regulatory contracts deny ardent believers on both sides
of an issue the opportunity to advocate for noncompromise resolu-
tions and the broader public thus never receives the education and
enlightenment that (one might hope) results from open debate.
Moreover, in the case of regulatory contracts consummated by a regu-
latory agency rather than the legislature itself, there is a real risk that
important public controversies will be "resolved" and de-politicized
for many years to come without any significant public attention.81 The
same risk simply does not exist for constitutional amendments.12
bying plans. Indeed, this may have been what certain big-time cable companies did.
Several such companies had regulatory contracts in place with the FCG-contracts de-
signed to last 10 years-at the time Congress enacted legislation deregulating the cable
industry. For an example, see the so-called "Social Contract" between Time Warner
and the FCC, In re Social Contract for Time Warner, 11 F.C.C.R. 2788 (1995) (running
from 1995 to 2000). For a discussion of the time-line for deregulation of the cable in-
dustry, see Michael I. Meyerson, Ideas of the Marketplace: A Guide to the 1996 Telecommu-
nications Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 251, 271 (1997). The industry will in fact be deregu-
lated before those contracts are due to terminate. See Conversations with Margaret
Egler, FCC Staff Attorney (Nov. 1998) (indicating that some cable industry contracts
have termination dates that extend past the deregulation of the industry). The cable
companies holding those contracts are too important in the industry not to have
played a central role in the effort to get Congress to deregulate the industry. Their
contracts may have been secured to eliminate the downside risk of putting cable regu-
lation on the legislative agenda.
81 A similar criticism may be, and has been, made about consent decrees between
the government and a private entity that provide for remedies beyond those the gov-
ernment would be entitled to under existing law. See, for example, Michael W.
McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political
Change 1987 U. CM. LEGAL F. 295, 316-17, and other articles in that symposium issue.
82 Even if compromise regulatory contracts were normatively defensible as "split-
the-difference" deals between pro-regulatory constituencies and industry, the reality of
such deals is that they may not reflect the genuine preferences of either group. In-
stead, compromise regulatory contracts may reflect the self-serving preferences of the
agents of pro-regulatory constituencies, ostensibly pro-regulatory government officials,
and the agents of business corporations, corporate managers. There is no normative
ground for honoring deals between, and in the service of, such unfaithful agents.
Due to the high cost of monitoring, pro-regulatory constituencies can only imper-
fectly monitor the actions of their agents. As a result, ostensibly pro-regulatory politi-
cians and officials have some leeway to advance their personal interest at the expense
of these constituencies' interests, and politicians' and officials' overwhelming personal
interest is often thought to be to retain office. Striking compromise regulatory deals,
even ones that fully informed pro-regulatory constituencies would reject, may help os-
tensibly pro-regulatory politicians and officials stay in power for two reasons. First, as
discussed above, contracting out of political change normally will entail both substan-
tial concessions by industry now and substantial concessions to industry later. To the
extent that politicians can take advantage of this fact and highlight the current benefits
and obscure the future costs, contracting out of political change may help politicians
solidify their support with voters sympathetic to an activist regulatory state.
Second, contracting out of political change removes much of the incentive of con-
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The "No Surprises" Habitat Conservation Plans, contracts entered
into by the United States with private landowners, and the failed at-
tempt at a national tobacco deal are recent examples that come close
to the compromise contract ideal. Both deals tried to use the mecha-
nism of contract to resolve, or deflate, debates that reveal (or would
reveal, if allowed to flourish) deep ideological divisions and conflicts
in this country.s
tracting companies or industries to bankroll challengers to the incumbents in power.
Incumbents already enjoy various advantages in our political system. Contracting out
of political change might further strengthen the position of incumbents and increase
the likelihood they will retain office.
For their part, corporate managers also have incentives to approve compromise
regulatory contracts that their fully-informed principals, corporate owners and corpo-
rate shareholders, would disapprove. Particularly in larger corporations, the managers
often operate with substantial autonomy with respect to the shareholder owners. Such
managers may be risk averse, even if shareholders are risk neutral, with respect to the
possibility of any future regulatory disaster for the corporation. See, e.g., John C. Cof-
fee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 1,
62 (1986) ("[M]anagers tend to be more risk averse than shareholders with regard to
their corporation."). Many, if not most, managers are risk averse because much of
their human capital is asset specific-that is, of value only in the context of their em-
ploying corporation. If the corporation fails or fares poorly, the managers are likely to
suffer substantially. Finally, in many corporations, profit sharing plans operate so that
the financial portfolios of high level managers are disproportionately invested in the
stock of their employers.
83 The tobacco story begins with the "settlement" of lawsuits brought by Attorney
Generals against the tobacco industry. See Text of the Tobacco Deal [6/20], (visited Oct.
21, 1999) <http://ash.org/june97/6-20-97-1.html> [hereinafter Proposed Tobacco
Industry Settlement, June 20, 1997] (consisting entirely of proposed federal legisla-
tion). The settlementwas contingent on federal legislation. See Memorandum of Un-
derstanding, June 20, 1997 (on file with authors) (consisting of a one page, three
paragraph document signed by the state attorneys general and tobacco industry repre-
sentatives providing that the signers agree to lobby for the legislation embodied in the
so-called Proposed Tobacco Industry Settlement). Although unreported by the press,
the June 20 agreement between the attorneys general and the industry (and the sepa-
rate settlements with the industry later reached by the states of Mississippi, Florida, and
Texas) provided that the signing state officials would work to get Congress to enact
federal legislation substantially similar to that advocated by the industry as a "settle-
ment7 of big tobacco's woes. See id.; Memorandum of Understanding, In re Moore ex
reL State of Mississippi Tobacco Litigation, July 2, 1997 [hereinafter Mississippi Settle-
ment] (on file with authors). Indeed, the three individual state settlements provided
that the industry would reimburse the states for expenses incurred in lobbying for fed-
eral legislation, and that the industry would pay reasonable attorney's fees for the time
spent getting federal legislation passed. See Mississippi Settlement, para. 8:
In the event of the enactment of the Proposed Resolution [referring to the
Proposed Tobacco Settlement ofJune 20, 1997] or other substantially equiva-
lent federal program, the parties contemplate that the State of Mississippi and
any other similar state [including, but not limited to, Florida and Texas]
which has made an exceptional contribution to secure the resolution of these
matters may apply to the panel of independent arbitrators for reasonable
compensation for its efforts in securing the Proposed Resolution subject to an
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To take one of these examples, the proper scope of government
efforts to protect endangered species on private land has been the
subject of intense controversy. On the one hand, over the last twenty
years, environmentalists and sympathetic public officials have increas-
ingly come to recognize that efforts to protect endangered species
cannot be limited to public land; large swathes of private land, too,
must be part of effective conservation management. At both the fed-
eral and state level, Endangered Species Act legislation arguably
authorized fairly intrusive developmental controls on private land,
even though from an environmentalist perspective, the statutes, even
if broadly construed, did not permit the sort of broad-based preserva-
tion planning that ideally would be employed to protect ecosystems
under pressure from human development. 84 From 1980 to 1992, how-
ever, the federal administration was ideologically opposed to aggres-
sive developmental controls on private land. The election of Presi-
dent Bill Clinton changed that because he brought a Secretary with
strong conservation credentials into the DOI for the first time in
twelve years. Secretary Babbitt's inauguration at the DOI at least cre-
ated the possibility of an ecologically-oriented preservation policy
concerning private land.
At the same time that political circumstances for the first time
made significant regulation on private land a feasible political possi-
bility, a massive backlash against "zany" environmentalism erupted
and threatened to erase even the possibility of continued preservation
regulations on public, not to mention private, land. In Congress, the
1994 mid-term elections brought to power an ideologically conserva-
tive Republican leadership that proposed new legislation weakening
the federal Endangered Species Act ("ESA")as and requiring compen-
appropriate annual cap on all such payments.
Id. In effect, the tobacco industry had bought the lobbying efforts of state officials
from the negotiating states. According to press reports, the lobbying expenditures of
big tobacco aimed at securing passage of its regulatory contract were unprecedented,
even for the tobacco industry. See, e.g., Saundra Torry, Tobacco Firms Put Much More into
Lobbying, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1998, at Al ("The tobacco industry spent more than
$19 million on outside lobbyists last year-three times as much as in 1996-most of it
to press for passage of the proposed national tobacco settlement."). But those press
reports understated the expenditures by failing to notice that the tobacco industry had
committed to reimburse the states, and the private plaintiffs' lawyers representing the
states, for their lobbying efforts in favor of the June 20 proposal, provided that Con-
gress enacted it.
84 See Bradley C. Karkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 198-221
(1997) (reviewing some of the limitations of the Endangered Species Act).
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1540 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
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sation for almost any government regulation. In the state legislatures,
property rights conservatives introduced and sometimes succeeded in
securing passage of parallel legislation.6 Meanwhile, the federal
courts, in particular the United States Supreme Court, signaled their
hostility to endangered species protection in both statutory construc-
tion and constitutional Takings Clause cases.17 The significant opposi-
tion to preservation regulation by key actors in the legislatures and
courts casts substantial doubt on the Clinton Administration's capacity
to reverse the Reagan-Bush era practice of ignoring private land in
preservation planning.
Faced with the possibility of an intense struggle over the regula-
tion of private land, and the substantial possibility they would lose the
struggle, Babbitt and pro-environmentalist regulators at DOI arrived
at the split-the-difference solution of Habitat Conservation Plans
("HCPs").88 In each HCP, the pro-environmental regulators received
the landowners' commitment not to use the courts or legislature to
See generally Robert L. Glicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and
(Breach o)~ the Contract with America: Improving Environmental Policy of Destroying Environ-
mental Protection, 5 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 9 (Winter 1996) (reviewing proposed prop-
erty rights legislation); Joseph L. Sax, Takings Legislation: Where It Stands and What Is
Next, 23 ECOLOGYL.Q. 509 (1996) (same).
87 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995) (rejecting a facial
challenge to a DOI regulation regarding the scope of protection for endangered ani-
mals against incidental habitat destruction, but emphasizing that the Court might re-
ject the application of the regulation in specific cases); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (purporting to establish, in a plurality opinion, a
qualified per se rule requiring compensation for stringent controls on land develop-
ment).
DOI officials and consultants themselves have portrayed "No Surprise" agree-
ments and similar certainty-enhancing measures as a response to radical statutory pro-
posals they believe would explicitly or effectively repeal the current framework of envi-
ronmental laws. See, e.g., Blaine I. Green, The Endangered Species Act and Fifth Amendment
Takings: Constitutional Limits of Species Protection, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 329, 370 n.201
(1998) ("Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt has consistently been a strong proponent of
habitat conservation planning, extolling its benefits to both landowners and species.");
Joseph L. Sax, Using Property Rights to Attack Environmental Protection, 14 PACE ENVIL. L.
REV. 1, 14 (1996) (reporting Sax's view, as counselor to Secretary Babbitt, that "these
administrative innovations demonstrate[] that the ESA... can be protected vigor-
ously... [thereby] protecting economic values for both private landowners and com-
modity users of the public lands. They... show that the ESA can be adminis-
tered ... effectively and fairly, and need not be undermined by ill-conceived, grossly
expensive, and unnecessary [statutory] compensation schemes"); Karin P. Sheldon,
Habitat Conservation Planning Addressing the Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6
N.Y.U. ENVTi. L.J. 279, 281 (1998) ("Secretary Bruce Babbitt and the Fish and Wildlife
Service ... are scrambling to promote the 'flexibility' of the [Endangered Species Act]
and to create policy approaches that will lessen the likelihood of drastic legislative sur-
gery on the Act.").
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fight the agency's efforts to set up a preservation program that en-
compassed some of their land. At the same time, the agency sanc-
tioned the landowners' plans to engage in some development activi-
ties on their land that arguably, or sometimes clearly, violated current
endangered species regulations. Even more importantly, given the
real downside risk landowners faced, that in the absence of an HCP
compromise they might face more, and not less, intensive preserva-
tion regulation in the future, landowners received long-term contrac-
tual commitments from the government that they would not be sub-
ject to any additional regulation, or, if they ever were, they would be
fully compensated.8 9 HCPs thus represent contractual compromises of
the current political dispute over preservation regulation that, as a
practical matter, may severely constrain the terms on which future
public debate regarding preservation regulation can take place.90
C. Opportunism Protection Regulatory Contracts
Operating at arms-length from industry, and representing non-
89For a good discussion of the guarantees afforded landowners and the political
forces that compelled the grant of those guarantees, see Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging
the Deck Chains: Endangered Species Act Reforms in an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. &
MARY ENVTL L. & POL'YREv. 227, 284-93 (1998).
90 Commentators generally have not claimed that the DOI's HCP contracts reflect
capture. The DOI, however, has a long history of close-many would say, incestuous-
relationships with the private interests it regulates. See GEORGE CAMERON CAGGINS &
ROBERTL. GuCESMAN, PUBiC NATURAL RESOURCES LAw § 16.01[1] (1990) (reviewing
charges that the DOI is dominated by the industries it regulates); Michael C. Blumm,
Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why "Multiple Use" Failed, 18 HARV. ENVrL L.
REV. 405, 405-07 (1994) (same). One could imagine that, under the stewardship of a
Secretary less "green" and less watchful than Babbitt, the HCP regulatory contracting
program could evolve into a means of freezing into place very favorable deals for land-
owners. Monitoring by environmentalist and community groups might prevent such
outcomes, but monitoring hundreds or even thousands of complex HCPs might well
entail more resources than such groups could possibly muster. SeeHolly Doremus, Pre-
serving Public Participating in the Era of Reinvention: The Endangered Species Example, 25
ENviL. L.Q. 707, 712-15 (1999) (discussing the problem of meaningful environmental-
ist participation in reinventing programs such as DOI's HCP program); Warren L. Rat-
liff, The De-Evolution of Environmental Organization, 17J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVri- L.
45, 48-53 (1997) (addressing implications of decentralization of environmental regula-
tion for representation of environmentalist interests).
One caveat regarding a political compromise account of the rise of HCPs is in or-
der: the risks that the no-surprises guarantee is meant to redress are not only political
ones, but also scientific ones that reflect, fundamentally, the rudimentary state of our
ecological understanding. Political and scientific risks are inextricably intertwined in
practice, but in theory at least, we might normatively assess the efforts to contract out
of scientific risk differently from the way we assess efforts to contract out of political
risk.
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industry constituencies, government actors might reasonably believe
that in order to induce industry to make some socially beneficial in-'
vestment, the government needs to promise stability with respect to
the regulatory treatments surrounding that investment. For example,
to get an industry to invest in inner-city neighborhoods, a state gov-
ernment might promise favorable tax treatment of the investment for
the next twenty years. If such promises were not legally enforceable,
however, the industry might fear that the government actors would
induce them to make socially beneficial investments based on prom-
ises of continued favorable regulatory treatment and then renege.
As noted above, compromise contracts generally will call for cur-
rent investments by industry of a sort that are costly for industry to re-
verse.9' For industry, it is just such investments that most pointedly
raise the specter of government opportunism; industry, therefore,
might be unwilling to make certain investments in the absence of the
protection afforded by a regulatory contract. As a result, regulatory
contracts entailing immediate and difficult-to-reverse industry invest-
ments may be either compromise contracts or opportunism protec-
tion contracts (or to an extent, both). For example, the landowners
who received "No Surprises" assurances maintain, and some academic
commentators agree, that their deals with the government are de-
signed to prevent them from being taken advantage of by committing
land to preservation that they might otherwise have developed and
then, having made such costly concessions, being forced by "greedy"
activist regulators to give up more (and later still more) .92
Moreover, almost all, if not all, capture contracts could plausibly
be labeled opportunism-protection contracts. For example, the for-
mer electricity monopolists claim, and some academic commentators
agree, that their implicit regulatory contract with regulators reflected
91 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining that in the absence of cur-
rent concessions by industry, the pro-regulatory government actors would be running
the risk that they would be replaced in a subsequent election before they realized the
benefits of the contract).
92 For statements of the view that DOI assurances are necessary to prevent govern-
ment opportunism, see, for example, Fred P. Bosselman, The Statutoy and Constitu-
tional Mandate for a No Surprises Polity, 24 EcOLOGY L.Q. 707, 718 (1997) (stating that
"[a]ssurances agreements ... guarantee[] developers that they will only have to pay a
certain amount for compliance even if the regulatory scheme changes after they have
invested time and resources in the process described above"), and Barton H. Thomp-
son, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 305, 371 (1997) (noting that assurance agreements are necessary to "ensure
property owners prior to regulation that they will receive some level and form of com-
pensation if the ESA ultimately limits use of their property").
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nothing more invidious than their common sense need for some as-
surance that their investments of millions of dollars in infrastructure
would not be followed by rate cuts that regulators might wish to put
into place in order to score political points with electricity consumers.
Similarly, the S&Ls that allegedly received forbearance assurances
claim, and again some academic commentators fully agree, that they
would have been foolhardy to make the significant financial sacrifices
requested by the government (taking over failed thrifts) if the gov-
ernment were not going to guarantee them some financial benefits in
93return.
Enforceable contracts that promise regulatory stability are, of
course, not the only method of protecting private parties from oppor-
tunistic behavior by the government. 4 The government's commit-
ment is first and foremost guaranteed by the costs to the government
of being seen as an entity whose word may not be trusted. As men-
tioned earlier, the costs in reputation-effects to the government of
breaking its word are greatest when the promise is visible and specific.
Thus, private parties may decrease the risk of governmental opportun-
ism by getting the government to commit itself in writing, and by pub-
licizing the fact and content of the government's commitment!' The
government could also insure the private party against the prospect
that the government will act to deny the private party the benefit of
the bargain by paying more money up front to get the private party to
assume the risk of a change in government policy. That strategy
might, however, make some deals too costly. Additionally, there is the
hostage strategy. A regulator's promise to maintain a certain regula-
tory approach is strengthened whenever reneging on that promise
93 See, e.g., Linda B. Coe, Note, Abrogation of Forbearance Agreements: Unauthorized by
FIRREA and Unconstitutional, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 192 (1990) ("Honoring for-
bearance agreements continues to be in the public interest."); Steven J. Tsimbinos,
Note, Forbearance Agreements To Consider Goodwill as Regulatory Capitak Binding Contracts
Thrifts Should Recover, 73 B.U. L. REV. 451, 476 (1993) (advocatingjudicial recognition
of regulators' forbearance assurances in order to "maintain private sector confidence
in government contracts, and preserve[] the government's ability to seek the private
sector's assistance in the future").
94 The alternative means of controlling government opportunism, however, some-
times may entail greater transaction costs, and those greater transaction costs some-
times may be more than the parties would find it worthwhile to bear. Thus, we recog-
nize that, at least in some contexts, the unavailability of regulatory contracting as an
option to safeguard against government opportunism may mean that certain transac-
tions simply do not take place.
95 This strategy may work best where the industry invests in the retention of influ-
ential allies in domifiant political institutions, such as maintaining good relations with
important politicians who can "make a stink" about the government breach.
BARGAINING AND DEMOCRACY
would lead directly to greater government costs. This is so whenever
the government has a continuing demand for the services or goods
provided by the private party being asked to perform based on the ex-
pectation that the government will keep its side of the bargain. For
example, "[i]f consumers have a growing demand for utility services
that will require capital investments, their future demand can serve as
a hostage to present commitments [to set compensatory rates of re-
turn on investment].95 The risk of government opportunism may also
be reduced whenever it is possible to reduce the stakes by opting for a
series of small promises, each to be performed and paid for in turn,
97versus one large one.
D. Interlude: Where We Are Going and Why
The existence of alternative means of reducing the risk of gov-
ernment opportunism does not mean that it is right to prohibit regu-
latory contracts as a method of achieving that goal. If the goal is valid,
enforcing some regulatory contracts to achieve that goal may make
sense, assuming, that is, that the cost of enforcing those contracts is
not too great. For example, if the cost of enforcing regulatory con-
tracts were to encourage the formation of capture and compromise
contracts, the cost might well be too great, particularly given that
other methods of preventing government opportunism exist. Indeed,
we believe that there are other, even more serious costs, associated
with enforcing any subset of regulatory contracts-costs which will
lead us to advocate a doctrinal approach aimed at isolating regulatory
contracts from other government contracts to hold all of the former
96 Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, Fragile Commitments and the Regulatoy
Proces, 9 YALEJ. ON REG. 73, 100 (1992). This article offers a number of strategies
available to regulators and industries to decrease the potential for government oppor-
tunism. It is noteworthy that the authors dismiss regulatory contracts, which they term
"the most obvious approach," in a few concise sentences:
Regulators interested in strengthening commitment can find many potential
approaches, though none are without cost. Perhaps the most obvious ap-
proach would be to make a commitment in the form of a contract. However,
such a contract would have to account for a vast number of contingencies,
many unforeseeable. In addition, the contract would be difficult and expen-
sive to enforce.
Id. at 101. For a description of other methods of shoring up government commitment
that have developed in the case of regulated utilities, see id. at 101-03.
97 See AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE
COMPETIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLrICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 157 (1991) ("Honor
among thieves is restored if they have to trust each other only a little bit at a time.").
For a general description of other methods of making commitments credible, see id. at
142-67.
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nonenforceable. 9'
First, however, we want to take seriously the idea that enforcing
some subset of regulatory contracts to protect against government op-
portunism makes sense and consider what doctrinal approach might
further that goal. If a doctrinal approach exists that would greatly re-
duce the formation of capture and compromise contracts, while still
leaving room for the enforcement of some regulatory contracts (con-
tracts that are more likely to be pure opportunism protection con-
tracts), it is worth detailing for both practical and analytical reasons.
The practical reason is that any such approach would be an im-
provement over the Court's current approach, which we believe in-
vites capture and compromise contracts and an all but limitless sale of
sovereignty. This happens because the Court treats regulatory con-
tracts as no more normatively problematic than contracts between pri-
vate parties and therefore, finds them entitled to routine enforce-
ment. Even more important, the Court justifies its willingness to
enforce virtually all regulatory contracts largely in the name of pre-
venting government opportunism. Thus, a doctrinal approach sensi-
tive to the goal of preventing government opportunism would not
only represent an improvement over current doctrine but would also
have some chance, albeit not a great chance, of being adopted.9 In
contrast, the more radical solution we advocate below, which is aimed
at invalidating all regulatory contracts would require the Court to do a
complete about-face.
Analytically, if no method of deterring capture or compromise
contracts exists short of invalidating all regulatory contracts, and as-
suming we are right about the evils of capture and compromise con-
tracts, the argument for invalidating all regulatory contracts is
strengthened. Conversely, if capture and compromise contracts can
be deterred through less drastic means, the argument for invalidating
all regulatory contracts must rest on other grounds.
98 See infra Part III.
Given how little respect was shown by a majority of theJustices in Winstarfor the
kinds of procedural requirements we advocate to deter capture and compromise con-
tracts, we recognize that the chance of an about-face in the near term is slim. United
States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996). Nonetheless, given that a majority ofJus-
tices could not agree on an approach to regulatory contracts in Winstar, there is some
reason to hope that an approach sensitive to government opportunism might influ-
ence some members of the Court. See supra Part I.B for a detailed discussion of the
Winstaropinion.
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III. PROTECTNG SOVEREIGNTYTHROUGH PROCEDURE
A. The Virtues of Transparency
After a regulatory contract has been formed-and, as we sug-
gested above, even at the moment it is formed-whether the contract
represents capture, compromise, or pure opportunism protection will
be a question with multiple answers, all of which may seem plausible
in most, if not all, cases. These categories may be separated for the
purpose of discourse, as we have stressed. That does not mean, how-
ever, that there is an easy way to choose among them when it comes to
characterizing what actually happened in any particular deal.
The preceding analysis does suggest at least two variables that
might be used to answer the question whether a given contract was
primarily a function of capture, compromise, or opportunism protec-
tion: (1) the extent to which the contract was formed during a period
of impending political change, and (2) the extent to which the con-
tract imposed burdens on the contracting private parties that, at the
time of contract formation, appeared to be roughly proportionate to
the burdens or costs imposed upon the private parties and to the
broader public gains achieved thereby. If the contract in question was
formed at a time of apparent long-term political stability with regard
to the contract's subject, the contract probably represents an oppor-
tunism protection contract and not a capture or compromise con-
tract. On the other hand, if the contract in question was formed at a
time of widely-recognized political instability on the relevant question,
the contract more likely represents capture or compromise, and not
pure opportunism protection. Contracts that disproportionately favor
the private contracting parties presumably reflect capture; more bal-
anced contracts could be either compromise or opportunism protec-
tion contracts.
The problems with any exercise based on questions like those we
have just posed should be readily apparent. How precisely would a
court, or anyone, determine whether a period of time is one of politi-
cal stability or consensus on an issue versus one of instability? While it
may be true that indeterminacy inheres in every legal test, there is un-
doubtedly a continuum of indeterminacy and the questions above
seem to rest at one extreme. To make the indeterminacy problem
worse, any typing of a contract by a court is likely to happen years after
the contract was formed when, because of political change or other
factors, some powerful forces both within and outside of the govern-
ment are likely to be claiming that the contract is unfair to the
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broader public interest and should not be enforced. If political
change followed the contract formation, hindsight bias might easily
lead a court to judge that the contract represented an effort to ad-
dress the risk of political change even though, at the time of contract
formation, the contracting parties may have foreseen only political
stability. Similarly, because the contract ex post may seem to be a very
good deal for industry and a poor one for "the public," hindsight bias
might lead a court to find capture even though the contracting parties
at the time thought they were striking a balanced, arms-length deal.
To deter capture and compromise contracts, it is necessary for the
parties to believe at the time the contract is formed that a court would
be able to tell whether the contract reflects capture or compromise
more than opportunism protection. Given the enormous uncertainty
that would entail any ex post inquiry aimed at discerning capture or
compromise, there is no reason to believe that contracting parties will
hold such beliefs.
Upholding only those regulatory contracts that meet certain pro-
cedural requirements for their formation is a much more promising
approach. The procedural requirements to which we refer focus on
the level of openness, publicity, explicitness, or (as a one-word aggre-
gation of all of these) transparency surrounding the formation of the
contract and the terms of the contract itself. There is good reason to
believe that the greater the transparency of the contract's terms and
the political process surrounding the contract's formation, the less
likely it is that the contract represents either capture or political com-
promise and the more likely it is that the contract represents pure op-
portunism protection. With respect to capture contracts, transpar-
ency in the political process would, at least in theory, allow non-
captured political actors representing majoritarian interests to stop
the corrupt contracting process before it is ever consummated. Simi-
larly, transparency in the compromise contract process would allow
interests that regard the compromise as a sell-out or as a boon to self-
serving risk-averse politicians to weigh into the debate and influencethe . .100
the political outcome. In contrast, because they are not attempts to
sidestep current or looming political divisions, opportunism protec-
100 Of course, there may be a down side to limiting the formation of regulatory
contracts in this way: interest groups that otherwise would have stabilized political out-
comes by contract might simply resort to alternative means, for example, increased
campaign contributions. If those alternatives are themselves normatively undesirable,
they too should be addressed by reform proposals, such as effective campaign finance
reform legislation.
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tion contracts should be formed as readily under conditions of politi-
cal transparency as under conditions of political non-transparency.
For example, if a strong majority of the townsfolk wants to guarantee a
racetrack a five-year tax break to encourage the racetrack's construc-
tion and the consequent increase in town tourism, transparency re-
quirements should have no effect on the ability of the town to make
that deal. Perversely, the thrust of Winstar-clearly the most impor-
tant recent case regarding when regulatory contracts are enforce-
able-is to require less transparency, not more. This surely is a mis-
take that warrants immediate correction.
B. Restoring and SupplementingProcedural
Protections for Sovereignty
The Supreme Court never articulated a clear functional justifica-
tion for the particular procedural impediments it placed in the path
of regulatory contracts. They were impediments to enforcing regula-
tory contracts, and nothing more needed to be said. This jurispru-
dential attitude is rooted in a natural law tradition that predates the
Revolutionary War and was undoubtedly familiar to the framers of the
Constitution.' It is the attitude expressed by Lord Mansfield in Som-
erset in 1772: "the state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapa-
ble of being introduced on any reasons... but only by positive
law... It is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but
positive law."102 Similarly, in cases in which the procedural protections
of sovereignty were used to avoid contracts, the Court expressed the
sentiment that contractual commitments that impeded the State's ex-
ercise of sovereign powers were so disfavored by natural (as opposed
to constitutional) law that those commitments would be allowed to
impede legislation only when the positive law clearly supported that
reading of them and no other. Understanding this is important to
understanding the demise of the unmistakability and express delega-
tion doctrines. Once a majority of Justices stopped taking seriously
the notion that awarding damages for breach implicated sovereignty,
the unmistakability and express delegation doctrines lost their reason
for being. They were bound to fall. Aside from the assumption that
regulatory contracts ceded sovereignty, and that such was a bad thing,
the cases expressed no opinion on whether-and if so, why-the re-
101 See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 8-28 (1975) (discussing slavery, natural law, and judicial positivism in the 18th
century).
Somersetv. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (KB. 1772).
1999]
520 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREV1EW [Vol. 148:473
fusal to enforce the subset of regulatory contracts that failed the par-
ticular procedural hurdles built by the Court would advance the social
welfare while the enforcement of contracts that failed these hurdles
would not.
0 3
It is our claim that these particular procedural rules can be justi-
fied by their ability to deter the formation and the enforcement of
capture and compromise contracts. In addition, they are useful as de-
fault rules, which may promote more efficient trades by increasing
certainty about what is being bought and sold. The default rule justi-
fication may be quickly stated, as it is tangential to our present pur-
pose.
The default rule justification for the unmistakability rule is: Par-
ties to any contract or deal-including deals between the government
and private parties-sometimes fail to explicitly manifest their intent
as to the terms of their deal. Where they so fail, courts employ default
rules to approximate the parties' intent. If the default rule an-
nounced by the court is a clear and straightforward one, it assists par-
ties in subsequent contract negotiations by putting them on advance
notice of how their contracts will be interpreted in the absence of ex-
plicit provisions, and thereby indicating the explicit provisions they
should take care to include in the contract. The existence of default
rules facilitates efficient bargaining. Moreover, the unmistakability
doctrine, which sets the absence of a government commitment of
regulatory stability as the default, seems preferable to the alternative
default rule: that in the absence of an explicit manifestation of intent,
the courts will assume that the parties intended an enduring regula-
tory commitment on the part of the government. The unmistakability
default rule is preferable because judging which legislative acts breach
a contract is no simple matter, given the government's broad power to
legislate and the myriad of ways that legislation might interfere with a
contract. Insisting that the parties specify precisely what, if anything,
the government is promising not to do would minimize the uncer-
tainty created by ex post court review. Court review under the alterna-
tive default rule would seem to invite more uncertainty, not to men-
103 In the Providence Bank case, one of the earliest unmistakability precedents, Jus-
tice Marshall did suggest that the unmistakability requirement is important to ensure
notice to the "whole community" in a matter-the abandonment of the sovereign
power-in which "the whole community is interested." Providence Bank v. Billings, 29
U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 561 (1830). That passage, as well as the other cryptic comments by
the Court on this topic, does not illuminate why greater notice is needed in the regula-
tory contracts arena than in other arenas of governance or, perhaps more importantly,
what real difference that notice would make.
BARGAINVG AND DEMOCRACY
tion a greater countermajoritarian role for the courts-something
worthy of avoidance in its own right.'0 4
The more important justification for the unmistakability and ex-
press delegation doctrines involves their potential to influence the
dynamics surrounding dealmaking between government and private
actors. Both doctrines lower the monitoring costs for parties not in-
volved directly in the agency or legislative process of formulating regu-
latory contracts and thus, facilitate efforts by such parties to oppose
politically the attempted formation of such contracts. Where regula-
tory contracts do not represent in fact a broad political consensus,
such opposition is quite likely to be successful. Since both capture
and compromise contracts are unlikely to represent a broad political
consensus while pure opportunism protection contracts are likely to
represent such a consensus, these devices would help deter the first
two kinds of contracts, while encouraging the latter.
Consider a capture contract where a group of agency officials
want to strike a highly favorable deal with an industry that imposes
modest benefits on the industry in return for a highly valuable prom-
ise of stable regulatory treatment. In the absence of the express dele-
gation doctrine, such a deal could be legally consummated without
any express legislative authorization. 15 The requirement of legislative
authorization forces the agency to enlist the legislature in a program
of contract formation, and it therefore serves to notify non-captured,
public interest legislators of impending regulatory deals. So notified,
they can organize to defeat the legislative authorization by raising
questions about the public interest justification for regulatory con-
tracting in the context of the particular agency and regulatory pro-
gram at issue. Even if they cannot defeat legislative authorization, the
concerned legislators are put on notice to oversee the agency receiv-
ing the authorization more closely than they otherwise might have.
104 The unmistakability doctrine, like all plain or clear statement rules, constrains
judicial discretion. It is thus ironic thatJustice Scalia, the leading proponent on the
Court of limiting judicial discretion through plain statement rules, advocates a tooth-
less version of the unmistakability doctrine that would enhance judicial discretion to
decide precisely what commitments the government had and had not made. See
United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 920 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("In
my view, the doctrine has little if any independent legal force beyond what would be
dictated by normal principles of contract interpretation.").
105 The express delegation cases left open the question whether "anything less than
a clear and affirmative" legislative delegation of the authority to "contract[] away a
power of regulation," Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265, 276 (1908),
would ever be sufficient to permit a delegee to enter into judicially enforceable regula-
tory contracts. We believe the answer should be no.
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Furthermore, even where the legislature and the agency both are
fully captured, the unmistakability requirement serves to notify con-
stituencies who may not be represented in the agencies or legisla-
ture-but who still can wield political clout-of the impending forma-
tion of regulatory contracts and the consequent need to launch a
lobbying effort to thwart that formation. For example, imagine that
pro-regulatory, but highly risk-averse agency officials wish to enter into
a compromise regulatory contract with an industry to secure certain
regulatory concessions and cool political battles. If the officials can do
so without entering into an express agreement with the industry, then
they may be able to "close the deal" without any awareness on the part
of less risk-averse, pro-regulatory constituencies. It is, to say the least,
hard for outsiders to monitor unspoken and unwritten deal-making.
If, however, the agency must secure explicit legislative authorization
of at least its general plan in order to engage in regulatory contract-
ing, and must incorporate the regulatory deal in an explicit, unmis-
takable rulemaking, then opposition groups are more likely to take
notice and perhaps raise questions and rally support against compro-
mise measures.
While the pre-Winstar procedural doctrines served to lower the
monitoring costs for noncontracting parties and thus presumably
played some role in deterring the formation of undesirable contracts,
the doctrines did not go far enough. They did not ensure anything
like full transparency in the regulatory contracting process. For one
thing, it appears that the express delegation doctrine was never read
to require that each specific agency promise purporting to impede fu-
ture government action be a promise that the agency is expressly
authorized by the legislature to make. Instead, at most what seems to
have been required was unmistakable legislative authorization for the
agency to enter into a particular type or category of regulatory con-
tracts (e.g., authorization for the federal bank regulators to enter into
forbearance agreements with thrifts, rather than authorization for
specific forbearance agreements). A requirement of specific legisla-
tive authorization for each contract obviously would consume substan-
tial legislative resources but such a requirement would make it signifi-
cantly easier for constituencies (including legislators) to track and
challenge the regulatory contracts that the agency might seek to en-
ter.
Additionally, the pre-Winstar unmistakability requirement did not
guarantee that the agency's contract with the private contracting party
be made subject to public notice and comment before its final con-
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summation. Agency rulemakings can proceed, as a matter of statutory
requirements, only after the public is given notice and time to com-
ment. That requirement dramatically lowers monitoring costs for out-
side constituencies and thus helps them to participate effectively in
policy formation. In contrast, the procedural protections put in place
by the pre-Winstar Court fell far short of the public notice and com-
ment required by the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA).' 06 Thus,
for the purposes of the unmistakability doctrine, regulators and an
agency could enter into an unmistakable, express deal in a back room
with no opportunity for public notice, let alone meaningful comment.
Notice and comment requirements for regulatory contracts would add
to the costs of agency contracting, but regulatory contracts formed by
agencies are (or should be) rare enough, and the stakes for demo-
cratic governance seem high enough, that the costs of formalized pub-
lic notice seem justified. The Court could interpret the APA to in-
clude regulatory contracts although we think that would be highly
unlikely. Therefore, Congress should consider amending the APA to
bring regulatory contracts under the notice and comment regime.
Another additional procedural requirement that the Court or
Congress might adopt to deter capture and compromise contracts by
fostering transparency is a liquidated damages requirement. Regula-
tory contracts without liquidated damages provisions should be unen-
forceable in court. This rule would minimize the moral hazard prob-
lem implicit in regulatory contracts and facilitate thoughtful
democratic deliberation surrounding their formation. The moral
hazard problem, simply stated, is that once the government has prom-
ised to insure the private party against the risk that the law will
change, the private party has little incentive to worry about the social
utility of his activities or investments. Thus, all full insurance con-
tracts invite inefficient behavior, which is why one rarely sees full, as
opposed to partial, promises to insure. A liquidated damages re-
quirement might function in a manner similar to partial insurance,
limiting the moral hazard problem. Perhaps most importantly, a liq-
uidated damages provision would help the present majority focus on
the costs it was about to impose on the future-costs likely to be dis-
counted too heavily even if they are highlighted, a difficulty "inherent
in play now, pay later" contracts. Highlighting them, however, would
help minimize the over-discounting problem.
106 SeeAdministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (setting forth the rule-
making requirements of general notice and an opportunity for interested persons to
participate).
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The tobacco deal, in either of its two incarnations, would have
failed our transparency requirements. It did not contain a liquidated
damages provision nor did it expressly state that the government
promised to pay damages in the event that Congress either outlawed
nicotine prior to the year specified by the law as the earliest date for
such action or lifted some of the obstacles to FDA regulation of to-
bacco that the bill contemplated would remain in place for twenty-five
years. Nonetheless, under Winstar, if Congress had enacted some ver-
sion of the tobacco deal, a court could have required the federal gov-
ernment to pay damages to the tobacco companies for repealing any
part of the complex legislation prior to the date contemplated by the
original deal, which for most purposes would have been twenty-five
years from the date of enactment. Yet did anyone (other than the to-
bacco lawyers whom we presume are worth the money they are paid)
understand that the people of the United States were being asked to
assume the risk that this law was a huge mistake? Did anyone (again,
other than the tobacco lawyers) understand that if the tobacco deal
was passed and ended up failing to achieve any of its purposes, we
might not be able to afford to repeal any material part of it because
the damage payments that might be due to the industry (even dis-
counted by the probability that the Court would carve a tobacco-
exception to Winstar) would be more than we could afford to pay?
Certainly no newspaper article that we have found discussed the con-
tractual nature of the tobacco deal or mentioned the possibility of
damage payments, and no member of Congress mentioned this dur-
ing the debate on the McCain bill'°7 or at any other time, as far as we
have been able to tell. We are convinced that as soon as the public
and lawmakers focused on the possibility, however remote, that the
tobacco bill might leave us paying the industry, instead of the other
way around, this approach to the tobacco problem would have been
dead.
Winstar invites opportunism, not by the government, but by pri-
vate parties. Private parties are always more likely than the public to
know whether the deal they are entering with the government (be it a
deal memorialized in legislation or regulation) sounds enough in con-
tract to support a plausible threat in the future that a change in policy
will cost the government dearly. The public (and the legislature, at
least when it comes to agency contracts) is much less likely, both dur-
ing and after contract formation, to be aware that damages might be
107 See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (discussing the McCain bill).
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due upon breach. Even where the possibility of breach is obvious, the
public is also unlikely to have any idea how to assess the amount any
such damages might be. The tobacco story we just told demonstrates
the true dangers of living under a Winstar regime, and the pressing
need for the Court to adopt transparency requirements that might
help prevent a replay of last year's events, only this time with a scarier
ending.
IV. PROTECTING SOVEREIGNTYTHROUGH SUBSTANCE
Assume that all the transparency requirements we advocated
above are adopted.108 Why should Congress or a state or city legisla-
ture not be held to the contracts it makes? We return then to the
problem with which we began: Imagine the year 2003. Neither Con-
gress nor the President wants to raise taxes on the eve of a presidential
election year. On the other hand, both the President and Congress
want to spend money on programs popular with a majority of the
American people: education, health care, infrastructure improve-
ments, intelligence agency programs aimed at terrorism, or whatever
else seems pressing that year.
Luckily, the merger-mania of previous years has produced mam-
moth conglomerates with serious cash to spend on the right invest-
ments. The senior management of Travelers or some other outsized
company has, as most company management teams have, a laundry
list of initiatives that would greatly benefit the company. Through
lobbying and strategically placed campaign contributions (assuming
no effective campaign finance reform has been enacted), some of
these initiatives stand a better than even chance of becoming law; oth-
ers do not. Those that get enacted will, in all likelihood, stay enacted
for the foreseeable friture, but there is always some risk that some un-
foreseen event will give next year's Congress (or some later Congress)
a strong enough reason to change the law.
The CEO has an idea. Why not draft a bill with all (or almost all)
of the desired government policies in it and offer to pay $10 billion up
front for such a law and $1 billion every year thereafter for the next
fifty years, the length of time the bill specifies it is to stay in effect as
law? Our transparency requirements have been enacted, so the bill
would have to state explicitly that it is a contract, that the federal gov-
ernment agrees to pay damages in the event of breach, and the sums
10 An eventuality we consider highly unlikely but nonetheless probably more likely
than the Court's adopting the proposal we are about to make.
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that would have to be paid as damages should one or another part of
the law be repealed before 2053-sums that are in the billions of dol-
lars. With the $10 billion up front payment, Congress could fund
some popular programs without raising taxes and the $1 billion a year
thereafter would undoubtedly also come in handy. To many lawmak-
ers the legislative provisions of this bill appear desirable-or at least
not too bad. They begin to tout the virtues of this bill, arguing that it
makes sense today, and that it will make sense tomorrow. Who can
prove otherwise? All crystal balls function equally well and are sel-
dom, if ever, likely to reveal the same picture.
The law is passed. Why should a court not hold us to this bargain?
What, if anything, is wrong with bargaining of this sort that it should
not be treated with the respect to be accorded all (or at least, most)1"
fully informed trades?
The short answer is that such a bargain undermines a fundamen-
tal norm, a norm that legitimates our government-majority rule."0
Regulatory contracts undermine majoritarianism in two separate ways:
by entrenching the will of past legislatures and by transferring sover-
eign power to private parties. Only the strongest of normative justifi-
cations could, therefore, possibly sustain court enforcement of regula-
tory contracts. After examining possible justifications, we find none of
them sufficient to warrant undermining majority rule.
A. Majoritarianism and Constitutional Entrenchment
Majoritarianism is a constitutional norm. We do not mean that
the United States Constitution was intended to operate, or now oper-
ates (through the institution of judicial review or in any setting in
which it is appealed to as evidence of what is right), primarily in the
service of majoritarian goals.' By "constitutional norm" we mean a
109 Of course, some "ordinary" contracts are not accorded this respect. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1979) (providing that certain terms of
a contract may be unenforceable on grounds of public policy).
10 At least one of us believes that an equally strong argument against these con-
tracts may be made on grounds not fully developed here. See Susan P. Koniak, Whose
Law Is It Anyway?, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 575, 604-06 (1992) (concluding in a review of
CORPORATE LAwBREA .NG AND INTERACTIvE COMPLIANCE (Jay A. Sigler & Joseph E.
Murphy eds., 1991) that fairness and impartiality are higher legal values than flexibility
and responsivity).
I Some scholars seem to argue that the Constitution and the institution ofjudi-
cial review properly understood are dedicated to enhancing popular sovereignty. See,
e.g., 1 BRUcE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONs 191-93 (1991) (characteriz-
ing judicial review as a mechanism to prevent factionalism); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill
of Rights as a Constitution, 100YALE LJ. 1131, 1206-08 (1991) (hypothesizing that both
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norm so central to group definition (to that which constitutes a
group) that to undermine the norm is to undermine the group. To
the extent that group members come to believe that those who pur-
port to control the group have abandoned their commitment to a
constitutional norm, the legitimacy of the leadership is discredited,
and the legitimacy of resistance to that leadership-in the name of
preserving the norm and thus restoring the group's integrity-is bol-
stered.
As we use the term "constitutional norm," some of the norms in
the Constitution are constitutional for almost all, if not all, Ameri-
cans-for example, freedom of speech. That does not mean that all
Americans agree on what threatens the norm and what does not. It
means that all or almost all agree that the norm is at the essence of
our national identity, and consequently, if most people came to be-
lieve that our government had stopped acting in accordance with that
norm, we would be a nation in crisis. Other norms in the Constitu-
tion are constitutional for some groups in our society and not for oth-
ers-the right to bear arms is an example. Our claim is that the norm
of majority rule is as constitutional, in the sense we have just de-
scribed, as free speech or any other norm in our national pantheon.
The existence of norms widely accepted as constitutional, like free
speech and majority rule, makes us a nation.' They facilitate norma-
Madison andJefferson intendedjudicial review to encompass both jurors and judges);
Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Aticle V, 55 U.
CmH. L. REV. 1043, 1055 (1988) (describing the people as both the masters and the
source of the Constitution). Our argument is different. First, to the extent it makes
sense to speak of the intent of the framers, we think that intent included a powerful
desire to counter majority preferences. Second, as to judicial review, while we will ar-
gue that majoritarianism has an important role to play in defining the proper scope of
that institution, we do not believe that the Supreme Court now (or ever) has acted, or
should act, in the service of majoritarianism to the exclusion of all other competing
norms.
1 Consider for a moment the reaction of the country (and the existence of consti-
tutional norms makes it possible to speak of that reaction as singular in some meaning-
ful, although not precise, way, given that there will always be a subgroup following a
prophet with some radically different understanding) if the government of Trenton,
NewJersey were to assume dictatorial power. Whether or not there were open revolts
in Trenton, this state of affairs would in all likelihood be seen as intolerable by Ameri-
cans outside of Trenton. Indeed, the normative argument used tojustify our tolerance
of non-majoritarian governments elsewhere in the world always begins with "their"
right to define themselves differently than we do, which itself can be seen as an expres-
sion of the norm of majoritarianism. On the other hand, the weakness of that claim is
to be found in the growing tendency of Americans (and others) to define perpetual
self-government or self-determination as a universal human right.
That phenomenon is not unusual. Constitutional norms, by definition, are so
cherished by the groups whose norms they are that the "right" of others to reject them
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tive discourse across the many groups that make up the greater soci-
ety--groups whose particular normative understandings and com-
mitments are complex and often diverge from one another's. Be-
cause constitutional norms are scarce and enormously valuable
commodities in the normative life of a nation, their meaning is bound
to be hotly contested."3 While it may not be possible to speak of the
meaning of a constitutional norm in a nation as big and diverse as
ours, it may nonetheless be possible to speak of normative positions
that most Americans would likely consider too strained to count as
plausible interpretations of a norm. Just as knowledge of what is true
is not a necessary condition for knowledge of what is false, agreement
on what a norm means is not a necessary condition for agreement on
what it does not mean.
Because majoritarianism is a powerful constitutional norm in this
country, the argument that the Supreme Court should use its power
to strike down laws only in the name of majoritarianism is forceful."
4
On the other hand, we believe (although these things are not matters
that lend themselves to easy proof) that there is a widely shared con-
sensus in the nation that majoritarianism should yield at times to
other compelling constitutional norms. There is even some substan-
tial agreement on the norms that might qualify for that exalted posi-
is difficult to accept and the "choice" of others not to value them is difficult to conceive
of as informed without assuming that those who make that choice are somehow not as
worthy as we. Thus, tolerance as a constitutional norm is quite difficult to maintain, at
least when it comes to any matter of critical normative importance, as this nation's ex-
perience and the experience of all groups demonstrates. For this reason, there is wis-
dom in prohibiting the establishment of religion as a means of protecting freedom of
religion. By attempting to prevent a religious creed from becoming a constitutional
norm, the First Amendment helps to maintain freedom of religion as a constitutional
norm.
13 "Were [a uniformity of meaning to occur] for a fleeting moment, a philosopher
would surely emerge to challenge the illusion of its identity with truth. The unification
of meaning... exists only for an instant, and that instant is itself imaginary [yet enor-
mously potent]." Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos
and Narrativ 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1983) (footnote omitted). Consider the power-
ful, imaginary, and fleeting nature of the moment in which Brown v. Board of Education
was accepted by almost all Americans as right. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and
Miranda, 80 CAL L. REV. 673, 674-75 (1992) (describing how Brown was initially one of
the most controversial decisions ever issued by the Court and how it has become
"common ground" that Brown is correctly decided while at the same time admitting
that "muted debate" about the correctness of the decision continues and, more impor-
tantly, offering in the remainder of his imaginative article, a strong critique of Brown).
That does not mean that we believe it is plausible to argue that the fi-amers in-
tended that result or that the Supreme Court has ever accepted such a limit on the
power ofjudicial review. We do not so believe.
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tion: liberty and equality. 5 The consensus that it is right for the
powerful norm of majoritarianism to yield on occasion is manifested,
however paradoxically, in the intensity of the struggle over what the
Constitution means.
Constitutional interpretation is important precisely because it is
understood as the single legitimate method of trumping the constitu-
tional norm of majority rule. It is the background norm of majoritari-
anism and its power that elevates a debate over the meaning of a few
pages of text into a discussion of fundamental values, of the right way
to live and to relate to one another.
Just as the constitutional debate is infused with power and mean-
ing by the background norm of majoritarianism, the norm of majori-
tarianism is reinforced and celebrated by its exception: constitutional
command. The expressive power of law works just that way: an excep-
tion may proclaim its own importance and, at the same time, the im-
portance of the rule. Thus, constitutional entrenchment, the triumph
of an imagined consensus of the past over the manifest will of the pre-
sent majority-or what is accepted as its proxy, the present legisla-
ture--cannot merely coexist with a powerful constitutional norm of
majoritarianism, but may reinforce that norm. We believe that for the
most part constitutional entrenchment has functioned just that way.
The relative rarity of Supreme Court decisions invalidating laws and
the extraordinary procedures that must be followed to entrench new
concepts have served to reinforce the power of the background
norm-the majority should rule.
By legislative entrenchment we mean a legal hierarchy in which
the will of a past legislature trumps the will of a present legislature."
16
US Again, that does not mean there is consensus on what these norms mean al-
though we believe that across a substantial area of normative space there is a widely
shared sense of what these norms do not mean. For example, we believe that very few
groups or individuals in present day America would maintain that adult sex with chil-
dren or sexual activity by anyone with animals is within the concept of liberty. Our
reference to a substantial area of normative space simply means that there are many
other examples like this one.
116 Our concern is not limited to legislatures. The argument we make applies
whether it is a present legislature attempting to bind a future legislature or a present
executive branch official or administrative agency trying to bind a future legislature,
executive officer, or administrative agency. Notice that we did not include in the list a
present legislature binding a future executive branch official or administrative agency.
That situation is different because in our system, the formal hierarchy of law provides
generally that neither an act of the executive nor one of an administrative agency may
trump a legislative decision. As long as in the future, the majority, through some arm
of government, can express its will without encountering some extra-constitutional le-
gal impediment put in place by a past majority acting through an equal or lesser arm
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Of course, it is true that in some sense all acts of present legislature-
for example, decisions about whether to declare war, how much
money to print, whether to invest in infrastructure, and whether to in-
vest in education-limit what future legislatures might do. By creating
so-called entitlement programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and
Medicaid, past legislatures created present expectations that succeed-
ing legislatures have found all but impossible to ignore.'1 7 In all such
examples, however, the future legislature is limited either because
past acts have changed the physical world or because they have
changed how people perceive the world, their place in it, and the du-
ties of their government in a way that creates a future consensus for
one policy or another. As to the second phenomenon (past legisla-
tion shaping perceptions), it is not properly seen as legislative en-
trenchment in that it is the present majority whose will stands in the
way of changing what a past legislature has done."" Moreover, neither
phenomenon (physical world entrenchment nor perception en-
trenchment) can be eliminated. Majority rule would be meaningless
without the ability to decide matters that have future consequences on
the physical world or mental perceptions, and, in any case, no limit on
of government, there is no problem of entrenchment, as we mean to use the term.
Notice too that one might plausibly argue that the hierarchy of legal authority on
its own prohibits a past administrative agency (or executive branch official) from bind-
ing a future legislature. The Supreme Court sidesteps this problem with its broad
delegation doctrine, which allows it to treat a regulatory contract made by a past ad-
ministrative agency (or executive branch official) as if it were a regulatory contract
made by a past legislature on the ground that a past legislature delegated to the past
agency or official the power to make contracts. See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp.,
518 U.S. 839, 890-91 (citing the statutory history that authorized FSLIC and the Bank
Board to make contracts governing the treatment of regulatory capital). For that rea-
son and for ease of reference, we will use the term "legislative entrenchment" to refer
to entrenchment by past administrative agencies and executive branch actors as well as
by legislatures.
117 But see Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Star. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)
(limiting social welfare benefits).
118 This phenomenon points to an important distinction between retroactive legis-
lation and regulatory contracts. Louis Kaplow was right in noticing that regulatory
contracts involve many of the same problems raised by retroactive laws. See Kaplow,
supra note 3, at 563-64 (stating that both retroactive laws and regulatory contracts pre-
sent concerns about retroactive effects and the ability of government to later modify
any provisions made). Indeed, see infra note 191 and accompanying text, where we
rely on his insights to support our proposal. As his main concern was neither regula-
tory contracts nor the preservation of the majoritarian process, however, he did not
concentrate on the fact that regulatory contracts (unlike the other methods that he
discusses of relieving people of the consequences of legal transitions) are made ex ante
(by a past legislature), and thus, before the need for a legal change has become appar-
ent.
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majority rule could prevent either phenomenon. 9 For those reasons,
we do not consider either phenomenon as an example of legislative
entrenchment.
On the other hand, the fact that present decision making neces-
sarily affects future decision making, in the ways we have just dis-
cussed, does not mean that the present majority should be free to add
to the natural effects of its decisions additional impediments to having
its will overturned by a future majority. By "additional impediments"
we mean provisions of law that prohibit or otherwise restrict the right
of a future legislature to repeal a law. Those impediments are what we
mean by entrenching mechanisms, and they may take various forms.
The leading commentator on legislative entrenchment, Julian
Eule, identified four varieties: absolute entrenchment, which denies the
power to repeal for all time; procedural entrenchment, which demands
that extraordinary procedures be followed to effectuate a change;
transitory entrenchment, which denies the power to repeal for a specified
period of time; and preconditional entrenchment, which allows change
"only on the occurrence of a preordained event."20 The Constitution,
as Eule pointed out, uses all but the first of his entrenchment de-
vices121 without directly addressing Congress's power to bind its succes-
sors through the use of similar devices or the power of state legisla-
119 One could try to identify those legislative actions whose power to alter the fu-
ture seem unalterable or so severe that one legislature should not be permitted to take
them at all or at least not without following extraordinary procedures. The problem
with this exercise is that not acting also has long-term and severe consequences. Thus,
it seems to us incoherent to limit majority rule based on the degree to which a major-
ity's decision might affect the physical world or the mental perceptions of persons
within a society.
3
20 Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retro-
activity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 384-85. Eule noted that absolute entrench-
ment is rarely used. See id. at 384 ("Rarely is an attempt at entrenchment seen in such
unqualified form.").
21 See id. at 385 (arguing that Article V of the Constitution uses the three en-
trenching devices short of absolute entrenchment). Article V specifies that two clauses
of Article I (on the importation of slaves and the proportionality of direct taxation)
shall not be changed until 1808, which "exemplifies transitoy entrenchment." Id. (em-
phasis added). Article V also prohibits "deprivation of a state's equal suffrage in the
Senate absent the consent of that state," which is an example of preconditional entrench-
ment, i.e., no change in the rule unless a particular event occurs. Id. Finally, as to the
rest of the Constitution, Article V requires "extraordinary procedures for alteration,"
which is an example of procedural entrenchment. Id. We recognize that the "state con-
sent" requirement could be described as procedural entrenchment instead of precon-
ditional entrenchment, but preconditional entrenchment need not be procedural at
all. A regulatory contract, for example, could provide that it was to last for 10 years but
that the government had a unilateral right to cancel at any time if war broke out in the
Middle East.
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tures to entrench their will against the will of their successors. One
could argue that the extraordinary process detailed in the Constitu-
tion for amending the text, that is, for entrenching new policies, is in-
consistent with entrenchment of any sort by ordinary legislative act,
but Eule rejects that argument as too simplistic.'2 2 For him, the fram-
ers' pro-entrenchment bias, evident from their willingness to entrench
their own views of the public good, acts as a counterweight to what-
ever anti-entrenchment bias might be implied from the extraordinary
procedures for amending the Constitution outlined in Article V.'23 In
other words, for Eule, the very existence of constitutional entrench-
ment implies that legislative entrenchment may also be constitutional.
Eule thus embarks on a search for more specific constitutional text to
bolster his intuition that entrenching devices should be given no ef-
fect by the courts, which is precisely what extant cases that specifically
address this question hold, albeit without specifying that the Constitu-
tion dictates this result.
Eule argues that all four methods he identifies as entrenching vio-
late specific provisions of the United States Constitution and state
constitutions.1 4 His argument is this: in England, each Parliament is
12 See id. at 399 ("Admittedly, [Article V] must be interpreted as providing the ex-
clusive vehicle for amendment, but it does not follow that any enactment that has some
entrenching impact on future legislatures must necessarily be regarded as an amend-
ment.").
123 Eule suggests that accepting constitutional entrenchment as a good somehow
requires one to concede that legislative entrenchment might be similarly justified:
James Madison, albeit a man of vision, was no oracle. Do not the utilitarian
fears counsel against the petrification of a constitutional structure to the same
degree that they warn against the entrenchment of a legislative command?
Were the Framers blessed with greater powers of progn[o]stication or purity
of motive than are possessed by those the people elect to govern them?
Id. at 389 (footnote omitted). Eule makes clear that he accepts the good of constitu-
tional entrenchment, although he leaves a full-blown defense of that argument for an-
other day. See id. at 385 n.19 (deferring discussion of the validity of the assumptions
underlying constitutional entrenchment to a future date). Nonetheless, he makes
clear in this work the underlying premise of that argument: the Constitution is an ex-
pression of the sovereign, the people, while legislative acts are an expression, not of
the sovereign, but of the agents of the sovereign. His argument against legislative en-
trenchment thus hangs on the temporal limits of the agency conferred on legislatures
by the sovereign people. While we think this is a neat argument, to the degree it sug-
gests that the institution ofjudicial review is somehow more majoritarian than the acts
of elected representatives, we do not buy it.
124 Eule makes his main argument while considering only federal legislative en-
trenchment, concluding that Article I, § 2, cI. 1, and § 3, cI. 1, set out the term lengths
of members of Congress. "Just as the members of Congress lack power to extend their
terms beyond those set by the Constitution, they may not undermine the spirit of that
document by immutably extending their influence beyond those terms." I& at 404.
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sovereign, i.e., the supreme source of law during its existence; there-
fore, its laws cannot be trumped by laws emanating from any other
source, including past Parliaments. Congress, on the other hand, is
not sovereign. In the United States, the people are sovereign, and
their will is expressed in both the Constitution and through periodic
elections. The Constitution, recognizing the importance of frequent
elections to the people's retention of sovereignty, limits the terms of
legislators. The "spirit" of those constitutional limits is undermined
when legislators seek to extend their influence beyond those terms
through entrenching devices, just as surely as the letter of those con-
stitutional provisions would be violated by legislation purporting to
extend the actual length of the terms that Senators or House Mem-
bers serve. Eule thus concludes: "Ironically, therefore, the en-
trenchment prohibition, which in England originates in the perpetual
nature of legislative power, emanates in the United States from the
transitoy nature of such power.
"
1
We think Eule's constitutional analysis is plausible, assuming one
accepts his premise that the existence of constitutional entrenchment
suggests that legislative entrenchment is equally acceptable.27 We re-
ject, however, the idea that absent specific constitutional text, no
principled basis exists on which to prefer a later legislative act over an
earlier act with which the later act is inconsistent. Majoritarianism
dictates the preference. If majority rule means anything, it means rule
by the current majority and not by a majority of the past. That is the
point of elections. Moreover, our understanding of the relationship
between constitutional entrenchment and majority rule differs
strongly from Eule's. We see constitutional entrenchment as reinforc-
ing, however paradoxically, the background norm of majoritarianism;
he sees it as placing the virtue of rule by the present majority in doubt.
Eule refuses to rest his rejection of legislative entrenchment on
Later, while discussing the Contracts Clause, which is directed exclusively to the states,
Eule suggests in a footnote that both the clause guaranteeing states a republican form
of government and state constitutional provisions setting the terms of state legislators
yield the same result for the states. See id. at 420 n.189 (deriving from state constitu-
tions and the provisions of Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution a basis for applica-
tion of his thesis to both state and federal bodies).
12 See id. at 391-93 (discussing the volitional abolishment of entrenchment by Par-
liament itself).
126 Id. at 403-04.
127 It is that premise, which we reject, that sends Eule searching for constitutional
text to support the proposition that later legislative acts should trump earlier ones.
Our understanding of the constitutional importance of majoritarianism dispenses with
the need to support an absolute preference for later legislative acts (over earlier ones)
with constitutional text.
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majoritarianism not only because he understands constitutional en-
trenchment as undercutting that norm but also because he is appar-
ently embarrassed by how far from majoritarian American political life
really is.'28 Although Eule does not specify which aspects of American
political life embarrass him, we can easily imagine what he might have
in mind. The small number of Americans who actually vote and the
disproportionate influence of wealthy corporations and individuals
are two obvious examples. We too are embarrassed by those facts, but
we contend that our embarrassment and Eule's come from the same
place-the power of the majoritarian norm. Indeed, we would claim
that most Americans, if asked, would be just as embarrassed by these
facts. Thus, those who argue against campaign finance reform must
stand on a constitutional norm that has some chance of trumping ma-
joritarianism-free speech-to make their argument tenable and
avoid similar embarrassment.
Despite Eule's claims that it is the text of the Constitution that
convinces him that the Court should not uphold entrenching devices,
this constitutional interpretation derives not only from his own com-
mitment to the norm of majoritarianism but also his belief that it is an
enormously powerful constitutional norm (agreeing with us). He
concludes his argument on the reading of the text of the Constitution
in this way:
Each election furnishes the electorate with an opportunity to provide
new direction for its representatives. This process would be reduced to
an exercise in futility were the newly elected representatives bound by the
policy choice of a prior generation of voters. The fundamental, albeit
admittedly often suspect, assumption of American political life-that leg-
islative action reflects current majoritarian preferences-could be finally
laid to rest if shifting majorities were unable to alter prior majoritarian
choices. It is unfortunate that legislative inertia and retentionist biases
often prevent the repeal of anachronistic statutes that could not be pres-
ently reenacted and thus can be said to lack current majoritarian sup-
port. It would be intolerable, however, if additional obstacles set in place
by the enacting legislatures had to be hurdled for the new majority to
find a statutory voice.
We could not have said it better.
Before moving on to consider the extent to which regulatory con-
tracts resemble other entrenchment devices, we wish to examine how
the Court in Winstar treats the relationship between constitutional and
128 See id. at 405 (noting the persistence of anachronistic statutes, that despite their
lack of majoritarian support, Congress has not repealed).
12 Id. at 404-05 (footnote omitted).
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legislative entrenchment. Justice Souter, writing for the plurality, cites
Eule's article as the source of his perspective on the two forms of en-
trenchment
In England, of course, Parliament was historically supreme in the sense
that no "higher law" limited the scope of legislative action or provided
mechanisms for placing legally enforceable limits upon it in specific in-
stances; the power of American legislative bodies, by contrast, is subject
to the overriding dictates of the Constitution and the obligations that it
authorizes.'"
In short, Souter agrees with Eule that the Constitution somehow
places the question of whether current legislation should trump past
legislation in doubt.
According to Souter, the current legislature's power is limited not
only by the "dictates of the Constitution" but also by "the obligations
that [the Constitution] authorizes."' 3' The potential breadth of that
last phrase emerges when one contrasts it with an alternative, "the ob-
ligations that the Constitution demands be honored." This alternative
leads to the Contracts Clause, which has been read since Chief'Justice
Marshall's time to prohibit the states from impairing the obligations
of (some) contracts made by predecessor state governments.32
Souter's language, on the other hand, points to no specific constitu-
tional text. Rather, it suggests that the Constitution in some unspeci-
fied manner requires that Congress honor certain "obligations" that
the text has empowered it to undertake (and perhaps also those that it
does not prohibit a state from undertaking, which might also be con-
sidered "authorized").
Where in the Constitution is that principle to be found? Souter
never tells us. He might have argued that the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment prevents the federal government from interfer-
ing with its own contracts, thereby reviving the spirit of Lochner3 al-
beit with a twist: public contracts would be treated as creating rights
with which the government could not interfere, while private con-
tracts would presumably continue to be treated as if they created no
such rights. But Souter does not cite the Due Process Clause or any
other provision of the Constitution as the source of this limit on Con-
ISO United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (plurality opinion).
1S 1 I&
332 See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (declaring that a legislature
cannot void its past contracts, including grants of land, by passing new legislation).
I Lochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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gress's power (and perhaps also on state legislatures' power),' T al-
though a later Supreme Court case does briefly refer to Souter's opin-
ion as if it were grounded in the Due Process Clause."" Souter does,
however, quote Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck, '
where Marshall identified two principles that prevented the then-
present Georgia legislature from reneging on its own contract: the
Contracts Clause (which of course would be inapplicable in the fed-
eral law context of Winstar), and an inherent limit on "legislative
power" resulting largely from natural law as opposed to the Constitu-
tion's text. Given Souter's understanding that Parliament's legislative
power includes no such inherent limit, one would expect him to jus-
tify his insistence on imposing this limit on Congress's legislative
power in the absence of specific constitutional text. This is an obliga-
tion he assuredly does not fulfill.
B. Regulatory Contracts as Legislative Entrenchment
Regulatory contracts do not fit neatly into Eule's entrenchment
categories.' s3 Under current Supreme Court doctrine, which denies
specific enforcement as a remedy for government breach'38 regulatory
contracts do not involve transitory entrenchment, as Eule uses that
term, in that a succeeding legislature may change the law before the
contract's expiration date as long as damages are paid. Regulatory
contracts also do not involve preconditional entrenchment, as Eule
intended to use that term. Instead of conditioning repeal on the oc-
currence of some prior event (precondition), regulatory contracts
impose a financial cost (a tax or a fine, if you will) on the exercise of
the power to repeal. It is no accident that regulatory contracts fall
outside Eule's categories. Eule sees regulatory contracts as attempts at
134 It is possible that this amorphous duty to honor "obligations" would extend be-
yond what the law might recognize as contractual duty. After all, the normal under-
standing of the word "obligations" encompasses more than responsibilities created by
the exchange of mutual consideration necessary to the formation of a binding con-
tract.
13 See Lynce v. Mathus, 519 U.S. 433, 440 (1997) (citing Winstar to support the
proposition that "the Constitution places limits on the sovereign's ability to use its law-
making power to modify bargains it has made with its subjects").
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
1S7 SeeEule, supra note 120, at 384-85 (defining forms of entrenchmentas absolute,
procedural, transitory, or preconditional).
3 Of course, specific performance is not normally available for breach of contract
even when both contracting parties are private parties. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CoNTRAcTs § 359(1) (1981) (stating that specific performance is not to be ordered if
damages would be adequate remedy).
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entrenchment only insofar as specific enforcement is the remedy for
breach, which would place them squarely in his transitory entrench-
ment category.
Here, Eule and the majority of the Justices in Winstar seem to
agree: neither considers a tax imposed by a former legislature on a
specific policy choice of a current legislature to be entrenchment. We
do.3 9 Indeed, we see the point as so obvious that we are at a loss as to
what more there is to say. We thus turn to the arguments advanced by
Eule and Souter to sustain the opposite conclusion. Unfortunately,
Eule substitutes assertion for argument. At first, he seems to be on
our side: "This entrenching of legislative error may seem fair under
someone's theory of equitable estoppel, but it slights the temporal
limits of legislative authority and handcuffs the ability of the current
representatives to serve the legitimate needs and desires of their con-
stituents."4 1 Ultimately, he excludes damages-only contracts from en-
trenchment. He fails to explain, however, the basis for distinguishing
preconiditional entrenchment, which he views as unconstitutional,
from postconditional entrenchment, which he would allow.
Souter also fails to distinguish a requirement to pay damages from
illegitimate forms of entrenchment. He states that
[W]hile agreements to insure private parties against the costs of subse-
quent regulatory change do not directly impede the exercise of sovereign
power, they may indirectly deter needed governmental regulation by rais-
ing its costs. But all regulations have their costs, and Congress itself ex-
pressed a willingness to bear the costs at issue here ....
139 The recognition that regulatory contracts may deter regulatory change is Gillian
Hadfield's starting point in a thoughtful examination of what type of contract reme-
dies would be most normatively defensible in Winstar-type litigation. See generally
Gillian Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract: Damages for Breach of Contract by Govern-
ment, 8 S. CAL. INrEmisc. LJ. 467 (1999) (assessing the justifications for expectation
damages in breach-of-contract cases and concluding that reliance damages are a more
normatively appealing measure).
140 Eule, supra note 120, at 423.
141 Eule may have carved out damages-only contracts from his list of entrenchment
devices that the courts should ignore at least in part because he believed that the Su-
preme Court, having treated government contracts as subject to the Contracts Clause
for virtually all of constitutional history, would never seriously reconsider that position.
See id. (calling the argument that the Contracts Clause does not apply to government
contracts as "tilting at windmills").
1 United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 883 (1996) (plurality opinion).
Justice Souter's plurality opinion repeatedly refers to the alleged arrangement between
federal bank regulators and the thrifts as an insurance contract, as if to suggest that the
contract functions the same as, and is no more problematic than, the conventional in-
surance contracts with which we are all familiar. See id. at 894 (comparing the gov-
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That is true, but the fact that all regulatory change entails some
costs does not mean that the threat of regulatory contract damages
will not slow or even stop change that otherwise might have occurred.
Here, the well-developed debate regarding the Takings Clause is in-
structive. Both advocates and opponents of broad applications of the
Takings Clause agree that requiring the government to pay for regula-
tory change would result in less regulatory change. They simply dis-
agree as to whether that would be a good thing.'4
There is good reason to think (and for legislators and agency offi-
cials to believe) that regulatory contract damages often would be sub-
stantial and thus would serve as a powerful deterrent to later legisla-
tive change. Private parties to enforceable regulatory contracts have
no incentive to minimize the costs to themselves of possible regulatory
change; quite the contrary, precisely because they may wish to stop
such change and, in any event, because they hold a legal entitlement
to damages resulting from such change,'" such parties might take ac-
tions to enhance the government's damages liability. This point-that
the private parties to regulatory contracts can control, to some extent,
emnment to a private insurer through its regulation of capital reserves). The alleged
arrangement between the regulators and bank board, however, differs from conven-
tional insurance contracts in one critical respect: the risk that is ostensibly being in-
sured against (that is, the risk of regulatory change) is under the control of the in-
surer. In conventional insurance, the insurer insures against a risk external to itself
and hence beyond its control (for example, an earthquake or a theft in a homeowner's
policy). Thus, in the regulatory contract setting as opposed to the conventional insur-
ance setting, the existence of the contract predictably will result in reductions in the
likelihood of the insured-against risk.
14 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POsNER, ECONoMIc ANALYsIS OF LAw 56-61 (4th ed. 1992)
(favoring compensation requirements on the ground that legislatures will impose
more regulations if doing so does not require compensation for the private costs of the
new regulations); Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law? Libertarian Prop-
erty, Natural Law, and the Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25 ENvT L. 171,
179-80 (1995) (criticizing an expansive interpretation of the Takings Clause on the
grounds that "increased compensation requirements will produce less regulation,
which in turn will produce more environmental injuries"); J. Peter Byrne, Ten Argu-
ments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 131-36
(1995) (arguing that expansive interpretations of the Takings Clause will result in in-
sufficient regulation to protect against long-term environmental risks); Michael M.
Berger, Environmental Protection? It Depends on Who is Paying, L.A. DAILYJ., Aug. 1, 1993,
at 7 (predicting-and praising-the reduction in regulatory burdens on private land-
owners that would result from compensation requirements). For a dissenting view
from the general consensus that more compensation requirements means less regula-
tion, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence 90
MicH. L. REv. 1892, 1958-59 (1992) (arguing that compensation may reduce opposi-
tion to regulation).
4 For a discussion on reasons a private party might not see damages as the equiva-
lent of performance, see supra text following note 26.
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the costliness of those contracts to the government-leads us to our
second normative criticism of such contracts.
C. Regulatory Contracts as Sales of Sovereignty
Our argument thus far has been that regulatory contracts, like all
entrenching devices, threaten majoritarianism by transferring sover-
eignty to past majorities and their representatives. Yet regulatory con-
tracts pose an additional threat to majoritarianism not found in any
other form of entrenchment: they transfer sovereignty not just to the
former sovereign, but to private parties as well.
The private party who holds a regulatory contract has the power
ex post to release the sovereign from its promise by not seeking dam-
ages, to reduce the sovereign's cost of a particular decision by claim-
ing or actually incurring fewer damages, or to make the sovereign's
decision more burdensome to make by acting to increase the damages
that would be due upon breach.
It is at least as inconsistent with majoritarianism to transfer power
to private hands (by definition, also a minority) as it is for a present
majority to extend its power into the future. The principle that major-
ity power may not be transferred into private hands is reflected in that
part of the nondelegation doctrine that still stands-that the govern-
ment may not delegate legislative power to private groups.145
But is the power to contract not itself a power of sovereignty?
That might at least distinguish the nondelegation cases, where gov-
ernment power was transferred as a gift as opposed to an exchange for
consideration. Perhaps a majoritarian conception of democracy is in-
consistent with gifts, but not with sales for value. In Perry v. United
States,146 the Court said that "the right to make binding obligations is a
competence attaching to sovereignty." Can that be doubted?
We believe the answer is yes. Indeed, it is our position that the
sovereign's power to enter into binding contracts is by the very nature
of sovereignty ephemeral. How binding is anyone's promise to punish
14 SeeA.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 539-42 (1935)
(striking down a delegation of legislative power conferred upon private parties to
promulgate rules which apply a fair competition standard to virtually all of American
industry); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regula-
tory Negotiation, 43 DUEE LJ. 1206, 1216-17 (1992) (discussing the constitutional limits
on delegating government power to private groups, the seminal case on this point be-
ing Schechte, and noting that "American democracy traditionally is wary of delegating
policmaking tasks to private groups").
294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935).
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herself in the event that she does x? In other words, sovereignty nec-
essarily includes (at least in any government structure we can imag-
ine) control over the apparatus established by the State to enforce
promises. This is true even in our system which divides sovereignty
among various branches and levels of government precisely to avoid
the awesome nature of concentrated sovereign power. As Justice
Brandeis noted in Lynch v. United States,147 while the Court may hold
that Congress is bound to honor a particular promise, Congress may
always avoid that ruling, if not by open defiance of the Court, then by
withdrawing from it jurisdiction to decide whether any or some subset
of government promises are binding. Indeed, Congress or any other
nation-state48 could simply print more money when held liable for
149
contract damages. What would a court do then? For these reasons
alone, we reject the idea that the power to enter into binding con-
tracts is an incident of sovereignty in our country or anywhere else.'O
147 292 U.S. 571, 585 (1934).
148 The European Union may impede member nations from printing money at
will. See generally Brian K. Kurzmann, Challenges to Monetary Unification in the European
Union: Sovereignty Reigning Supreme, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 135, 149-52 (1994)
(discussing legal challenges focused on upholding national monetary sovereignty).
149 Even the plurality in Winstar conceded as much in the discussion of taxes. See
United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 881 (1996) (plurality opinion) ("[A] re-
quirement to pay [damages] supposes no surrender of sovereign power by a sovereign
with the power to contract.").
ISO Here our argument appears to run counter to international law. Consider, for
example, the following description of how international law treats the link between
sovereignty and the power to contract:
The state as a sovereign entity possesses the power to grant rights and bind it-
self to agreed [upon] terms. To permit a state to use its sovereignty to disre-
gard commitments that it freely undertook through the exercise of that very
sovereignty would be anomalous. Such a result would undermine and destroy
the legal framework of the international order.
Robert B. von Mehren & P. Nicholas Kourides, International Arbitrations Between States
and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 476, 518
(1981). Despite the absolute terms of this quote, however, international law does rec-
ognize that there are certain powers (rights of governments) that may not be bar-
gained away, generally referred to as "jus cogens," which literally translated means
'compelling law." Id. at 521. That exception appears to mirror our Court's essential
attributes to the sovereignty doctrine. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 888 (defining the re-
served powers doctrine as holding that "a state government may not contract away 'an
essential attribute of its sovereignty'"). More importantly, however, whatever the "let-
ter" of international law purports to dictate, the very nature of international law, such
that nations submit to it on a "voluntary" basis and employ that submission as a means
of establishing a reputation for trustworthiness, actually demonstrates the point we
make in the text instead of contradicting it. Indeed, the authors of the vehement lan-
guage quoted above conclude their article with the following reflections:
Arbitrations between private foreign investors and governments [to resolve al-
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Our claim is that the power to change the law, unlike the power to
contract, is critical to sovereignty in our political system and should
not be transferred to private entities. We have already suggested one
way in which regulatory contracts transfer law-making authority to pri-
vate groups by giving them the ability to control how much a change
in law will cost. That is not, however, the whole picture. Regulatory
contracts also make the private contracting parties to those contracts
co-equal partners with the government in the creation, interpretation,
and maintenance of public law. The legal regime promised in the
contract may be created by the contract itself, which means that the
private contracting party's acquiescence determines the law's content.
Or, if the contract merely promises to maintain in place for x years an
extant regulatory regime, then the private contracting party's acquies-
cence determines the law's duration. In addition to providing the pri-
vate contracting party with privileged control over the content and
duration of public norms, regulatory contracts also afford the private
contracting party control, not accorded other citizens, over the inter-
pretation of the law embodied in the contract. Does a particular act
violate the law of the contract? The practical significance of the legal
regime specified in the contract can only be determined by consider-
ing what the private party (and the government) intended when the
contract was formed. The private contracting party's understanding
of the reach of a law or regulation will thus be privileged above that of
other citizens. 51
leged contractual breaches by those governments] are not common events.
When disputes arise between them, they usually work outan arrangement or
reach an agreement in order to preserve the beneficial relationship. In in-
stances where the government expropriates or confiscates them foreign inves-
tor's assets.... the investor ... has generally attempted to negotiate a settle-
ment,... rather than pursue legal proceedings against the government. Such
proceedings can be laborious and time-consuming, and, even when successful,
may prove in the end to be hollow victories because of the difficulty of enforc-
ing thejudgments and awards that result (although ... refusals [by govern-
ments] to comply [with awards] are rare).
Von Mehren & Kourides, supra at 549. We wish to thank DetlevVagts for leading us to
this material.
151 Taking public law private by making it the subject of a regulatory contract has
important implications for the legitimacy of our legal system. Small, cohesive, volun-
tary groups (families, community groups, congregations of worshipers in a common
faith) create and maintain law by agreement-by discussing together what they stand
for and what actions are licensed and condemned by their shared principles. Robert
Cover called this method of creating and maintaining law "paideic." Cover, supra note
113, at 12-13. In the paideic world, law is legitimate precisely because it is personal:
law is not forced upon adherents, nor enforced against them; it is their law because
they embrace it, because they personally accept it. "Moreover, just as the law-receiver's
acceptance and understanding of the law is personal in the paideic world, the law's
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Our consideration of majoritarianism thus leads us to this conclu-
sion: Regulatory contracts are inconsistent with the norm of majori-
tarianism, the ideal of popular sovereignty, because they allow the past
to tax the particular policy choices of the present majority and be-
cause they transfer majority power into minority hands. Enforcement
of such contracts by the least majoritarian branch of our government,
the judiciary, cannot be justified by arguing that judicial interference
with the will of the present majority in the name of the contract
somehow furthers majoritarian goals.
52
We began, however, by conceding that constitutional entrench-
ment assumes that there are constitutional norms that are capable of
trumping majoritarianism. In other words, perhaps there are power-
ful normative justifications for a transition policy that assures people
ex ante that the government will compensate those adversely affected
by a change in government policy, or at least those to whom the gov-
ernment has made such an explicit promise. Certainly, broad sub-
stantive protection for sovereignty might be wrong if there are strong
acceptance and understanding of the individual is also personal." Koniak, supra note
110, at 593. In contrast to the paideic mode is the manner in which all levels of gov-
ernment in our nation create and maintain law-the imperial mode. When people are
not brothers, when interpersonal commitments are weak and normative and cultural
diversity abounds, law is enforced, not embraced. It is legitimate precisely because it is
impersonal, objective, impartial, and fair.
Regulatory contracts build state law on personal acceptance and leave its contours
to be determined on the basis of personal understanding and the intent of the con-
tracting parties. Personalizing the law of the state undermines both the state and its
law by suggesting that favoritism has replaced the imperial virtues of fairness and im-
partiality. There are paideic features in our legal system: the jury's power to nullify
law, the pardon power, prosecutorial discretion, and judicial control over sentencing.
Notice, however, that each of these institutions has been tamed, constrained, and lim-
ited by imperial devices. We not only prohibit instrucingjuries on their power to nul-
lify the law, we painstakingly instruct them on the details of the "objective" norms they
are to apply. Executives issue pardoning standards to govern how they exercise their
power. Prosecutorial discretion is also checked by self-imposed guidelines and by
statutory provisions like those in the Equal Access to Justice Act and ultimately (if not
robustly) by the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
laws. Judicial discretion in sentencing is reined in by sentencing guidelines and statu-
tory requirements. There is good reason for this tendency to make the paideic aspects
of public law more imperial. Law maintained in imperial mode is law that knows no
favorites. To move away from that notion toward a world of public law by private con-
tract is to risk undermining the legitimacy of the legal and political order in our di-
verse society.
152 It thus seems that those who argue that the institution ofjudicial review isjusti-
fled only in the name of majoritarian principle should reject the enforcement of any
regulatory contract. But seeMichaelJ. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 383,
412 (1997) (supporting majoritarian judicial review as well as a strong interpretation of
the Contract Clause).
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normative reasons to support the enforcement of regulatory contracts,
and even the procedural protections that we advocate may go too far
depending on the content of the normative objection.
V. No TRuMP
A. IsJudicialEnforcement of Regulatory Contracts Justified To Prevent
Unfair Surprise and Opportunistic Singling Out?
As both Michael Graetz and Louis Kaplow have explained in con-
sidering the question of compensating those harmed by the adoption
of new legal rules, the argument that fairness requires compensating
those who have relied on the old rule is circular.153 As Graetz put it
"IT]he argument asserts that people have a right to protection merely
because either they now expect such protection or they expected such
protection when they entered into a transaction; their expectations
allegedly create a right and their asserted rights legitimate their ex-
pectations."'5 He was not, however, speaking of expectations created
by contracts." One might argue that a party with a regulatory con-
tract is in a fundamentally different position: such a party's expecta-
tion is created by the contract, the government's promise, not
"merely" its own optimistic view that the government, which often (or
sometimes) in the past has provided compensation when it changes
the law, will do so in the future.
That difference, however, turns out to be illusory. The reason
that a private party's expectations created by a favorable contract
might be said to differ from the expectations created by the mere exis-
tence of a favorable non-contractual law is that under our current re-
gime, private contracting parties have a right to damages upon breach
but not upon repeal of the law.J If private parties entering into regu-
15 See Graetz, supra note 3, at 78 (stating that because of the uncertainty inherent
in the legislative process, "[i]ndividual reliance on the status quo simply will not suffice
as a basis for compensation"); Kaplow, supra note 3, at 606 (claiming that arguments
for compensation "are quite uncertain, cut in different directions, and are likely to be
high1y contingent on the circumstances").
MichaelJ. Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited; 98 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1823 (1985).
Kaplow, unlike Graetz, intended to include what we call regulatory contracts in
his analysis of legal transitions, see Kaplow, supra note 3, at 563-64 (explaining how the
Takings Clause and Contract Clause are related to transition policy), and thus pre-
sumably within his general rejection of fairness as a justification for compensating
those harmed by legal transitions. He did not, however, specifically address whether
contracts demand a different analysis.
156 Of course, the government's so-called promise not to take away the mortgage
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latory contracts had no legal right to damages upon breach, their ex-
pectations would be based on their belief that political forces would
operate to prevent the government from changing its policy. Of
course, private parties holding explicit contractual government prom-
ises could argue that "you gave us your word," which could not be said
by those merely disappointed by the government's failure to do as it
had done in the past. 15 7 They thus might estimate, quite accurately, a
high probability that the government would honor its commitments to
them. Before entering into the contract, however, they presumably
would understand that the government's willingness to honor its
commitments depends on a variety of factors following contract for-
mation and thus incorporates some degree of uncertainty.
What of those who miscalculate either because they fail to under-
stand that regulatory contracts are unenforceable in court or because
they underestimate the risk that the government will break its prom-
ise? The Supreme Court has consistently held that individuals who
rely on the word of government agents regarding what is lawful do so
at their own risk."' The Court has refused to bind the government to
interpretations of law or regulations offered outside of formal pro-
ceedings, notwithstanding how reasonable it might seem to an ordi-
nary American to assume that an IRS official, for example, could be
trusted as speaking for the government.159 While both the unsophisti-
cated and the sophisticated individual are likely to rely on the advice
of government agents and thus are subject to the rely-at-your-own-risk
rule, in general those who actually enter into regulatory contracts are
deduction is implicit, but so was the contractual promise upheld in Winstar. We be-
lieve that the more explicit the promise, the stronger all the arguments addressed in
this section for enforcing the contract become. Thus, throughout this discussion we
are assuming that our unmistakability approach, as opposed to the Supreme Court's
approach in Winstar, is in force.
However, as the recognition of relational contracts suggests, the expectations
created by past performance are sometimes rightly treated as the equivalent of an ex-
plicit promise.
IV SeeFederal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 381-86 (1947) (holding that
the government is not bound by interpretations of law provided to private parties by
administrative officials). For a more recent application of this principle, see Office of
Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990) (reiterating the holding of
Merrill while also admitting the possibility of estoppel against the government in ex-
treme cases). For a discussion of this line of cases, see Koniak, supra note 110, at 600
n.93 (reviewing the cases which demonstrate that the government is bound by the ad-
vice of its agents only in rare circumstances).
159 See Merrill, 332 U.S. at 381-86 (holding that the government's law-making power
will not be held hostage to the word of a government agent, however honestly given or
relied upon). It is interesting to note that the plurality in Winstar cited the dissent in
Merrillas if the majority opinion in that case had not been consistently followed.
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likely to be sophisticated players with ample access to legal counsel.
In short, if we do not reorder government authority in the interest of
being fair to those most likely to be ignorant of the formal legal rules,
we surely need not do so for those sophisticated enough to demand
the government's word in a writing ostensibly supported by mutual
consideration.64
While those with regulatory contracts are likely to be sophisti-
cated, at least in relation to those who might rely on the word of a
government agent as to the meaning of law, they are arguably more
vulnerable in one sense. When the government breaks its promise to
a particular industry, entity, or individual, after having induced per-
formance that confers some benefit on the government (the consid-
eration that underlies the contract), the fairness equation is arguably
quite different than when a court, an agency, or the legislature re-
nounces a legal interpretation offered by a government agent gratis,
or, for that matter, when the government changes a broad-sweeping
law (such as the Social Security law) that affects the public at large.
The prospect of opportunism is much greater in the regulatory con-
tract context than it is either when no particular benefit is conferred
on the government in exchange for its word (the advice situation) or
when a law of general application is changed or interpreted in some
new fashion (most legislative and many advice situations). 6' The in-
16 For a discussion of the wisdom of the first doctrine, see Koniak, supra note 110,
at 599-601 (discussing the implications of binding the government to the legal inter-
pretations provided by its agents, as well as the implications of binding the corpora-
tions who have sought the advice of those agents).
161 Indeed, under the pre-Winstar doctrine, the government's contractual obliga-
tions might be excused if they contravened subsequent regulation of a "public and
general" nature. As Justice Souter acknowledged in his Winstar plurality, this "public
and general" doctrine "reflects the traditional 'rule of law' assumption that generality
in the terms by which the use of power is authorized will tend to guard against its mis-
use to burden or benefit the few unjustifiably." United States v. Winstar Corp., 518
U.S. 839, 897 (1996) (plurality opinion). Justice Souter found that FIRREA was not
"public and general" regulation, however, because its impact upon "public con-
tracts -- that is, the alleged forbearance agreements between regulators and thrifts-
was not "merely incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental
objective," but rather was tainted with the government's self-interest in avoiding its
compensation commitments. Id. at 897. Justice Souter thus added an intent or
motivational element to the public and general doctrine. We question the utility of
any doctrine that turns on the generality of a new regulation (a difficult-to-assess
criterion) and the extent of governmental "self-interest" in the passage of new
regulation (an impossible-to-assess criterion). At any rate, it seems to us that FIRREA
did operate to advance the broad governmental objective of salvaging a banking
regulatory system, the laxness of which had resulted in a major banking crisis that
threatened the general economy and the welfare of many Americans.
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creased likelihood of government opportunism seems to explain why
the Court, in both the regulatory takings context and the regulatory
contracts context (at least before Winstar), was most likely to require
compensation when the new regulation adversely affected the few
rather than the many."'
We are not, however, persuaded that this argument justifies judi-
cial enforcement of regulatory contracts. First, although the party
holding a particular regulatory contract may be only a single person
or a few individuals or corporations, that does not mean that such an
entity cannot make its voice effectively heard in the political process.
The entities that enter into regulatory contracts invariably control im-
portant economic resources, and wealth magnifies voice in our politi-
cal system. Second, a private party who enters into a narrow regula-
tory contract (such as a contract which only affects that party) should
know ex ante that such contracts are more susceptible to opportunis-
tic breach than contracts that cover a large industry. Presumably, that
private party will adjust its expectations of the value of the contract
based on these political understandings. Hence, there is no "unfair
surprise" but only the assumption of political risk.
B. Does Economic Analysis Justify Judicial Enforcement of
Regulato2y Contracts?
In approaching the question whether a particular legal rule will or
will not enhance the net social welfare and thus be efficient or ineffi-
cient, economists conventionally assume that the relevant members of
the polity maintain stable preferences over time. This premise runs
counter to our assumptions about preferences, as reflected in our ear-
lier discussion of majoritarianism: we assume that preferences may
162 On some accounts, the Takings Clause should protect citizens against unfair
singling out or discrimination much as the Equal Protection Clause does in the con-
text of classifications accorded heightened scrutiny. SeeJoseph L. Sax, Property Rights
and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45
STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1454 n.102 (1993) (arguing thatJustice Stevens's dissent in Lucas
advances an equal protection perspective of the Takings Clause and maintaining that
"[t] here is an equal protection element in the Takings Clause");A Colloquium on Lucas:
Panel Discussion, 23 ENVIL. L. 925, 929 (1993) (comment of Michael Blumm, Profes-
sor) ("[T]he takings clause ought to be thought of as a kind of equal protection law for
property holders."). A court adopting this equal protection-type view of the Takings
Clause might find a taking where a government breached a regulatory contract with
one private entity while honoring identical or substantively similar contracts with other
entities. We would not necessarily disagree with such an approach because, as we have
said, we believe that constitutional norms such as equality, as advanced in our evolving
constitutional law, legitimately can take precedence over majoritarian concerns.
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change and, indeed, that public challenges to preferences regarding
public policy and the evolution of those preferences are essential to
any meaningful conception of democracy.
Even if we employed the standard economic assumption of stable
preferences over time, we would still believe thatjudicial enforcement
of regulatory contracts is unlikely to enhance net social welfare and
thus operate efficiently in the sense we are using that term." As a
preliminary matter, we recognize that a rule against judicial enforce-
ment of regulatory contracts does carry some social costs, which in
certain cases are quite large.64 Some regulatory contracts-in particu-
lar, the "pure" opportunism protection contracts discussed above' 6-
represent the most cost-effective way for society to achieve a particular
end that requires the cooperation of private parties. In the absence of
judicial enforcement and the additional protection it provides against
government opportunism, some private parties may be unwilling to
bear the risk of loss from government opportunism and thus may de-
cline to enter and fulfill socially beneficial regulatory contracts 6 6
On the other hand, there is good reason to doubt that regulatory
contracts will represent efficient solutions to perceived social prob-
163 For that reason we do not need to address the question whether and, if so,
when efficiency considerations might trump the majoritarianism concerns outlined
above. One of us, Susan Koniak, believes that no argument based on the purported
"efficiency" of a particular practice could justify political or legal practices as funda-
mentally inconsistentwith majoritarianism, as she perceives the enforcement of regula-
tory contracts. Moreover, she believes that no argument purporting to demonstrate
the "efficiency" ofjudicial enforcement of all regulatory contracts can be sustained.164 Indeed, one of us, David Dana, has analyzed at some length the possible costs
that result from the absence of a firm guarantee of compensation for costs resulting
from changes in natural preservation regulation. See David A. Dana, Natural Preserva-
tion and the Race To Develop, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 668-95 (1995) (discussing "the so-
cial costs of uncompensated natural preservation regulation"). Dana continues to ad-
here to that analysis, which suggests that some legal response to "the race to develop"
might be in order. Dana does not believe, however, that full insurance for regulatory
change by means of regulatory contracts is the appropriate legal response because: (1)
serious normative concerns weigh against the recognition of firm rights to full insur-
ance or compensation (whether those rights are based in contract law or the constitu-
tional law of takings); (2) a special exception for natural preservation regulation would
be difficult, although perhaps not impossible, tojustify and maintain; and (3) alterna-
tive means to a full compensation guarantee exist, such as ex ante or ex post partial
payments, by which government decision makers can curb "the race to develop." See
generally id.
166 See supra Part II.C (discussing opportunism protection in regulatory contracts).
As we have said, however, we believe that the reputational constraints on the
government as a repeat-player mean that it will generally abide by specific contractual
commitments even in the absence of any threat ofjudicial enforcement.
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lems-that is, solutions that yield greater social benefits than costs.'67
First, as discussed above, some regulatory contracts will simply reflect
capture. It is logical to assume that capture contracts are highly un-
likely to yield greater social benefits than costs.16s While the proce-
dural protections we advocated are designed to reduce the possibility
that capture contracts will be made (and subsequently enforced),
transparency is no guarantee against the formation of capture con-
tracts. In short, there is no foolproof method for a court ex post to
distinguish reliably which regulatory contracts are the product of cap-
ture as opposed to a reflection of honest compromise or a pure effort
167 One school of public choice scholarship depicts politicians as a-or perhaps
the-key interest group. According to this view, politicians extract favors or "rents"
from constituents by threatening to impose costly new regulations on them. See gener-
ally FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: PoLITcIANs, RENT EXTRACTION, AND
PoLrncAL EXTORTION (1997) (developing this thesis at length). Writing in this tradi-
tion and addressing the specific context of tax reform, Professors Ramseyer and Naka-
zato have argued that politicians will disfavor firm guarantees of compensation for
regulatory change because such guarantees limit their ability to threaten constituents
with costly, uncompensated regulatory change. Thus, Ramseyer's and Nakazato's
analysis suggests that regulatory contracts will constrain rent extraction by politicians,
and, for that reason, regulatory contracts are socially efficient. See Ramseyer & Naka-
zato, supra note 76, at 1175 (arguing that the ability of legislators to extract payments
from their constituents is dependent upon their ability to threaten changes in the law).
Even if one accepts the view of politicians as rent-extractors, the analysis offered by
Ramseyer and Nakazato is unpersuasive. For one thing, incumbent politicians may
rationally reject a strategy of successive "shake downs" of constituent groups because
those shake downs may eventually backfire. Rather than continuing to pay rents each
legislative cycle in order to avoid costly new regulations, constituent groups may throw
their support to political challengers. Moreover, even assuming incumbent politicians
do not face a re-election risk, there is no reason to believe that regulatory contracts
(and the protection against uncompensated regulatory change they provide) will result
in less net rent-extraction by politicians. Consider the case where the loss of a particu-
lar tax benefit would cost the industry $1 million in present value. Under these facts,
the industry would be willing to pay either (1) some amount approaching $1 million in
present value each year for 10 years to prevent the passage of a reform bill stripping
the industry of the tax benefit, or (2) some amount approaching $10 million for a
regulatory change for a term of 10 years. The total rents paid in either case would be
the same.
168 See Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Government Liability for Breach of Con-
tract 47-53, 61 (Sept. 15, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (argu-
ing, largely based on concerns about capture, that pre-Winstar doctrine, with its robust
procedural and substantive protections for sovereignty, was more efficient than the
Court's apparent re-reading of that doctrine in Winstar). We add an additional argu-
ment to those offered by Fischel and Sykes about the inefficiency of capture contracts.
To the extent that capture contracts are perceived as such-in other words, under-
stood at some point during their duration as the product of an industry's effective con-
trol of a government agency-and to the extent that costs are calculated to include
increasing cynicism about the nature of our democracy among those who view the con-
tract that way, capture contracts are never likely to yield greater gains than losses.
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to prevent opportunism by the government. That means any en-
forcement of regulatory contracts will necessarily entail the enforce-
ment of some inefficient deals.
On the other hand, as we have argued, strong procedural protec-
tions minimize the chance that capture contracts will be enforced.
Capture aside, there are still strong reasons to doubt the efficiency of
regulatory contracts. In other words, it is our claim that even those
regulatory contracts negotiated by independent, fair-minded govern-
ment agents, operating at arms-length from their contracting part-
ners, are likely to be inefficient. First, government agents are likely to
have insufficient information on which to base regulatory contract de-
cisions, which could lead to inefficient contracting. Second, regula-
tory contracts are likely to encourage private parties to engage in inef-
ficient investment by purchasing what amounts to full insurance
against the risk that the law will change. We address each of these
problems in turn.
There are two reasons to believe that government agents will have
inadequate information. First, private actors are more likely than
government actors to have accurate information by which to estimate
the risks (both long- and short-term) that the private actors' conduct
poses to the public, to the extent that such information is presently
available. Indeed, private actors might seek out and consummate
regulatory contracts precisely in those situations where they enjoy
such an informational advantage. In the language of economics, this
problem is known as adverse selection 69
Many aspects of the tobacco story illustrate the informational dis-
advantage that may plague the regulatory contract process. The deal
the tobacco companies put on the table provided for the release of
warehouses of information on what those companies knew, when they
knew it, and what they did.'70 Obviously then, when the contract was
being negotiated, the industry had information not available to gov-
ernment agents that helped it predict the likelihood of public support
for stricter industry regulation. The industry-proposed deal also de-
tailed marketing restrictions designed to reduce public, and particu-
169 For a discussion of how adverse selection can undermine an efficient insurance
market, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 3-4 (2d ed. 1995).
170 See Proposed Tobacco Settlement, June, 20, 1997, supra note 83, app. VIII
("Public Disclosure of Past and Future Tobacco Industry Documents and Health Re-
search").
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larly teenage, smoking.171 Undoubtedly, the information available to
the industry on the relationship between various forms of advertising
and the consumption of cigarettes by teens and others was vastly supe-
rior to that possessed by the government. Additionally, the deal in-
cluded penalty provisions to be paid by the industry in the event that
teen smoking was not reduced by specified percentages.ln Again the
tobacco companies possessed vastly superior information than the
government concerning the likely financial effect of the deal on their
financial operations. 73 Indeed, the government's information on
what the deal would actually cost the companies and on whether the
"penalty" provisions would provide the hoped-for incentives was well-
nigh nonexistent.1 74
When the government compensates private parties for losses in-
curred by changes in law either under the Takings Clause's mandate
to do so, by phasing-in a legal change, or by including a grandfather
provision in a law of general application, adverse selection is unlikely
to be a problem of major proportions." That is not to say that it is
generally efficient or good policy to provide such compensation. Both
Professors Graetz and Kaplow have made strong arguments against
the efficiency of transition relief even when adverse selection is not
likely to be a factor. 76 Our point here is that even if there are some
171 See id., tit. L.A ("Restrictions on Marketing and Advertising").
1 See id., tit. II (stating that "Look Back" Provisions/State Enforcement Incentives
provide that if specified reductions in underage smoking do not occur by target dates,
the FDA will "impose a mandatory surcharge" on the industry "based upon an ap-
proximation of the present value of the profit the industry would earn over the lives of
all underage users in excess of the target," not exceeding an annual cap for the ciga-
rette companies of $2 billion, which could be partially abated-up to 75%-if the
companies could show they fully complied with the Act).
SeeJon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for
Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE LJ. 1163, 1181-86 (1998) (emphasizing the
informational advantages of the tobacco industry and the consequent likely ineffec-
tiveness of the command-and-control regulatory restrictions embodied in the June 20,
1997 tobacco proposal); Shankar Vedantam, Tobacco Pact 's Effect on Profits Is Trade Secret,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 13, 1998, at A20 ("'No one outside of the [tobacco] industry can
predict precisely what will happen' [as a result of the settlement] .... Only the com-
panies 'know what will happen, how much cigarette sales will decline, how it will affect
revenues and share price.'") (quoting Kenneth Warner, a specialist on health policy at
the University of Michigan).
174 SeeVedantam, supra note 173, at A20 ("The precise balance of price and smok-
ing rates, with its implications for future markets and current stock prices, is a closely
guarded industry secret.").
17 See Kaplow, supra note 3, at 544 (noting that adverse selection is unlikely to oc-
cur when a law treats individuals in the same manner).
176 See Graetz, supra note 3, at 64-73 (arguing that transition relief prevents the im-
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situations, as Kaplow surely concedes, in which it might be efficient to
compensate private parties for changes in legal rules, regulatory con-
tracts are highly unlikely to reflect those situations because adverse se-
lection is particularly likely to be a problem.
The government's second informational problem is at least as se-
rious. Even if the government and the private party have identical in-
formation at the time of contract formation regarding the present
costs to the public of the private party's conduct, the government's
ability to assess the long-term costs and benefits of alternative future
policies will rarely, if ever, equal that of the private party. Even if we
assume that societal preferences remain stable, as we have already
done, however counterfactual and normatively problematic that as-
sumption is, the difficulty of calculating future societal benefits and
costs is still enormous. Not only are the utility curves of corporations
(and even individuals) simple compared to that of societies (and at
least in the case of corporations less likely to include preferences satis-
fled by "units" difficult to measure), but the number of variables that
might seriously affect the future net social utility of adhering to a cer-
tain policy is also staggering. Because government agents contract in
an extremely complex environment, the likelihood that they will re-
liably estimate the effects of all possible variables on the utility of fu-
ture adherence to a particular regulatory regime is extremely low.'7
Government agents, therefore, are very likely to make bad deals re-
gardless of how earnestly they try and whether or not at the time of
contract formation they and their private contracting partner share all
plementation of efficient government policies); Kaplow, supra note 3, at 615-16 (noting
that, as a matter of efficiency, compensation is an unwise policy).
177 For a discussion on decision making in complex environments-environments
in which the assumption that agents are aware of how imperfect their information is
and are capable of quantifying their own ignorance does not hold-see JOHN
GEANAKOPLOS & LARRY GRAY, WHEN SEEING FURTHER Is NOT SEEING BETTER (Cowles
Found. for Research in Econ. at Yale Univ. Paper No. 797, 1992). The authors con-
clude that in environments in which it is impossible to calculate with any degree of cer-
tainty the consequences of all possible actions, looking to the future is not likely to be
the best method of making decisions. In situations in which the normal assumption of
economic theory-that agents are aware of their own information deficits and are ca-
pable of quantifying their ignorance--does not hold, knowing more and searching
deeper in the decision tree is not the best method of making decisions. Geanakoplos
and Gray articulate five principles deduced from mathematical formulas (which we do
not profess to follow) for optimal decision making in such environments. In sum, they
conclude that only when all the error probabilities are very small does it make sense to
base decisions on the values one assigns to the terminal nodes in a complex decision
tree. Our point is that this condition is not likely to be met in the context of assessing
the costs and benefits of future adherence to a particular government policy.
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known facts&
78
In addition to the information problems, regulatory contracts are
likely to create inefficient behavioral incentives because they remove
the incentive for the private contracting parties to hedge against the
possibility that the regulatory policies "frozen" into place by the regu-
latory contract are (or will turn out to be) socially detrimental and
that ultimately, the government will realize as much and change
them.17 Consider, for example, a regulatory contract that promised
an industry immunity from tort suits for a certain kind of injury, like
that caused by second-hand smoke, for the next twenty-five years in
exchange for a lump-sum payment to the government or some other
form of consideration. Assume, however unlikely, that at the time of
contract formation the tobacco industry and the government have
identical information on the hazards of second-hand smoke. Over the
term of the contract, however, the industry becomes increasingly
aware that the range and severity of illnesses caused by second-hand
smoke are much greater than previously thought and that the ventila-
tion systems previously believed to be effective are ineffective.
In the absence of a governmental promise to pay full compensa-
tory damages resulting from the enactment of a law or regulation end-
ing the companies' tort immunity, the tobacco industry would have a
greater incentive to act promptly to reduce the societal costs associ-
ated with its product. The industry might, for example, invest in de-
veloping cigarettes that disperse less smoke and thus cause less sec-
ond-hand illnessl °s Notice that a law that eliminated tort liability
would not have the same effect on incentives as a regulatory contract
because if the law were repealed, the industry would be required to
pay tort damages without compensation from the government.""
178 The complexity of determining social efficiency affects all government decision
making, but in the noncontractual and ordinary legislation and regulation settings,
government decision makers can correct mistakes once they realize them, without pay-
ing fines.
17 Here our argument largely tracks that of Professor Kaplow, supra note 3, at 527-
32 (arguing that the efficient level of investment is generally that where the investor
bears all real costs and benefits of his decision).
180 See Hanson & Logue, supra note 173, at 1268 (arguing that incentive-based
regulation is superior to command-and-control regulation in that it forces the industry
to take precautions).
1 One could make precisely the same argument using the Winstar example of ag-
gressive lending by thrifts. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the govern-
ment thrift regulators were not "captured," but rather truly believed that the forbear-
ance policies represented sound public policy. Let us also assume that the bank
mergers the regulators wished to facilitate were, at least from the vantage of that mo-
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If, instead of full compensation, regulatory contracts were en-
forced by payments of partial compensatory damages, they might pro-
duce, at least in theory, a socially optimal solution, as we suggested in
our discussion of liquidated damages. A guarantee of partial damages
might be enough to induce the desired private-party behavior: the
bank mergers thought socially desirable by the regulators in Winstar,
the lump-sum payments to fund government projects some govern-
ment actors thought desirable in negotiating the tobacco deal, or the
limits on advertising to teens some thought would produce significant
social benefits. At the same time, failing to fully compensate the pri-
vate contracting party upon government breach would reduce that
party's incentives to ignore the risks that its behavior might cause
harm not taken into account by the government at the time of con-
tract formation. 'sn Partial damages are, however, not a standard rem-
edy in contract law. Courts will award them only if ex ante the parties
specified a partial damages formula or numerical limit in the contract.
In order to specify a damages formula or limit, however, the govern-
ment would need to know fairly accurately the risks that might result
from the private contracting party's post-contractual conduct. Gov-
ernment ignorance or at least highly imperfect information in this re-
gard seems to us, to put it mildly, a much more plausible assumption.
C. Would Refusing to Enforce Regulatory Contracts Destabilize
"Ordinary" or "Routine" Government Contracting?
In explaining its decision to ignore the entrenching effects of a
judicially enforceable damages remedy for regulatory contracts, the
plurality in Winstar expressed concern that there is no way to distin-
ment, reasonable efforts to shore up a troubled financial system and thus in the public
interest. It was not the case that the regulators were simply hoodwinked. But let us
also assume that, at the time they entered the regulatory contracts, the banks who
agreed to the mergers had better information than the regulators about the default
risks that would be involved in maintaining aggressive post-merger lending policies,
and, in addition, over time the banks became increasingly aware of these risks while
the regulators remained essentially in the dark.
In this scenario, in the absence of a guarantee of full compensatory damages, the
banks might have engaged in somewhat conservative post-merger lending and reserves-
building with the hope that this cautious behavior would reduce or eliminate the risk
of regulators imposing new reserves requirements. That caution might have translated
into fewer bad loans and, hence, fewer defaults, with all the negative externalities they
entail. Whatever societal benefits were achieved by the bank mergers through the
regulatory contracts may well have been outweighed by the social costs of the aggres-
sive lending that the regulatory contracts induced.
18 See supra text accompanying notes 106-07 (discussing liquidated damages provi-
sions).
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guish contracts that infringe sovereignty, which we have been calling
regulatory contracts, from the unproblematic, everyday procurement
and other ordinary-seeming business contracts that all governments
make. According to Justice Souter, there is no principled way to dis-
tinguish between such ordinary "business" contracts and regulatory
contracts because any line one might draw would lead to "enormous
analytical difficulties" and would defy "any limiting principle."83
Souter's concerns notwithstanding, it seems relatively straightfor-
ward to distinguish regulatory contracts from other types of contracts.
Regulatory contracts contain a promise not to change a specified gov-
ernment policy; nonregulatory contracts contain no such promise. It
is that simple. The Winstar plurality hints at the claim that there may
be many cases where it is difficult to decide whether a particular
agency action or a legislation embodies a regulatory contract. The
plurality, however, identifies no examples of such hard cases, and we
are not aware of any.
1 8 4
This is not to say that Souter was imagining analytical difficulties
that do not exist. As we have said, the Court's pre-Winstar efforts to
protect sovereignty by picking and choosing which government pow-
ers could be the subject of enforceable contracts and which could not
was incoherent. They were incoherent because no rhyme or reason
183 Justice Souter makes this point in the context of explaining his abandonment of
the unmistakability doctrine and other procedural requirements for the enforceability
of regulatory contracts. See United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 886 (1996) (plural-
ity opinion) (noting the difficulty of distinguishing "those contracts that are 'regula-
tory' in nature" from those that are not). As we have explained, these procedural re-
quirements function to promote political transparency, which we believe would be a
good thing in "ordinary" government contracts as well as in the less-than-ordinary
regulatory contracts at issue in Winstar. Indeed, by statute, most ordinary public con-
tracts, such as procurement contracts, already must satisfy a wide range of transpar-
ency-enhancing procedural requirements.
One potentially problematic type of "deal" (typified by the deal at issue in
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)) is that in which a government
borrows money and, as a condition of receiving the money, promises to maintain cer-
tain government policies or else to forfeit the right to continue the loan. Such deals,
although falling within the debt contract category for which we would generally advo-
catejudicial enforcement, also contain characteristics of what we have termed regula-
tory contracts and implicate some of the concerns we have raised regarding such con-
tracts (such as taxing future majorities' policy choices and transferring control over
public policy to private parties). Therefore, we would include such deals within the
universe of contracts that we believe courts should not enforce. In any event, notwith-
standing the centrality of the United States Trust case to contemporary regulatory con-
tracts jurisprudence, we have found no instance of the federal government borrowing
money in exchange for a promise to keep a particular policy in force, and, to our
knowledge, state and local governments do not normally borrow money by making
such policy promises either.
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seemed to distinguish those powers on the no-contract list from those
on the free-to-contract list; even predicting which power the Court
would decide was implicated by a particular contract was no easy
task. "1 Thus, the plurality in Witar had reason to bemoan the ana-
lytical difficulties, or rather the analytical emptiness, of previous ef-
forts in this area.
While we thus have some sympathy for the Winstar plurality's cri-
tique of past doctrine, its proposed alternative-the enforcement of
all regulatory contracts except those in which awarding damages
would be tantamount to specific performance-is hardly an improve-
ment. First, other than contracts in which the government promises
to maintain a specified tax deduction, rate, or interpretation, the plu-
rality tells us nothing about what else, if anything, its line intends to
proscribe. More important, the analytical justification for the line is
weak as it depends on the plurality's assertion that the only infringe-
ments on sovereignty worthy of concern are those that directly forbid
the government from taking a particular action. The plurality's line
leads to the ludicrous result that contracts promising a specified tax
treatment for those investing in the inner city would be unenforce-
able, but contracts promising to compensate six multinational corpo-
rations for all lost business caused by the government's breach of its
promise not to engage in military operations in twenty specified coun-
tries would be enforceable as not unduly infringing upon our nation's
sovereign prerogatives.
The analytical challenge for us is whether our line reasonably
tracks the problems we have identified with the enforcement of regu-
latory contracts. Are the entrenchment and transfer-of-power prob-
lems that condemn regulatory contracts equally present in govern-
ment contracts that fall outside our line, specifically those that do not
1s One might argue that this unpredictability in the pre-Winstar regulatory takings
law had some significant benefits. An uncertain entitlement to full compensation for
regulatory change may, for the private party to a contract, be the economic equivalent
to a firm entitlement to partial compensation for regulatory change, which, in sub-
stance, is the same thing as partial insurance. Thus, under a regime of uncertain enti-
tlements to full compensation for contract breaches, private parties might act as they
would under a partial insurance regime, which, as we have explained, may be optimal
under conventional economic analysis. The problem with this argument, however, is
that to be optimal, partial insurance must be partial in a manner that reflects the abil-
ity of the private party to minimize the risk-being "partial" in and of itself is not suffi-
cient.
186 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 880 (commenting that agreements for tax exemptions
impermissibly limit the scope of "sovereign authority").
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promise a specified legal regime?'8 7 In that case, the logic of our posi-
tion would force us to reject the enforcement of all government con-
tracts, which is precisely the result Souter sought to avoid.
18 8
First, all regulatory contracts strongly implicate entrenchment
concerns because, by their very design, they tax particular policy
choices facing future government decision makers. That is not true of
the other contracts governments enter. Commitments to spend
money to procure some good or service, pay a debt, or insure against
a risk outside the control of government policymakers (like govern-
ment contracts with individuals to provide flood insurance) do not tax
particular policy choices to be made by future legislators in the same
way as regulatory contracts. For example, if in 2000 the government
commits to pay bondholders $1 million in 2030, that commitment
does not make any particular policy choice more or less expensive in
2030, although it certainly may affect the range of policy options open
to legislators. 89
Second, at least as to regulatory contracts that lack liquidated
damages clauses (to our knowledge, historically all of them), regula-
tory contracts empower private contracting parties to drive up the cost
of future regulatory changes. This results not only in a fortification of
the entrenching effect of these contracts but also in a transfer of con-
trol over policy choices from the government to private hands. Again,
187 Our functional concerns about regulatory contracts-that they entail a kind of
anti-majoritarian legislative entrenchment and that they may unduly empower private
actors-are strongest in the case of long-term, indefinite, or multi-year regulatory con-
tracts and least strong in the case of regulatory contracts designed to last, for example,
only a few months. It might be plausible to argue that the government decision mak-
ers are entitled to bind the government for the next few months, if not until the next
legislative term, and that this contract duration is simply too short for the private con-
tracting party to manipulate the magnitude of government liability for breach. Pre-
cisely because short-term regulatory contracts provide little protection against political
change, however, we expect that parties will rarely, if ever, enter into them.
See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 886 (stating the Court's unwillingness to subject all gov-
ernment contracts to unmistakability litigation).
189 We do not mean to suggest that every imaginable procurement (or other non-
regulatory) contract would constrain future government decision making to a lesser
degree than every imaginable regulatory contract; that would be an implausible claim.
We are proceeding on the basis of generalizations about certain legal categories of
contracts because any legal rule short of "enforce everything" or "enforce nothing"
requires the use of (one hopes helpful, but inherently imperfect) generalizations.
Moreover, we do not claim that our proposed legal regime would eliminate all en-
trenchment or otherwise objectionable government action or would be "ideal" in any
meaningful sense. What we do claim-and what we think is a pragmatic criterion for
any reform proposal-is that our proposed legal regime would be normatively superior
to the one that currently exists.
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the other sorts of contractual commitments made by governments do
not similarly empower private parties because, as a general matter, the
outer limit of the government's potential monetary liability is set and
publicly understood at the time of contract formation 9 In the pro-
curement and debt context, for example, the government's liability
normally cannot exceed the full purchase price of the goods or the
face value of the debt instruments, no matter what strategic actions
the contracting private parties take.
Finally, while our argument does not proceed on efficiency
grounds, we believe that the enforcement of debt, procurement, and
insurance-for-external events contracts is more likely to be efficient
than the enforcement of what we have called regulatory contracts.
Debt, procurement, and insurance-for-external events contracts are
less likely than regulatory contracts to involve severe informational
problems for the government.19' Procurement contracts generally are
designed to span a relatively short period of time, requiring less com-
plicated calculations as to what the future is likely to bring. Debt con-
tracts do not require many, if any, calculations involving units of utility
that are difficult to measure, and the variables likely to affect the costs
and benefits of providing something like flood insurance are relatively
simple compared to those involved in regulatory contracts. As to the
moral hazard problem, partial insurance is not only standard but also
relatively simple to calculate in government insurance contracts for
matters other than changes in legal rules. Furthermore, government
procurement contracts routinely include (as required by statute) ter-
mination-for-convenience provisions that function like partial insur-
ance.'92 Finally, because it is true that capture is a serious problem, at
190 The United States Constitution specifically authorizes the federal government
to enter into both contracts for the sale of tangible government property and land and
debt contracts. This constitutional imprimatur further distinguishes these sorts of con-
tracts from regulatory contracts.
1 We read the work of Kaplow and especially Fschel and Sykes as reaching the
same conclusion as we do. See Kaplow, supra note 3, at 615 (arguing that governmental
transition relief is generally undesirable, and reliance on the market to address the
effects of changes in government policy is more efficient); Fischel & Sykes, supra note
168 (arguing that pre-Winstar doctrine, with its robust procedural and substantive pro-
tections for sovereignty, was more efficient than the Court's apparent re-reading of
that doctrine in Winstar).
1W For example, imagine that the government enters into a procurement contract
that provides for the purchase of military planes from a private company each year for
the next 30 years. In the absence of a termination-for-convenience clause, the com-
pany would have little reason to take account of the risk that the perceived need for
the military planes might diminish during the 30-year period. The termination-for-
convenience clause might induce the company to take account of that risk by, for ex-
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least in the case of procurement contracts, we advocate procedural
protections designed to reduce capture in the formation of all gov-
ernment contracts 9
Regulatory contracts are different from the other types of con-
tracts governments enter. Judicial doctrine for many years tried, how-
ever imprecisely, to attend to those differences. The intuition that in-
spired that doctrinal struggle was correct. The pre-Winstar doctrine
was messy and at times weak. Admittedly, it required clarification and
stronger enforcement, but the trajectory of this doctrine should have
been preserved. The Court signaled a change in direction in Winstar.
It needs to turn back.
CONCLUSION
In the second century A.D., to become emperor of Rome, one
needed to win the consent of the Praetorian guard both as a practical
matter and, at least according to the Praetorians, as a matter of consti-
tutional law.'9 4 To guarantee the continued support of the Praetori-
ans, emperors, after their selection, lavished money and other benefits
upon the guard; later, the tradition of paying the Praetorians for their
support became a legal requirement 95 In 193 A.D., convinced that
they should receive the best price "for so valuable a commodity" as
their consent, some of the guards decided on a new procedure.'9
6
One of the Praetorians "ran out upon the ramparts; and, with a loud
voice, proclaimed that the Roman world was to be disposed of to the
best bidder by public auction.' 97 They sold the throne. Although all
in Rome understood that the guards were routinely and lavishly paid
by emperors with public money and thus in some sense understood
that public money was necessary to maintain this institution, Gibbon
ample, funding an ongoing research program exploring potential commercial uses for
military production equipment and aircraft.
193 At both the state and federal level, there are many statutory and regulatory re-
quirements in place to limit corruption in government procurement. See generally W.
NOEL KEYES, GOvERNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL AcQUISITON
REGULATIONS (1996).
194 See 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECuNE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 92 (1932)
("The advocates of the guards endeavoured to justify by arguments, the power which
they asserted by arms; and to maintain that, according to the purest principles of the
constitution, their [referring to the Praetorian guard] consent was essentially necessary
in the appointment of an emperor.").
195 See id. (noting the tendency of an emperor to praise, flatter, and indulge the




states that "[t]his infamous offer... diffused a[] universal grief,
shame and indignation throughout the city."19s What, however, did
the auction change? In effect, sovereignty had been for sale long be-
fore this offer, albeit in a form that allowed the Romans to deny that
reality.
The point of this paper is simple: We should not wait until the
ongoing auctioning of our government-the auctioning not merely of
laws subject to change by popular will, but rather of the underlying
law-making authority itself-becomes so blatant and pervasive that it is
no longer possible to sustain the conviction that the imperfections in
our democracy have not consumed the ideal. We should act now.
198 Id.
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